







# MENTAL HYGIENE

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## BOOK REVIEW SUPPLEMENT

### ANNOUNCEMENT

JOURNALS consist of sections, and the space to be devoted to any one section must of necessity be limited. This frequently is a cause of editorial embarrassment as the material available at times exceeds the space that can be allotted. The increase of activities in the field of mental hygiene, for example, exceeded some time ago the reportorial possibilities of the Notes and Comments section of MENTAL HYGIENE. This situation was met by the establishment of a new monthly publication, the *Mental Hygiene Bulletin*. The limits it has been necessary to place upon the Book Review section of MENTAL HYGIENE has frequently made it difficult to give adequate consideration to the current literature in mental hygiene and closely allied fields that appears in book form. Many books require but a brief notice. On the other hand, certain books that appear during the course of each year deserve careful critical analysis and discussion. In order to make possible the presentation of such critical discussions and the consideration of a larger number of books, the present Book Review Supplement has been planned. We should like to make the supplement an annual publication. This we cannot promise, but if the present experiment proves useful, provision for an annual publication may be found.

## A CRITIQUE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS\*

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Dr. John MacCurdy's *Problems in Dynamic Psychology* is for many reasons a book of considerable significance for psychoanalysis in America. It is written by one whose experience in psychiatry has given him a position of authority and who has for years identified himself with psychoanalysis. The work itself is remarkable in that it contains one of the few criticisms of Freud that is based on conscientious study and it is executed with an honesty rarely found in our native critics. The criticisms are for the most part devoid of rhetorical tricks; the author's purpose not being to subvert or prejudice the reader, he uses none of the common devices to that end. We hear no cries of outraged sensibility over the crassness of Freud's views; there is no attempt at humorous, but totally irrelevant analogies; and though the author sometimes deplores Freud's seemingly enormous sins against common sense, he has the discretion not to make the reader feel that the public is a proper forum for the dispute of technical questions. Since these faults have been more or less characteristic of criticisms of psychoanalysis in this country, we have in the very fact of their avoidance something for which to be grateful. The book is likewise remarkable for its original content. The author is singularly free from the predominant tendency of the "American school of psychopathology" to construct systems of hurried completeness, in which psychology, neurology, physiology, and chemistry are thrown together into fantastic and uncheckable theories, and through whose burdensome terminology we wade only to find truisms at the end. There is, in short, no "neurologizing" and no "physiologizing". The author's

\* PROBLEMS IN DYNAMIC PSYCHOLOGY; A CRITIQUE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AND SUGGESTED FORMULATIONS. By John T. MacCurdy, M.D. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1922. 383 p.

basis remains throughout a psychological one, and he has that much in common with the Freudian position.

But in the constructive portions of the book, he makes such wide departures in approach to material and methodological pursuit, and his conclusions are so remote from his premises, yet woven into a theory of such remarkable seductiveness, that the book deserves the closest scrutiny. It finally represents a remarkable experiment; it is the history of an effort to restate the facts of clinical psychiatry by renouncing some of Freud's most essential data, with what success we shall see.

The author's avowed purpose in writing the book is to take out of psychoanalytic theory what he believes to be durable, to supplement it with other material, and then to recast it into a complete and well-established body of knowledge. The material that he expects to add can hardly be called new; it may be considered an effort to incorporate the theories expounded chiefly by Trotter and Rivers. The result is quite confusing. In so far as the book is intended as a critique of psychoanalysis with suggested formulations, it behooves us to examine whether the criticisms are based upon such understanding of Freud as is consistent with the best practice, whether care has been taken to preserve the Freudian connotations, and finally whether the objections are in themselves internally consistent—whether what is rejected is consistent with what is accepted.

One cannot avoid the impression that in comparison with the loudness of the author's invectives against Freud, his criticisms themselves sound rather thin. They are often itemized, detached, founded at times upon garbled versions of the original, and their significance to the whole subject is never demonstrated. Most of the "inconsistencies" are created by the author's tying of dialectic knots. One is especially irritated at the damaging use he makes of his misunderstandings and by his attempt to obscure real issues by raising irrelevant questions. He objects, for example, that in a discussion of sex Freud has nothing to say about altruism, its origin, development, and influence on other factors of dynamic psychology. This hardly differs from the criticism recently advanced that Freud insufficiently takes into account "environment", because this word occurs only six times in all his works.

One is likewise irritated at MacCurdy's repeated presumptions on the reader's ignorance, and at his frequent use of dogmatic assertions, when he feels that his dialectic has failed. Moreover, when he attempts, in lieu of a rejected explanation, to substitute one of his own, the effect is exceedingly feeble. For one who complains so bitterly of Freud's anthropomorphism and weakness as a logician, the author himself is guilty of some pretty loose reasoning and not a few inconsistencies of methodological approach to material. He accepts for constructive purposes material so questionable and so isolated from the experiential point of view, and so weak from the logical, that we cannot but feel that he has overstated his claim. One feels a hurried and breathless quality about the book, as if one were being argued and urged to certain conclusions and beliefs rather than quietly convinced.

Let us examine first his criticism of the theory of narcissism. In the first place, it should be stated that neither the concept nor the term narcissism was originated by Freud. The term was first used by P. Näcke and H. Ellis independently, to describe a perversion in which the individual treats his own body as a sexual object and is indeed in love with himself. MacCurdy objects to its use by Freud on the ground that it was introduced into psychoanalysis, not for essential reasons, but for logical ones merely, since it allows one to "pan-sexualize human psychology". He objects chiefly to the concept of "ego libido", fully accepting that of auto-erotism. He makes it clear that auto-erotism can go on without any consciousness of self, and before the time when the self becomes clearly differentiated from the mass of internal and external stimuli that strike the larval consciousness of the infant. However, if they manifest themselves after this "self" is differentiated from the environment, they still have an "independent existence". (This we take to mean that they are motivated by the ego, but are in no way attached to it.) In other words, auto-erotism never acquires a psychic superstructure. Why, then, should we regard auto-erotic activities as efforts to gratify libido, and whence, once self-consciousness is established, does the urge for repeating them come? The self, which registers these pleasurable stimuli, never gets to realize that its body is a source of pleasure, and to esteem it



accordingly, but it may do so in the case of some outside object. "When we say that the object of the libido is the body of the subject, that is auto-erotism. The libido become narcissistic when it is occupied with the worship and affection of the subject's own personality. But this personality to which the narcissist is attached is probably his 'ego ideal', and since the ego ideal is a social product, it implies object love."

This argument has the following implications: that the development of self-consciousness makes no change in the character and goal of activities which were prior to that time auto-erotic; that while it can take external objects and esteem them for their pleasure-giving qualities, it can never have the same regard for itself as a source of pleasure; and that the qualities of narcissistic libido must be derived from the characteristics of the personality as it is viewed by the subject himself. The latter statement would of course be true and valid if we did not accept the hypothesis of unconscious mentation. If ego libido were a fact, is there any convention of speech or thought that could express it? If it is not a conventional idea, why look for its manifestation in what the subject says? Why make a special case of the perversion of narcissism, where the self-love is expressed, and why are not the rudiments to be found in all? Why, if in a case of manifest narcissism there are auto-erotic practices, should they be thrown out of the picture, on the basis of a belief that they may have an "independent existence"? The facts must evidently be made to fit the theory. The first two implications will be considered presently.

Not only is the theory of narcissism untenable, but the clinical observations intended to confirm it are wrong, according to MacCurdy. The following argument is one that does no credit to the author and demonstrates the damaging use he makes of his fallacious reasoning. Freud postulates a withdrawal of libido from the outer world in dementia praecox, and a turning of this libido on to the ego, manifesting itself in the delusion of grandeur. A withdrawal of libido also takes place during sleep; hence we should expect during sleep to have frequent dreams of grandeur. The implication is that since this does not occur, the observation concerning praecox patients must be wrong. This is something of a travesty; but the fact does remain that in the dream the ego is represented as suc-

cessful, though it be not dressed up in the trappings of royalty. In that sense we do have frequent dreams of grandeur in that our purposes are carried out, and the ego is victorious. MacCurdy then represents Freud as speaking of the transformation of object libido into ego libido, not as a change of goal brought about by a regression. Again, the apathy of the praecox patient cannot result from withdrawal of libido, because "narcissism implies contact with the world, and what breaks contact with the world cannot be narcissism".

The real explanation of these phenomena is, according to MacCurdy, to be found in the following considerations: The apathy of the dementia-praecox patient is merely the manifestation of a most universal phenomenon of nature, a change from activity to inactivity. "The amoeba who withdraws its pseudopodia is not lost in admiration of his greatness; he is simply taking a nap. Psychologically, the process is identical with introversion, and introversion can account equally well for the symptoms of dementia praecox. Biologically considered, this resting phase is an adaptation related to self-preservation; it should, therefore, in Freud's nomenclature be classified as a reaction of egoism rather than narcissism." Well, really! We defer criticism. From all this it is apparent that the transformation of object libido into ego libido is untenable. Furthermore, "Freud has indicated that repression is strong in dementia praecox, but repression being an exclusion from consciousness of libidinous ideas repulsive to the ego ideal, there is no condition in which repression is so 'weak' as in dementia praecox. Clinical experience shows that the attention of the praecox is fixed on fantasies, and it is only the nature of these thoughts that can give us any real evidence as to the goal and type of the libido." We must evidently take the praecox patient at his word; if his libido were really on himself, he should so declare it. We wonder what interpretation the author would give the fantasy occasionally found in praecox patients, to the effect that they are having intercourse with themselves; or how he would explain the delusion of a paraphrenic doctor who insisted that heterosexual relations were quite unnecessary for propagation—that both males and females could fertilize themselves. These would probably

have to be made special cases. He persists in talking about auto-erotism in "pure" form, and feels that cases that show truly narcissistic features are "arrested cases", whatever that may mean. What factors determine the process of introversion, the reader is left to guess. The author gets out of the problem of how to retain the concept of auto-erotism without that of narcissism by including the connotation of the latter in the former, and then denying the existence of the latter. And in so doing he has failed to grasp the Freudian interpretation of auto-erotism. The concept of narcissism in MacCurdy's formulations is crowded partly into that of ego reaction, partly into that of auto-erotism.

Further on the author tells us that true hypochondria does not occur in patients suffering from dementia praecox; when it does occur, it is probably a coincidence and has no more to do with the essential disease than when it exists in conjunction with a compulsion neurosis. He is likewise skeptical as to the rectum's being the organ with a passive-masochistic goal. The absurd remarks of the praecox patient are due to his diminished regard for reality. "A psychoneurotic giving a series of free associations to the word 'stick' may produce a series of ideas between which a logical connection is discernible. The dementia-praecox patient, however, is apt to go directly to the latent phallic idea; in fact he is apt to make such a statement as 'a stick is a penis'. His regard for reality is so slight that he can use the words 'stick', 'penis', or 'sword' interchangeably. In this way delusions appear, or if the thoughts be sufficiently vivid, they are hallucinated." We are finally told that the seclusiveness of the dementia-praecox patient is an evidence of a constitutionally weak "herd instinct". Though we take the author at his word that these are only "suggested formulations", what do they teach us about the psychogenesis of dementia praecox, and is there any consistency of approach to all these deductions about the disease? Is there, moreover, any connection between all these explanations? What has the biological "rest period" to do with the obstinate "disregard for reality" and the weakness of the "herd instinct"? Each of these characteristics is ascribed on the basis of some analogy, but we fail to get even a hint of any dynamic process within the patient himself to

account for the phenomena of the disease process. And although MacCurdy states that in the productions of the insane the central theme or plot is some version of the *Œdipus* complex, its place in his system is formal and perfunctory.

We fail, moreover, to see how he can accept what he does of Ferenczi's description of the development of the sense of reality and Burrow's primary subjective phase, and yet reject the theory of narcissism as unproved. Although Ferenczi's ideas stand only in the relation of a corollary to the theory, it is an essential one. One of MacCurdy's criticisms of Ferenczi is thoroughly sound: his interpretation of the "mother-body" fantasy as an "elaboration, in works of imagination, dreams, and delusions, of knowledge gained after the stage of development to which they are assigned in the final production" is highly probable. But his acceptance of Burrow's primary subjective phase is paradoxical. Let us see how he explains unconscious homosexuality: "This is merely an extension into adult life of the primary identification [with the mother in her solicitude for himself], and a psychoneurosis is merely a state of heightened subjectivity. The neurotic is dominated by this primary identification, and unconscious homosexuality is incidental to a neurosis." He holds that such consciousness as the child does enjoy at first is in the form of unity with his mother; hence his first efforts at objectivation follow the line of the mother's solicitude to himself, and he regards his own body as a love object, just as does his mother. With weaning, he is thrown back on himself, and his body becomes the insistent object of his interest. We must still believe that this is not love of himself, his own body being the object; rather he is enacting the part of his mother. That this is a possible mechanism there is no doubt, but it would begin to operate at a period when the ego is sufficiently defined to identify itself with the mother, and not at a time when, as MacCurdy constantly insists, the self does not exist in a form sufficiently concrete to make it a possible object. This is an anthropomorphic argument, but evidently a sin only when Freud is the guilty one. Throughout the book we hear much about this anthropomorphism. This is a very long word and it means simply this: when you see a man laugh and you draw the conclusion that he is amused, you are guilty of anthropomorphism.



It is a type of reasoning based on the premise that there is a community of experience on which you can assign similar effects to similar causes, and is in fact a projection of one's own consciousness on to some one else. Naturally this method is likely to be fallacious where this premise is falsely assumed, as, for example, if you attribute anger to a tree because one of its branches falls and strikes you (animism), or when, upon the basis of your own experience, you draw conclusions about those who are living under a different convention or in a different stage of development, as in the case of animals, children, or primitive people.

All these facts with regard to the development of the sense of reality and narcissism can be correlated in the following manner, on the basis of data gathered by observation of children and the insane. The child is born with a certain capacity to appreciate stimuli and with a limited number of responses resident within its very anatomical structure. Some of these have already functioned *in utero*, such as fetal movements; others are initiated immediately after birth—i.e., breathing and the nutritive and excretory functions. As yet there is no consciousness; and it is not unlikely that at first the child reacts only to stimuli that disturb a state of equilibrium which may be designated as rest. These stimuli may be endogenous or exogenous, and their constant recurrence, followed by the restoration of the state of rest or satisfaction, gives the infant the first appreciation of quality, pain or pleasure. A certain group of stimuli are likely to be more persistent and regular in their recurrence, and these are connected with the oral, anal, and genital zones, and it is at these sites that pleasure is first recognized. Whatever pleasure is associated with the functions connected with these zones we call auto-erotic.

From the conative side, the child does not as yet recognize itself as an entity apart from anything in its environment; in other words, its ego is as yet limitless. When it begins to appreciate that there are objects separated from itself by space, the self of the child begins to acquire definite limitations, and with it the consciousness of a constant and unchangeable unity. This larval consciousness cannot at first consist of more than the organization of painful and pleasurable qualities, and the first problem of adaptation begins to be

the differentiation of endogenous from exogenous stimuli, the demarcation of the self from the not-self, so to speak. While it appears to the individual with a fully developed consciousness a self-evident or immanent fact that the various parts of the body are integral parts of the body, this must be the result of a long synthesis. It is likely that when the infant is first able to appreciate objects as such, it regards its own members as parts of the outside world. The knowledge that its hand is a part of its own self is created only by a series of integrations, tactile and muscular, and an appreciation of movement or motion. Moreover, it is likely that the infant is able to appreciate itself as an entity sooner than it can any other object in its environment—its bedclothes, or its mother, say. The experiences that were at first auto-erotic are not discontinued after the ego or self is relatively demarcated from the environment, but are continued in a higher form of organization. The addition of a primitive self-consciousness gives the auto-erotic experiences a psychic counterpart, and it is the latter that is now called narcissism.

This primitive narcissism represents, therefore, not only a libido position, but a position that is in accordance with the development of the intellect. True object relationship is possible only with a far more accurate appreciation of reality than the child at first has. The development of the libido and of the intellect, therefore, run parallel with each other; and it is a fact, although the dynamics thereof are not fully known, that a regression of the libido to this stage is likely to drag the intellect back with it. It is by means of these facts that we are able to interpret some of the phenomena in the psychoses. Why does it become necessary to posit that a dementia-praecox patient who complains that all her thoughts are known, and that she knows every one else's thoughts, is suffering from an atavistic regression to the period when herd thinking was dominant, when there is a stage in the ontogenesis of the individual in which the intellect does not appreciate the limits of the ego and in which all thought is as of one mind? Let us consider the child of six months which is made uncomfortable by the feeling of hunger. It cries—something is done that appeases its appetite. The child has a certain right to feel that all its thoughts are known to those about it. A little later

the child says "water" or makes some articulation which the mother recognizes, and lo! water appears. This is truly a stage when the child exerts magic influence on the environment. But at the age of two, let us say, mother orders it to get the water itself. Why, after this reasoning, may not the *cerea flexibilitas* of the catatonic be a regression to that stage in which the individual regards his various members as having an autonomous existence and not as parts of his own body?

The position that MacCurdy takes with regard to the perversion of narcissism and auto-erotism is paradoxical. The fact that such a perversion existed was recognized long before Freud. If the author accepts the idea that the perversion is the special development of one of the partial impulses in pure culture, then he must accept narcissism as a normal component of sexuality. Furthermore, if he does not accept this, he will have a hard time explaining auto-erotism. If he assumes that the form of auto-erotism that he calls "pure" is completely detached from the ego, he is assuming something that is logically impossible. If it is accompanied by fantasies in which objects are involved, then it can no longer be called pure; if no fantasies, conscious or unconscious, accompany it, the goal must be contained within itself.

The theory of narcissism is not a merely logical necessity in the Freudian system; it is more than a mere explanation of phenomena in connection with the psychoses; it offers a truly dynamic record of psychic events that are causally related. The brief narrative of a case might illustrate. The patient, a prosperous young man of thirty, befriends a helpless relative. The relationship grows into a friendship, which terminates in the patient's sharing his business and his mistresses with his protégé. Owing to an accident, the patient is falsely accused of murder and has to flee the country. He travels to another country, becomes intimate with another woman, has several children by her, and then develops a delusion of jealousy concerning her. He suspects that she is secretly living with the son of his employer. His mistress has him arrested on the charge of murder, for she knows his secret and would avenge herself upon him for leaving her. The patient spends several years in prison awaiting trial. While in prison, he develops some vague gastric symptoms. After he is freed,

these become obsessive with him. At first he treats himself with medicines, cathartics, and finally enemata. The latter treatment is pursued to such excess that it weakens the patient. He decides to seek medical help. Then follow clinics and doctor daily, rectal examinations, proctoscopies, and finally, getting no relief, the patient comes to the conclusion that he has a tumor or growth of some kind, and insists on being operated upon. The operation proves that there is no pathological condition. The old practices continue. In the meanwhile the patient has had severe reverses in business; he comes to the conclusion that all this trouble is directed by some one, and that this is none other than his one-time friend and protégé. He brings legal action against his friend, and is committed. After release, he develops the delusion that there is a powerful odor emanating from his rectum, that he is a public nuisance, and that he attracts universal attention; he, therefore, shuns all people and public places. Finally he threatens to kill any one who makes any reference to his odor, and to kill his doctors for refusing to operate upon him, to cut out part of his redundant gut or invaginated rectum, as he calls it. It is essential to mention that after his prison life, there was no resumption of any form of heterosexual relationship.

This case shows in particular that the regression is not a sudden and unrelated phenomenon, but that it depends upon a mutual relationship between environmental factors and predisposition or fixation. When we first see the patient, he is well adapted, with his homosexuality fairly well sublimated. He suffers two shocking experiences at the hands of women, both of which jeopardize his life. The last exposes him to the destructive influence of prison life. In one disposed as he is, they are sufficient to account for the motive of regression. The first symptom that appears, and the only one that the patient regards as his illness proper, is his hypochondria. This is concentrated entirely on the anal zone. The activities directed toward the relief of pain—the enemata, and the like—must have a pleasure concealed in them, as their persistence is far beyond reason. He then makes others do the same thing to him—insists upon digital examinations and proctoscopies. The most expert advice does not convince him that there is



nothing wrong. On top of this symptom he develops a delusion of reference. The patient now pursues none of his former habits with women and is apparently without erotic outlet. The hypochondria represents the auto-erotic phase of the disease, and the persistent visits to doctors an attempt at object relationship; that is, for this revived erogenicity of the anal zone, he seeks gratification through others. And finally this is the zone by means of which he wishes to attract others to him, but in his delusion it is characteristically projected—he now repels instead of attracting people.

As regards the homosexual component, we find it first quite sublimated, but no plausible motive existed for all his beneficence to his protégé. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that he was quite fond of him. This very protégé later becomes arch-persecutor, and gradually more and more people become involved in the plot. This is no mere coincidence. It all takes place at a time when the patient wished help from his protégé, but refused to ask for it. Their positions had become reversed; and in the passive or subservient position, the patient developed the delusion.

All the aspects of this case cannot be entered into here; a history of it will shortly be published with a discussion of all the issues involved. But sufficient material has been given to show that in this man's illness we are not dealing with a disconnected series of events; it all hinges upon a problem of adaptation. Being driven from one position with regard to women, though the evidence was that he was never very securely intrenched there, he regresses to a lower libido position in which the anal zone is active, and his psychosis represents his efforts to gratify it, first auto-erotically and then, repeating the original development, by investing this regained erogenicity with suitable objects. The libido that he formerly used in heterosexuality and in sublimated forms of homosexuality are now used to charge an auto-erotic zone. From this position an attempt at restitution is undertaken afresh by means of a transference neurosis, but the transference is on an infantile level on the basis of projection. The hypochondria represents, therefore, the auto-erotic phase of the disease; the delusion, and its two sets of projection mechanisms, a passive homosexual goal, and therefore the healing

process of the disease. The final fantasy that is expressed in the delusions is not very different from that found in a psychoneurosis. It differs in that the fixation point is lower in the biological scale, and in some of the specific mechanisms employed, which are also more archaic and correspond to that stage in the development of the intellect which accompanied the narcissistic phase of the libido.

The "insanity" is, therefore, produced by the efforts of the patient to bring regressive demands together with archaic methods of thinking into logical relation with the world. The disease process is always found mixed up with the remnants of the normal personality; and in every case are found the disease process, the efforts at restitution, and the normal personality.

Let us now consider MacCurdy's discussion of the emotions and the instincts. First, he objects to Freud's postulate that the mind is regulated by the pain-pleasure principle, and maintains that Freud has fabricated a physiology of reflexes on which to base his instinct theory, and that he has completely excluded intelligence as a factor in evolution. Now Freud has nowhere stated that the only function that a reflex can serve is a purposeful one, to the extent that its use is exclusively to avoid stimuli or abolish their effects. Freud does state that the reflex may be purposeful. As regards the pleasure principle, it is accepted merely as a pragmatic principle; it has never been stated as an irrevocable or all-inclusive law; its acceptance is merely part of the demonstrative proof of the truth of psychoanalysis. The pleasure principle is merely the name of a frequently occurring and predominant direction of psychic processes. The actual force that releases this process may not be subservient to this principle at all. The pleasure principle is thus the name of a secondary process. The author is evidently not aware of the fact that Freud has attempted to define even more elementary processes, one of which he calls the repetition compulsion (*Wiederholungszwang*).<sup>1</sup> The author does not tell us what the real objection to the pleasure principle is, except that it is hedonistic. The current ethical connotation attached to this word is enough to condemn anything thus designated, without further scrutiny.

<sup>1</sup> See *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*. By Sigmund Freud, M.D. London: Allen, 1922.

In his discussion of anxiety, MacCurdy persistently represents Freud as maintaining that the libido turns into fear. Now this to the general reader must sound ridiculous enough, for it cannot be otherwise interpreted, according to the representation, except as the transmutation or actual change of one emotion into another. Freud has never expounded any such alchemy of the emotions. The following case history will show what he means: A young man of twenty-five came for analysis because of vague psychasthenic symptoms, fatigability, indecision, and several other minor complaints. He had no phobias and had never suffered from any anxiety states. He proceeded with the analysis, and told a rather commonplace story. About a month after the analysis was begun, the patient saw an epileptic in a seizure on the street. He was immediately taken with the fear that the same thing might happen to him. This symptom grew to be obsessive and violent. Strangely enough, he did not complain, as the situation might have warranted, that analysis had precipitated a violent neurosis, but insisted upon continuing the treatment.

The actual facts of the case were these, and they were not revealed until many weeks after the phobia had made its initial appearance. The patient had, ever since adolescence, been addicted to masturbation, and when he entered analysis, had decided that the practice would have to stop, as it "would never do" to tell the analyst that he was still addicted to it. Consciously, he had very little conflict about the practice; but once he stopped it abruptly, a completely dissociated symptom arose, in which the patient feared that something, which in his mind was associated with great horror, would overtake him. We see, therefore, that he surrendered a practice that gratified him, and no sooner did he do so than a violent fear seized him. This is not an isolated case, but typical in all respects. There is no logical connection between these events—the surrender of masturbation and the phobia—but they illustrate just what Freud means when he talks about repressed libido generating anxiety. We will not stop to give the mechanism of the phobia; it was in all respects typical. This mechanism has been explained in a masterful way in Freud's analysis of the phobia of little Hans. We will, however, let MacCurdy explain the appearance of anxiety under these circumstances. The ap-

pearance of anxiety "is perhaps to be accounted for on the basis of the projection mechanism, which is the commonest unconscious escape from the impasse. Libidinous satisfaction not being gained by the direct efforts of the subject, the lack is made good by fantasies of others taking the initiative. These aggressions are readily symbolized by general bodily, instead of frankly sexual attacks, and fear develops as a response to these active unconscious (or co-conscious) fantasies of what would be actual dangers if enacted in real life. There is ample objective evidence of this to be found in the psychoses, and inferences (in my experience) from the analysis of neurotic patients support this view." This is the only explanation offered, and it does not strike us as very enlightening.

MacCurdy finds one of the great "inconsistencies" of Freud in the fact that the latter admits that normal or rational fear in the presence of real danger is an expression of the ego's instinct of self-preservation. MacCurdy forgets, of course, to mention that Freud has clearly in mind the differences between rational fear and neurotic fear. It is a fact that the non-satisfaction of hunger or thirst do not manifest themselves by a fear of epilepsy. Real dangers to the ego do not manifest themselves in phobias entirely dissociated from their apparent provoking cause. Where is the inconsistency, since they represent two distinct problems? The affect to real danger is conceded to be appropriate to the stimulus and directly connected with the cause by universal convention. With a phobia this is not the case. It is conceded by Freud that dangers to the ego's self may generate fear, as in the case of the war neuroses or the traumatic neuroses; but their mechanism differs essentially from the genesis of fear through a damming of object libido. A very complete discussion of this can be found in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*,<sup>1</sup> now available in an English translation. The question as to whether the fear in a phobia—fear of epilepsy, say—is a real fear, that is a question of fact; there is no debate possible; one must either accept the patient's word or not.

We quote the following passage in order to demonstrate by what process these so-called inconsistencies arise; they are

<sup>1</sup> See note 1, page 238.



simply of MacCurdy's own making. He says (pp. 86-87): "Freud claims that libido manufactures fear when it is denied outlet, but he does not explain how this happens in the presence of actual danger. We might assume, perhaps, that he thinks the ego sees the narcissistic object threatened, but even this comes back to a fundamental ego fear reaction. It seems impossible to get away from the otherwise universally admitted view that the emotion of fear is a reaction connected with the instinct of self-preservation. The problem becomes more intricate if an attempt be made to apply the hypothesis to neurotic fear. Freud has already said that the relationship to real fear is established by assuming that the ego regards the libido (object libido) as a danger. The ego libido would then supply the fear—how? The narcissistic object cannot be threatened because the offending object libido is regressive and weakened rather than aggressive. If, however, we imagine (which Freud never suggests) that this cutting off of object libido from real application leads it to attack the ego libido (a terribly anthropomorphic formulation), then we are confronted with the old dilemma of libido being antagonistic to libido. For ego libido to be inimical to object libido, it must have changed its essential nature when it was derived from the latter (the view of libido being merely 'energy' being repudiated by Freud). If it be different, the difference must lie in its combination with ego interests. If it be not different (the difference being inherent only in the object—i.e., self or outer world), then libido is not specific in its nature, but a general source of energy, as assumed by Jung. So again we return to the same conclusion that to get fear, the instinct of self-preservation must operate. Freud's attempt to pansexualize emotions fails."

We find this passage utterly unintelligible. But if the question is how and in what way neurotic fear can be correlated with rational fear, the following passage from Freud<sup>1</sup> will help dissolve the apparent inconsistency: "We have said that the relation between fear and libido, which in other respects seem clearly defined, does not fit in with the assumption that in the face of real danger fear should become the expression of the

<sup>1</sup> *General Introduction to Psychoanalysis*. By Sigmund Freud, M.D. New York: Boni and Liveright, 1922. p. 371.

instinct of self-preservation. This, however, can hardly be doubted. But suppose the emotion of fear is not contested by the egoistic ego impulse, but rather by the ego libido? The condition of fear is in all cases purposeless, and its lack of purpose is obvious when it reaches a higher level. It then disturbs the action, be it flight or defense, which alone is purposeful, and which serves the end of self-preservation. If we accredit the emotional component to the ego libido, and the accompanying activity to the egoistic instinct of self-preservation, we have overcome every difficulty." Freud sharply separates the emotion and the activity in connection with the situation of danger. In such a moment libido, otherwise distributed on objects, becomes added on to the narcissistic libido, and it is this excess which is now perceived as fear. The two phases need not even be synchronous. A man who escapes a serious accident, in which only dexterity and ingenuity saved him, becomes fearful long after he has reached a position of safety. We fail to see the point of MacCurdy's dialectic. First he throws out the concept of ego libido, then he challenges Freud to explain rational fear according to the libido theory minus the theory of narcissism. This is not exactly fair.

The author tells us that "for the past ten years he has been dissatisfied with the exclusive importance placed by Freud on the sexual as an explanation of psychopathological phenomena". Of course we do not know how generally this statement will be regarded as sufficient evidence for the need of a "broader" basis. In his own presentation of the subject, he intends to include the ego instincts (a statement calculated to give the reader the impression that Freud never considers the ego instincts), the sexual instincts, and the herd instincts. His reason for including the ego instincts is the fact that egoism is frequently made use of in pathological conditions and hence the ego instincts must be responsible for the psychogenesis of this group of traits. As regards the herd instincts, MacCurdy claims that he "could not account for repression without invoking the coöperation of some social force more potent than the intellectual recognition of convention and expedient compliance with its dictates", this social force being the herd instinct.

We need proceed no further to perceive that the author is

poorly oriented from the methodological approach and that he has failed to grasp the meaning of repression as Freud has described it. We see him invoking the word "instinct" to cover a group of tendencies whose purpose he interprets on the basis of behavior, and whose limitations as instincts he does not sharply demarcate from acquired or intelligent appendages. It is only by making the word instinct cover a vast number of divisible parts that he gets into the position where he can state that "the ego is that about which the ego reactions center, and the latter constitute the behavior of an organism placed in a purely hostile or indifferent environment". This is a purely academic and descriptive stand. It is, furthermore, a relic of obscurantism. He tells us, moreover, that instincts are phenomena that have the following attributes—they are unreflective, non-discriminative, immediate and uncontrolled in operation, ineradicable, and affective. It follows that any act into which these characteristics can be read must be instinctive. Some of these attributes describe the act itself; others refer to the changes it effects in the organism. This attitude MacCurdy maintains throughout; some of the characteristics of instinct are described from the point of view of what one can see, others of what the individual feels in conjunction with the activity.

MacCurdy states further that one can arrange a kind of hierarchy in the evolution of instinct: (1) the simple primitive reflex, in which no mental elements are discernible; (2) the conditioned reflex, in which there is a physiological component; (3) true instinctive reactions, which are best described both on the afferent and efferent sides by the employment of physiological terminology; and finally (4) instinct motivations, in the construction of which appear ideation and, in fact, the highest type of intellectual operations. As long as the instinct motivation remains a motivation and does not become (as it may in emergencies) an instinct reaction, there is no physiological element discernible. This sketch of the evolution of instinct can be considered from many angles; there is only one at which we shall pause. In all the first three classes, there is assumed a definite connection between the instinct and some somatic source; whereas in the last, instinct motivation, the somatic connection is apparently lost, though eventually

some somatic root may be demonstrable. This latter consideration we must bear carefully in mind when we consider MacCurdy's exposition of the herd instincts. We can now anticipate the question, these being true instincts, what were or are their somatic roots?

He proceeds to tell us that it is highly probable that a number of instincts coöperate in directing the motive power of a constellation. Disease consists of the destruction of more recent evolutionary developments, and hence mental disease should show us a wider range of atavistic instincts in operation than one sees in normal people. Therefore, it is unthinkable that one group of instincts could be responsible for all psychopathological reactions. Hence we should adopt some middle ground between the extremes of too many instincts and too few. His procedure is, therefore, to study the ego, herd, and sex instincts as hypothetically separate entities; to study their reactions when relatively independent or dominant; and then to trace their workings in combination.

This is a very arbitrary kind of program. The author assumes that these instincts exist as entities, and he proposes to select material purposing to prove that they do. What criteria we shall establish to determine whether or not a given phenomenon is a manifestation of one or another or of a combination of them, we are not told. The connection between the behavior and the instinct from which it is supposed to spring is in every instance quite arbitrary. And so he begs the question. Whatever may be said of Freud's conclusions, he has remained consistent throughout in his methodological approach. He has, first of all, come to no conclusions about instinct except through the products of its activity in thought, emotion, and conduct as viewed from within the patient. In other words, Freud has availed himself of the opportunity to study the manifestations of instinct from the inside, so to speak. His conclusions have, perhaps, the limitations that may be incidental to the fact that the human is his only source of material. Freud has, moreover, tended to limit the connotation of instinct to that of an endogenous stimulus with some somatic source. From this point of view, he can remain analytical throughout.

Let us consider for a moment the evidence from which the



behaviorist deduces that a given act is instinctive. He observes the behavior of an animal that is accustomed to live in groups and notes no special features about his conduct. He takes this very animal out of the group, isolates him, and notes that the animal begins to show signs of discomfort. He places him back again with the group and notes that the animal shows evident signs of gratification. This is a demonstration of the herd instinct. To a certain extent the conclusion is justifiable. However, the observer does not teach us the limits of the instinct and gives no intimation as to how much of this is acquired, on the one hand, or intelligent on the other.

Let us see how MacCurdy's approach works out in the case of the ego instincts. "The ego", he defines, "is that about which the ego reactions center and the latter constitute the behavior of an organism placed in a purely hostile or indifferent environment." The environment is here defined by such widely differing qualities that it almost loses all differential value. The statement also leaves the inference open that the ego is not the center of the sex or the herd instincts. "The ego views the environment as something to be subjugated for the indulgence of its appetites. The suckling child approximates this picture. After the 'ego' is subjectively perceived as a unity, the ego instincts are engaged in providing or preventing consciously conceived pleasures and pains." He does not describe to us the dynamics of how the ego ideal comes into existence—it appears abruptly; the child simply builds up an ideal of what it would like to be and how it would like to be regarded by others. This ego ideal is the vortex about which are centered the activities that may now safely be called instinct motivations.

According to MacCurdy, there are five general directions in which these ego-instinct motivations move: (1) a survival of the original body-pleasure phase, consisting of a desire for food and drink, for creature comforts and bodily sensations that may take the form of caresses (the latter being considered entities that may exist without love); (2) intellectual curiosity and desire for new experience (these are instinctive because there can be no question about it); (3) lust for power and for exhibiting it, both in crude physical form or in intellectual operations; (4) lust for recognition; (5) desire for security.

The latter tends to appear only when the ego is threatened. The ego idea, which yields to expediency, incorporates the standards approved by the group.

From this MacCurdy leads us to a consideration of the character of the egoist. It is hard to see how a description of the type of character in whom egocentric tendencies predominate constitutes a demonstration of the operation of the ego instincts. At any rate MacCurdy says that there is considerable clinical support for the belief that the ego instincts operate as above outlined, because in certain pathological conditions these reactions tend to appear in "pure form". Epilepsy is one of these, and we are introduced to a very excellent description of the epileptic character. In addition he mentions some other traits, such as absence of repression, violence in emotions, and the tendency of the epileptic to respond regressively with apathy and deterioration or unconsciousness to a thwarting of egocentric ambitions. As to the psychology proper of epilepsy, we are left to infer that the epileptic's ego instincts are strong or well developed, and that the others are either weak or in abeyance. But, MacCurdy proceeds, the kind of situation that disturbs the epileptic may excite ego reactions in more normal people. The normal individual in war, where duty comes into conflict with the desire for safety, shows marked ego reactions. These are mainly states of fear. We must conclude from this that the normal individual's ego instincts, when excited into activity, give rise to fear or some other dissociated symptoms, while in the epileptic they have a different effect. The relevancy of all this is very dubious, and we wonder why a mere quantitative increase in the size, so to speak, of the ego instincts should cause such varied responses.

Ego reactions, according to the author, become pathological only under certain conditions: (1) in situations that involve a direct threat to the individual (war neurosis); (2) under the operation of external or internal factors that lead to the unwonted, disproportionate prominence of ego motivations (as in the case of the epileptic and the criminal).

The "inferiority complex" is another pathological form of ego reaction. Early in life the child feels inferior and compensates by fantasies of might and wisdom. But the time comes when fantasies must be surrendered. The individual

is, therefore, inferior in comparison with his own ego ideal. We do not wish to enter into a discussion of this question at this point. We wish merely to indicate that if MacCurdy's statement is true that the basis of the feeling of inferiority is an actual knowledge of being inferior to a real object or to the ego ideal, then every *hod-carrier* should be afflicted with a feeling of inferiority and every child should be overcome with a feeling of its own insignificance. The inferiority of the child is an excellent example of a "terribly anthropomorphic" deduction. The inferiority of the child is always superimposed upon a primary narcissism. The deduction of inferiority of the child is, moreover, a question of fact. The author's explanation of the feeling of inferiority would be correct if one sought no further than the patient's own plausible explanation thereof on the basis of common sense. It occurs to us to ask why the feeling of guilt, for example, should not contribute to this sense of inferiority.

The sex instinct, MacCurdy holds, is not a pure function. It subserves both ego pleasure and propagation and on that account it is not "pure", but a compound. Auto-erotism serves the purpose of establishing the pleasure element essential to sex, and because of its sexual potentiality is repressed. When the child learns to differentiate between animate and inanimate objects, it selects the parent of the opposite sex as a love object. The boy who wishes to displace his father does so without having any notion of the sexual implications of possessing his mother. As regards narcissism, MacCurdy continues to treat it by omitting the concept of ego libido. "The narcissist is one who loves himself. This does not necessarily mean his body, although masturbation is frequently an expression of love. The affection is for himself as a personality." (We can only trust that his unconscious keeps this distinction very clearly in mind.)

The discussion of the herd instincts interests us more keenly. Herd life, MacCurdy maintains, is found only in certain species or genera. It is highly modifiable in reaction type, because "herd instinct" has no meaning unless associated with herd life. One's herd reactions are essentially connected with reactions of the group, while the motivations by which the other instincts are expressed are much more fixed and rigid. Herd-

instinct motivations are not personally elaborated by the individual, but by the group, after which they are adopted by the individual.

We are spared any demonstration of the need of the concept of a "herd instinct"; its existence is assumed and MacCurdy then proceeds to demonstrate its manifestations. He follows Trotter in assuming that the herd instinct operates when a man is thinking or living alone as well as when he is one of a mob. The uncritical acceptance of common views and habits is evidence of a special instinct designed for that purpose. MacCurdy finds a parallelism between the refinement of civilization, with its greater latitude for individual intelligence, and a weakening of the herd instinct. The contrast and incompatibility between intelligence and conformity are sufficient ground for inferring that the latter is an instinctive phenomenon. Conformity is unreflective and hence instinctive. There are few kinds of conduct less immediate and controlled than the pillaging of a mob. The criterion for instinct is to be found in certain attributes deduced from observing them. MacCurdy finds all other attributes as outlined in his criteria of what an instinct is.

Herd instincts operate both positively and negatively. The positive reactions are shown in emergencies and in motivations of longer duration. MacCurdy then proceeds to describe the behavior of various groups. The energy directed by the herd instinct is not incorporated in an internally evolved motivation, but adopts a formulation supplied by the group. The most obvious of these are laws, traditions, and conventions. The motivations are intuited by the members of the group. The motives of the group exert an inhibiting influence on the individual's ego or sex impulses, and conscience is the affectively colored recognition of what the group demands. (This classification really works, for it describes a conscienceless man as one with a strong ego and weak herd instincts.)

There is one further point in the discussion of herd instincts. MacCurdy borrows a conception from Sanger Brown which the latter designates as collective thinking and regards as an expression of the herd instinct. The defective sense of personality as an entity apart from its environment (a phenomenon aptly termed by Tausk *Verlust der Ichgrenzen*), found in



the psychoses, in dreams, and in the mental processes of childhood, is likewise evidence of a herd instinct. There are phenomena observed among savages which seem to indicate that the members of a group do not enjoy individual thought, but tend to think collectively. This is called group thought or "group consciousness". This, MacCurdy states, is found in the phenomenon of animism. The phenomena in the psychoses (and presumably in the mental processes of childhood) represent an atavistic return to this evolutionary phase of mental development.

We wish to pause for a moment at the assumption that there is a specific herd instinct. Those who assume it so readily rarely tell us just what they mean by the term, be it the impulse to be gregarious or to herd together, or the special behavior of the individual in a herd, or the impulses or behavior manifested by the herd as a whole. Where is the locus of the instinct—the individual or the group that now is a new entity? And what are the limits of the instinctive act? These distinctions are very essential, for each of these concepts has different implications.

If the herd instinct finds motor expression in the impulse to herd or to congregate with others of the same species, we feel it quite apropos to ask when and under what conditions resident within the individual this impulse appears, what goal it serves, and what releases the conditions of the impulse—in other words, gratifies it. The definition must be something that is fulfilled by neither ego nor sex instincts. In the human species the infant is born into a group, be it however small, and the long wait that the individual has to endure before achieving anything like independence necessitates his living with the group. To put it more accurately, the group is one of the conditions of human life, and the individual need make no special effort to form a group. It is possible that the very fact that the human infant is for so long a period helpless speaks for the antiquity of group life in some form as an indispensable condition of human life. We do not at this point see the relevancy of quoting examples from animal life, for our chief interest is in human psychology, and we fear the anthropomorphism involved in making deductions from animals. If thus, in an individual born into a group, we posit an instinct to be gre-

gamous, we wonder what the goal of such an instinct is. We should in that case have an instinct operating without any root in the soma, not accounted for by ego or sex instincts. If the instinct to congregate serves some function that is not covered by the ego and sex instinct and whose end is to be found within the individual, we should like to be enlightened as to just what that function is.

As regards the second possibility—that the manifestations of the herd instinct are to be found in the behavior of the individual when he becomes the member of an artificial group (horde, clan, army, state)—we have the implication that when man, who is always the member of some group, becomes transplanted into one of these artificial groups, a new instinct manifests itself. As a matter of fact, this is the source from which most characteristics of the “herd instinct” are deduced. The basis for positing a new instinct is evidently the fact that the individuals that compose the group seem to be operating in a manner quite different from their wont. This is, of course, a purely behavioristic stand, nor do we mean to imply anything other than that it involves a departure in method from the study of the instinct as it manifests itself, not only in the individuals that compose the group, but indeed from within them—as it were, from the inside looking out.

This leads us to the third possibility—that the herd is really a new entity and that the so-called instincts are shown by this new unit, the individual existing in relation to the whole as a cell to the entire organism. In order to posit this, we must endow the entire group with something of a common mind, and it is for this purpose that MacCurdy has evoked the “group mind or group consciousness”. This is anthropomorphism with a vengeance!

To return for a moment to the second possibility. The term *instinct* as applied to the behavior of individuals that compose a herd, we find superfluous for the following reasons. Freud says<sup>1</sup>: “In an individual’s mental life, some one else is invariably involved, as a model, object, and helper, and individual psychology is at the same time social psychology as well. The relations of an individual to his parents and

<sup>1</sup> *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*. See page 281 of the present issue of MENTAL HYGIENE.

his brothers and sisters, to the object of his love—in fact, all the relations which have hitherto been the chief object of psychoanalytic research—may claim to be social phenomena. In this respect they may be contrasted with certain other processes described as narcissistic, in which the satisfaction of the instincts is partially or totally withdrawn from the influence of other people. In speaking of social psychology, it has become usual to leave these relations to one side, and to isolate as the subject of inquiry the influencing of the individual by a large number of people simultaneously, people with whom he is connected by some tie, though in other regards they may be total strangers.”

The behavior of the individual in a group permits of more intimate study than is accorded by the exponents of the herd instinct. In the first place, the factor that gives a group cohesion is no vague biological “fiat”, but something contributed by all the members; that factor is community of interest and some degree of reciprocal influence. The new characteristics that MacCurdy shows in the group are not so new; under normal conditions they are submerged, repressed; under certain new conditions they are permitted, by common consent, to emerge. We are thus confronted with the dilemma that the group by whom in part repressions are initiated now releases them. The “group” that represses them is the long-continued, the stationary group, like the state; the “group” in which the repressions are released is a creation of circumstance, temporary, and much less stable. The factor that makes the mob so impulsive and unified is the factor of suggestibility, which at the present time we must consider a fundamental characteristic, allied to love. Those who describe the herd fail to emphasize the fact that leadership is one of its almost indispensable conditions. This may at times be replaced by an idea or an ideal. At any rate, what ties the individual to the leader or to the idea is a libidinous bond. The same is true of the relationship of the individuals to one another; it, too, is a libidinous relationship. When this libidinous tie is relaxed, the group disintegrates, a fact that is demonstrated by the picture of a group when panic overtakes it. If panic be considered a collective dread, then, as Freud says, “we can establish an important analogy. Dread in an

individual is provoked either by greatness of danger or by disruption of emotional ties. Panic arises either owing to an increase of the common danger or to a disappearance of the emotional ties which hold the group together." There is a cessation of all feelings of consideration that the members show to one another. If there is a "group consciousness", why does panic disintegrate it? Because of a conflict between the ego instinct and the herd instinct? No, it is a case of self-love versus object love. "Love for oneself knows only one barrier—love for others, love for objects." (Freud). It is love that is responsible for the change from egoism to altruism. The group limits the possibilities of narcissism, but only in so far as the narcissistic libido of an individual can be mobilized.

There is another emotional tie which binds the individuals of a group and that is identification. A primary group is defined by Freud "as a number of individuals who have substituted one and the same object for their ego ideal, and have consequently identified themselves with one another on that basis".

Freud contends further<sup>1</sup> that the herd instinct leaves no room for the part played by the "leader", the counterpart of the father in the family. While there is no great sin in hypothecating a "herd" instinct in studying animal behavior, the notion becomes superfluous when the study of human behavior shows us the finer structure of its composition.

As regards the contention that the group has a consciousness all its own, this is an hypothesis, and a wild one at that. In the example MacCurdy quotes from Rivers (p. 328) we note that in the particular group the latter observed "there was such delicacy of social adjustment that . . . the intentions of one were intuited by the rest. In studying the warfare of the people of the Western Solomons, I was unable to discover any signs of leadership." This is an observation on which it would be quite dangerous to erect any hypothesis of "group consciousness". The latter remark pertaining to the absence of leadership is highly significant. As an isolated fact not much use can be made of it; one would like to know more about the social organization of this group, their disposition

<sup>1</sup> *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego.*



of property, and the like. To cite them as an example of group thought is simply a case of not proven. MacCurdy says further that this "group consciousness" is an acquired mental process. If it isn't telepathic (and we feel sure that MacCurdy would resent that idea), the phenomenon can be accounted for by a highly libidinous tie between the members of the group, or by the fact that the special activity on which the group was engaged was an established routine with few subordinate parts. It occurs to us to ask whether this "group consciousness" exists only when the group is together, and whether they never think when alone; this leads us into absurdities.

Freud has been severely criticized for his hypothesis of a primitive Cyclopean horde; but this is rather tame beside the hypothesis of a period in which "group consciousness" was the method of thinking. Biology has hitherto been filled with magic formulæ, but none of these has received so much abuse as that of atavistic regression. This is not used except for the convenience of concealing ignorance. Once having accepted Ferenczi on the development of the sense of reality, why invoke atavistic regression, when there is a period in the individual's ontogeny to which it can hark back? It doesn't at all follow that the ontogenesis recapitulates phylogenesis. This conception is very shaky as a biological principle, and its applicability to psychology is still more dubious. The reason for its inclusion in MacCurdy's system is evidently to help establish the herd instinct.

As regards the conflicts of instincts, MacCurdy concludes: "The most important conflict is between the sex and the herd groups of instincts, and this results in unconscious cravings for the pleasure-giving aspects of sex. This 'unconscious' is present in all people and potentially capable of producing psychopathological reactions. The next most important conflict is between the ego and the herd groups. The former usually does not suffer complete repression and hence does not tend to build up any elaborate unconscious system. Abnormal mental reactions are produced by this conflict only when the ego is constitutionally preponderant or when special circumstances call forth an ego response."

† "In addition to the conflicts of the ego with sex, ego with herd, and sex with herd, one other possible type must be con-

sidered. It is conceivable that, with the highly complex development of psycho-sexuality, one kind of sex ambition might clash with another. Freud makes a great deal of this possibility in his discussion of narcissism and ego libido. His system becomes so complicated, however, that he himself has never been able to explain it without inconsistencies and the use of anthropomorphic argument. On the other hand, if one assumes that it is the herd instincts that supply the repressive energy, one can formulate a much simpler and apparently adequate psychological system. Narcissism, although an important type of psycho-sexual aberration, is probably only an overdetermining factor in relation to repression. One can account for repression proceeding from the individual's ideal of himself by assuming that herd instincts are an essential factor in the composition of that ideal."

MacCurdy adds an additional remark about the Melanesians, among whom herd reactions predominate and phenomena of group consciousness are striking—namely, that there is only one type of psychopathic reaction—"the victims seem simply to run off and exclude themselves from the group". Dementia praecox represents, therefore, a condition in which the herd instincts are weak, and accordingly the two types of personality that antedate the psychosis are the seclusive and the antisocial.

Now we begin to wonder whether, after all this vehement protesting that he will never accept the theory of narcissism and insisting that the herd instinct is a distinct entity, MacCurdy has taken a very demonstrative leave of psychoanalysis only to find himself hovering very close to it again. It is remarkable that after such a wide departure of method, MacCurdy's clinical sense should lead him back to a position where it needs but one twist of the kaleidoscope to make his formulations say practically what Freud says. In fact, MacCurdy has restated Freud in behavioristic terms. Let us consider what he says, and divest it of the special color that attaches to its specific verbal formulation. Consider the statement that the dementia-praecox patient is an individual with weak herd instincts. In itself this is a truism, a tautology—that an individual who is asocial lacks constitutionally or has in weakened form that psychological entity which makes those who possess

it social animals. MacCurdy has throughout represented the activities of the individual in the herd as a relation to others. But the correlation of these two facts—the presence of asocial traits and the attenuation of a proclivity for relation to others—indicates that the author knows that these two facts stand in some dynamic relationship to each other. He has furthermore emphasized the mutual incompatibility of the ego and the herd instincts, and in his exposition of the ego instincts he has described types of character whose predominant trait was the inability to mobilize their love impulses on to others, either in the form of libidinous relations or of ability to take the ego ideal from the group. When we apply the connotations implied in these formulæ of herd and ego instincts, we cannot but see ego- and object-libido relationships. And so the formulation that the *praecox* has weak herd instincts reduces itself to saying that he has diminished capacity for object libido. We do not see that this new formulation has any advantages over the Freudian formulation, and it has many disadvantages. It is not surprising that, with these new formulations, MacCurdy should be capable of hardly more than tautologies and truisms, and should give not the remotest conception of the dynamic factors at play. In fact, the use of such concepts as regression becomes meaningless. For if the notion of a weak herd instinct is used, why drag in the notion of regression?

Let us examine what implications MacCurdy makes in his discussion of the ego and the herd instincts. The ego instincts are described as pathologically active in the egoistic character. Of this type he says: "He serves his fellows for pay, not for love of man or woman." If expediency doesn't work, his "ideal" would quickly break down and he would regress to more primitive forms of gratification. With this loss of extroversion of interest, his energy would diminish and he would feel no repugnance to antisocial conduct or ideas. The epileptic receives news of his mother's death with equanimity, but is disturbed when refused a second portion of food at table; he is secretive and never a devoted friend, is conceited and conscienceless. In his character there is absence of repression (which, according to MacCurdy, proceeds from the herd instinct). Disappointments lead to regressions (of what nature?), even to unconsciousness. The author does not dis-

cuss the distribution of libido in the epileptic character, but the nature of his love relationships is sufficiently indicated; there is quite an evident poverty of object love. Now the energies of the egoist are expended apparently in enhancing the *interests* of his ego, since we dare not imply any ego libido. This being the case, what is the nature of the regression of the epileptic, what paths does it uncover, and what lower forms of gratification are re-activated? If the regression is sexual, why should strong ego instincts cause object-libido regression? What place, then, has the concept of regression in describing an attribute that is constitutional and static?

The implication of feeble applicability of love to environmental objects is evident, where ego instincts are "strong" and also the fact that the "herd instinct" is feeble, according to MacCurdy's way of reasoning. This fact he reiterates (p. 324) by saying that "egoism is necessarily correlated with relative weakness of the herd instinct". Conscience he defines as the affectively colored recognition of what the group demands or prohibits in conduct, the affective coloring being derived from the herd instinct. Again, since the channels for sex stimulation are many of them identical with the channels for social contact, the latter evidently belongs to manifestations of the herd instinct. "It is difficult to receive a social stimulus without at the same time receiving a sexual stimulus." The relation of the individual to the group necessitates a consideration of the mobility of his libido; his social relationships are expressions of his libido distribution. If we were to consider the reactions of a man placed in solitary confinement, as is the case in prison psychoses, as manifestations of a herd instinct, we are likewise making an assumption and using the formula of herd instinct as if it really described a process. The regressions in prison psychoses are ego reactions inasmuch as there is an enormous amount of libido thrown on to the ego that was formerly distributed on objects; the phenomenon that follows upon a sudden change in libido distribution may be used to explain it, rather than the mere suggestion that it is a regression. The case of paranoia that I have cited likewise demonstrates a regression under the influence of prison life; but the regression there is back to a stage of libido development, and remains there because of a



fixation. Without this, the regression of prison psychoses is temporary. The use of the term herd instinct in this instance neither explains the prison psychoses nor in any way defines the course of the regression. It is difficult to account for the phenomena that arise out of "strong" ego instincts without implying the concept of ego libido, though it be not expressed. The relation of the "egoist" to himself, as the author describes it, is a combination of enhancing the interests of the ego and of investing it with love; that is why the egoist or the epileptic has little love to give away.

In his final description of the origin of symptoms through a conflict of instincts, MacCurdy shows that despite his formulations he appreciates the relative value of the factors involved, as expressed in terms of energy and in relation to one another. He thus includes unreal thinking as an atavistic regression to the stage of group consciousness, for the sake of his pet herd instinct. While the phenomenon of "unreal thinking" is important, we fail to see the use of deriving it from this very questionable source since there is a stage in the ontogenesis of the individual in which it was active and it can thus be accounted for by ontogenetic regression. How close to the truth he comes when he blames the sex and not the herd instinct for the regression to autistic thought! "We must probably look to the sex instincts for the immediate production of most autistic thought, for the reason that imagery is for years the main outlet for sex impulses, which establishes fantasy as an expression for these motivations. If regression leads to an awakening of unconscious sex impulses, these tend naturally to expression in fantasy. If the lure of these images is stronger than one's desire to accept the herd's standards of reality, a delusion results." In other words, regression of libido tends to cause other regressions (in the ego); but as MacCurdy has represented the ego and herd instincts, the concept of regression is inapplicable. "Delusions would thus repeat a type of thought developed as a phenomenon of group consciousness, but now directed dynamically by the sex instincts." Out of this position, dangerously near the Freudian, he extricates himself by assuming a "principle (Rivers) whereby one instinct borrows the reaction elaborated with another". Try as he may, he

cannot escape using the concept regression except in connection with libido. "In every psychopathic reaction there is evidence presented of a weakened herd instinct." Finally he admits that "suggestion is probably sexual in origin", and bulks largely in herd phenomena, and that "group suggestion is a utilization and overdetermination of an earlier sex mechanism, and in psychopathological experience, suggestion seems to be largely an exhibition of an unconscious sex relationship".

We have analyzed MacCurdy's work at length because it is in itself a remarkable experiment. What saves the work is that it is based on sound clinical experience. He has shown that any one with such clinical experience, try as he may to reject Freud's specific formulations, must eventually come around to something very close to them. He has tried to arrange the material in different order, has given old phenomena new names, and he emerges with an apparently new formulation. Nothing of the kind. He has garbled Freud, rejected him, and then has very crudely expressed some of the same fundamental formulations by a different route. The author has given us very little demonstration of the application to clinical problems of his formulations, as they exist; but what he says is especially weak. And at this we do not wonder. He has rejected a dynamic method for a descriptive one. He has endowed new terms with mystic powers, the herd instinct struggling with the ego instinct. This describes apparently the external events; but when you come to examine the "herd instinct" as he describes it, it is a "*deus ex machina*". His passion for description has driven him to the point of taking a highly composite and complicated phenomenon and treating it like an entity, and it is no wonder that his formulations tell nothing. In itself the statement that the herd instinct is weak is dogmatic and tautological. It is only when the instinct is studied and dissected that one gets some notion of the underlying dynamics.

He has rejected the theory of narcissism only to come to grief. We do not feel through the book that he really ever grasped it before he rejected it, and in so doing he destroyed an integral and inseparable portion of the theory. He makes

good the want by reviving the herd instinct, which he endows with arbitrary attributes.

MacCurdy's error lies not so much in that he has assumed a separate herd instinct, but that he has used the term to carry and describe phenomena of a highly complicated and reducible kind. He has transferred the concept from the study of animal behavior, where it is much harder to define the limits of an instinctive act and to tell where intelligent or acquired traits operate. Moreover, in animals the operation of the sex instinct cannot be studied as it can in the human. MacCurdy has also refused to examine the behavior of the individual in the group and therein to find some very essential reactions of the individual. He has failed to make clear the relation of the herd or group to the ego ideal, and has failed to describe the relationship between the ego ideal and the individual himself.

In the study of the group and of the individual within it, Freud has made some very important discoveries. He has discovered, first of all, some very important facts pertaining to the structure of the ego. The ego is at first self-sufficient. The organization of auto-erotic experience gives it a psychic counterpart which we call narcissism. Between this stage and the relationship to objects there is an apparent gap. It is true that the child comes to regard himself actually as what his loving parents call him—the sum of all perfections; the things his parents teach him are incorporated within him as his ego ideal. This ego ideal is detached from the primary narcissism and comes, as MacCurdy correctly states, from the group. Notwithstanding its origin from the environment, the ego ideal is now incorporated within the ego and to it is attached a high degree of narcissistic libido. This internal model is one with which all of one's activities and qualities are compared. It has the functions of moral conscience, of self-observation, of censorship, and is also the force that does the repressing. Freud has designated this aspect of libidinous development as a characteristic one. The qualities found in some one else are annexed and attributed to one's ego. The process of identification, therefore, partakes both of the object and the self and thus constitutes a bridge between

narcissism and object love. The proclivity toward identification and its intensity render it liable to fixation, and thus another point to which the libido can regress. This is an instance of great use in explaining many pathological conditions.

The herd instinct cannot be identified with the ego ideal. Resistances and repressions do not emanate from a hypothetical herd instinct. Freud points out that this apparent instinct can be traced to the nursery. The child regards any one who threatens to share the love of the parent as a rival or an enemy, but the child is eventually forced to identify himself with such a rival on the basis of having the same claim to the love of the parent. The social feeling is, therefore, based on a reversal of the initial hostility into an identification, and the identification of various members of the group to one another is on the basis of a substitution of their ego ideal by the leader.

Of the book as a whole it must be said that it shows signs of haste and lacks cohesion. Its parts eventually prove to be united, but this union is not very apparent. The critical parts of the book must indeed be very confusing to the general reader. It is certainly no systematic or even reliable account of psychoanalysis. The author's criticisms of Freud are systematized only so far as the theory of narcissism is concerned; the rest are very disjointed. As a piece of exposition, the book is rather uneven. There are innumerable passages in which the thought is not clear and lacks sequence. There are other passages in which deficiencies in logic are made up for by arbitrary assertions. Though generally the author's acknowledgments to Freud are sincere and abundant, one is astonished at the cavalier attitude he sometimes assumes.

The reconstructive parts of the book on the whole read much better than the critical parts, and sections of it are indeed excellent pieces of exposition. The discussions on hypnotism and the theories of Rivers are excellently done. In propounding his own theories, MacCurdy is guilty of innumerable ambiguities. The terms ego reaction and ego instinct are sometimes used synonymously, as are the terms herd reaction and herd instinct. The word "motivation" is used at times as instinct wish, at times as motive. We dare not ascribe the



following to anything but pure error. MacCurdy credits Trotter with priority in the use of the word "rationalization" to describe the phenomenon of a man's accepting a current opinion, then offering alleged logical reasons for its support, and by this logic convincing himself that it is his own independent conclusion. The question of priority is a small matter at that; the author, however, tells us that Jones "popularized" the term, but he forgets to state that Jones's use of the word "rationalization" has a much broader meaning and application.

In the introduction to the book, MacCurdy raises an issue that deserves a thorough airing. He complains that one of the reasons for the various interpretations of Freud is that psychoanalysis has never been formally taught, but has been learned in the main by independent observers originally inspired by the scattered writings of Freud. For this complaint there is only a slight justification. We feel, however, that the author must ultimately be forced to assume responsibility for his own apprenticeship in psychoanalysis. There has for many years been an established convention whereby such an apprenticeship is served. However, it is very much to be doubted whether most of those who "do psychoanalysis" have been very much burdened with any feeling of responsibility in this regard. In most instances it is "picked up" and more often it is simply "done", on the assumption that no one will be any the wiser, and the apprenticeship is completed with the decision to "go into it", with the idea that somehow or other all the necessary training can be acquired in practice. This being the case, the reason for lack of uniformity in the interpretations of theory or technique is something that cannot be laid to the door of psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis has been regarded even by many who have attempted to practice it conscientiously as a field for controversy, before they have in any way mastered the teachings of its sponsor. The apostates and the dissenters have an equal ear with the public, which is as it should be, were it not for the fact that the public generally cannot pass upon the issues.

The author has given us ample evidence of a conscientious effort to master the theory and the practice of analysis. This notwithstanding, some of his case reports do not appear to be

in accord with the best precedents. We quote the following instance: "I can cite from my own practice a striking example of how material often considered to be fundamental may be neglected without affecting the success of the treatment. I once analyzed a man who had led a homosexual career for over ten years and wished to cure himself of it. During the analysis I never asked him nor did he have occasion to tell me whether he was an active or passive homosexual or what the nature of his actual practices had been. Throughout, attention was directed to his homosexuality as a relationship and not as an act. The analysis was speedy and effectual."

The latter remarks, of course, have no essential bearing on the case and the author knows it. We do, however, challenge the fact that a man can be thoroughly analyzed out of a homosexual neurosis without conveying some information as to the nature of his actual practices and how they arose. We do not mean that the man in question could not be cured by the procedure instituted, or, for that matter, by the "royal touch", if such were the fashion of the time and the patient's desire for a cure sufficiently strong. The error lies in using the cure as a check on the correctness of the procedure or as proof of the fact that essential material can be omitted with impunity. As to the distinction between homosexuality as an act and a relationship in an individual addicted to its practice, it is one that we fail to get. The author assures us in another place that his theories had been tried out clinically and found valid. It is inconceivable that such an approach as the author uses to the study of human psychology, from the point of view of a group of instincts that operate either against one another or with one another, has any applicability to clinical practice. However, it was apparently on such analyses as the one quoted that the validity of his theories has been tested. The author's formulation was evolved from concepts derived from various sources and could never have arisen in the laboratory, in which the only material is a struggling human.

Despite his many errors, however, MacCurdy has shown himself a capable observer and, generally speaking, has correctly sensed the relative relations of the various factors involved

to one another. He has suffered chiefly from his method of approach. His terminology is antiquated and inadequate. His efforts are tantamount to a restatement of Freud in terms of descriptive psychology, in so far as that is possible. He has taken us out of the truly dynamic conception of human psychology back again into the tyranny of obscurantism.

From the knowledge of psychoanalysis that the author has shown, we cannot regard his departure as a real apostacy. But so long as he keeps in contact with clinical material the possibility remains open that he will some day proclaim his allegiance to a real dynamic and analytical psychology.

## AN EXPOSITION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOANALYSIS\*

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A third edition of Dr. Jones's *Papers on Psychoanalysis* has recently appeared. This work is well known in the English-speaking world not only for the careful presentation of its subject matter, but also for its clear and facile style. The "papers", which deal with a variety of psychoanalytic subjects, do not neglect any important topic in this field.

The author is especially to be congratulated upon the fact that this new edition is truly a new one in the more important sense of the term. It represents no mere formal rearrangement of the second edition. Its claim to the designation "new" rests upon grounds more substantial and valid than a mere renumbering of pages or a change in type. Not only have five chapters of the old (1918) edition been omitted and five new ones substituted therefor, but the entire text has been revised wherever necessary, so as to do justice to the recent rapid and important additions to and modifications in psychoanalytic knowledge. In the past five years psychoanalysis has slowly, but surely, extended its field of investigation from the repressed sexual impulses of the individual to a study of the ego itself, and thus there has evolved a psychoanalytic theory of the structure of the ego. Psychoanalytic literature has, naturally, reflected this refocusing of the center of interest. In consequence, new terms have been added, new formulations crystallized, and a fundamental viewpoint restated with a somewhat redistributed emphasis. Any volume that proposes to deal adequately with the science of psychoanalysis can no longer ignore these considerations. As the author indicates in his preface, it is along these lines that the revision of his text has been made.

\*PAPERS ON PSYCHOANALYSIS. By Ernest Jones. Third Edition. London: Baillière, Tindall, and Cox; New York: William Wood and Company, 1923. 731 p.



A systematic discussion of the contents of this volume, involving as it would a summary of practically all that is known in psychoanalysis, is beyond the scope and purpose of this review. Suffice it to name the new titles in the order in which they occur in the book, and to indicate as concisely as possible the noteworthy features in each new paper.

To the group *General Papers* there has been added *Recent Advances in Psychoanalysis*. Here may be found under separate headings brief, yet adequate, expositions of (a) recent improvements in technique, including Ferenczi's "active therapy"; (b) characterology, including Abraham's "oral character", Freud's three "character types from psychoanalytic work", and certain "love types"; (c) narcissism, not only in relation to paraphrenia (Abraham) and pathohysteria (Ferenczi), but also as it manifests itself in the ordinary love life; and (d) metapsychology, with a definition of this concept and an outline of Freud's five essays on this subject. All this material is presented in only twenty-four pages of very readable text.

In the section *Papers on Dreams*, there now appears a technical contribution to dream interpretation entitled *Persons in Dreams Disguised as Themselves*.

The section on treatment now contains an engaging and timely discussion entitled *The Nature of Auto-suggestion*. Although the popular interest in M. Coué—that prophet of a day—has subsided to the vanishing point, a less noisy and more scientific interest in auto-suggestion, antedating this curious Frenchman's advent to America, will be gratified by Dr. Jones's attempt to divest this phenomenon of its mystical cloak and to explain it by a resolution into component processes in terms of ego, ego ideal, libido, and their interactions.

The section *Clinical Papers* now contains one written for the *Festschrift (Internationaler Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse, Vol. IX, Heft 3)* prepared by the Hungarian Psychoanalytical Society in honor of Dr. Ferenczi upon the occasion of his fiftieth birthday. As a tribute to Dr. Ferenczi's work on the interrelation of psychical and physical disorders, Dr. Jones discusses the possibility that false associations of a symbolic nature concerning a disease may lead an individual to expose

himself to that disease unwittingly. He points out that in the case of infectious diseases acquired by the respiratory route, the common belief that cold air is dangerous must operate to increase the rate of infection. He finds in the unconscious ideas associated with birth which throw light upon this popular superstition with reference to cold air, one that is still reflected in medical books. The medical man who has been following the work of such internists as F. Deutsch of Vienna will find much food for thought in this paper.

In the section *Papers on Child Study and Education*, one title has been changed and one new paper added. The former of these has been renamed *The Significance of Sublimating Processes for Education and Reëducation*. This paper, now emphasized by its new title, should do much to correct the erroneous notions concerning sublimation that are so widespread in this country. Perhaps because of the dizzy puritanical heights toward which American ideals strive, there has been an unmistakable tendency, both on the part of our psychotherapists in reshaping the lives of patients and on the part of our educators in directing the destinies of children, to over-emphasize the inherent possibilities of sublimation and to expect altogether unattainable results along these lines. Sublimation, being a turning away from the sexual, is considered by many as the more, if not the only, "respectable" side of psychoanalysis, excluding its ego aspects. Such an attitude has, we believe, fostered important misconceptions of the nature and significance of sublimation. The author attempts to correct the current misunderstanding of the sublimation mechanism. Sublimation involves something more complicated than is implied by the typical example so prevalent in psychological writings—viz., turning to art or work as a consolation for disappointment in a love affair. The process concerns the infantile partial components of the sex instinct rather than the adult heterosexual desire; it is a process accomplished primarily in childhood rather than in mature years; it is essentially an unconscious affair and consists in a displacement rather than a replacement of energy. After discussion of these points, Dr. Jones considers their application to the problem of educating children and of reëducating abnormal adults. In the case of the former, he pleads for educational

methods that would work hand in hand with the mechanism underlying the sublimation tendencies instead of running counter to them; while in regard to the latter, he suggests endeavors of a type more simple and less pretentious than those usually attempted. He criticizes both the forcing of children through an irrational intellectual mill and the saddling of neurotics, perverts, criminals, and social failures with all too heavy reconstruction programs.

The last of the new papers, *Some Problems of Adolescence*, forcefully presents a point of view that, if not altogether unique, nevertheless merits emphasis. The author, in his introduction to this paper, discusses the term "problem". He deprecates the fact that the desire for a practical "answer" to a "problem" outweighs the wish to throw light upon the lack of knowledge behind the problem. He defines a problem as "a nodal point of ignorance" that demands investigation and understanding before remedial action is undertaken. He believes that "the danger besetting all forms of applied sciences is that too much emphasis is apt to be laid on the 'applied' and too little on the 'science' " and that "the impulse to do makes us impatient of the desire to know". Having thus defined the term "problem", Dr. Jones discusses adolescence. He first asks, "Wherein does growing-up consist?" He gives the chief characteristics of the growing-up process as (1) increase in intellectual power, (2) greater integration of the mind, (3) decreased egocentricity, (4) a greater independence, and (5) a definite sexual evolution. He then contends that during adolescence the individual repeats and amplifies such changes along the above-mentioned five lines as have already taken place in the first five years of life. Thus adolescence has its pattern and parallel in infancy. The significance of the motor and emotional inhibitory forces is then discussed, and the author presents as an important research topic in the child study of the future the determining of the optimum inhibitory influences (both as to direction and degree) indicated to obtain the maximum intellectual development. He believes that the "goal-inhibited" libido of incestuous origin is the energy chiefly used in education.

The volume contains an appended glossary. We wish this were more extensive, not only in the number of terms listed,

but also in the definition of individual terms. Much psycho-analytical controversy has arisen and many a wordy Ossa has been piled upon Pelion for no other reason than that the disputants involved were using identical technical terms, but defining them differently. Many an imputation of inconsistency, self-contradiction, and the like, made against psychoanalysis is based upon such shadowy grounds.

Dr. Jones's book should interest a host of readers. While it is perhaps too technical, generally speaking, for beginners in psychoanalysis, it offers those already familiar with Freud's *Introductory Lectures* an excellent opportunity to widen the scope of their psychoanalytic knowledge. The book is absolutely indispensable to two classes of psychoanalytic students: first, those to whom German psychoanalytic literature is inaccessible because of the language difficulty; and, second, practicing experts who must needs be acquainted with Dr. Jones's original contributions to the science. Certain special articles will appeal to educators and others concerned with the mental life of the child. English-speaking psychoanalysts may well be proud of this volume.



## ONE OF THE MANY OVER-ENTHUSIASTIC BOOKS ON PSYCHOANALYSIS\*

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The translator's preface to Dr. Stekel's new volume on psychoanalysis and psychotherapy states the purposes of the book to be to outline the working technique and practical application of the "new psychology"; to emphasize the end results, since the busy practitioner and the nervous patient are interested in the first place in results; and to point out the various psychotherapeutic measures in vogue, their limitations, and the dangers of excesses. The book should save many an "over-enthusiastic beginner from regrettable errors or excesses". It is meant to be not only a guide, but also a timely corrective, especially in view of "the many over-enthusiastic books on psychoanalysis and psychotherapy for beginners". All worthy purposes, surely, and to achieve them, carefully prepared, well-sifted material should be presented.

The scope of the book is large, its size small. Therefore, only brief references can be made to the subjects under consideration. The result, naturally, is that because of the necessarily superficial presentation, the very dangers the book seeks to avoid are liable to be brought about—viz, "regrettable errors and excesses" on the part of the over-enthusiastic beginner.

In the present review, it seems advisable to take the first part of the book for detailed consideration. Its merits and demerits repeat themselves throughout the remaining portions of the 155 pages, which are of small size. Because of the disjointed method used by the author in elaborating his material, this review, while occupying itself with Part I, will at the same time include other portions of the book, because

\* *PSYCHOANALYSIS AND PSYCHOTHERAPY*. By William Stekel, Ph.D. Translated by James S. Van Teslaar. New York: Moffat, Yard, and Company, 1923. 155 p.

the same subjects have been treated by the author in several places. A few remarks on important phases of the remaining portions of the book will close the review.

Let us take Part I, which covers 47 pages and is headed *Technique and Applications of Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy*. The subheadings are twenty in number—to wit: *Freud's Earlier Technique; Free Associations; The Association Method; The "Will To Be Ill"; The Psychic Conflict; Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy; Analysis Is Not Interrogatory; Analysis of an Impotent Physician Suffering from Acatkisia; Nature and Meaning of Suggestion; The "Will to Subordination"; Analysis and Suggestion; The Relative Degree of Sensitiveness to Hypnosis; Experiences in a War Hospital; Hypnosis as a Therapeutic Aid; The Range of Applicability of Psychoanalysis; Freud's Earlier Views; Author's Modification; Curability of the Paraphilias; Results Obtainable in the Therapeutic Management of the Psychoses; The Need of Special Departmental Instruction in Psychotherapy and Sexual Science.*

This is a very large field, covered in a very small space. In the opinion of the reviewer, the beginner in psychotherapy, whatever its form, needs to study in great detail, first, the diseases he is to treat and, second, the methods he is about to employ as his therapeutic agents. No cursory discussion (and such only is possible in the short space allotted to it by the author) of, for instance, Freud's earlier teachings, will give a beginner any adequate idea of what Breuer and Freud did find, and why the latter abandoned his former methods as inadequate. The difficulties of the "cathartic" method under hypnosis, the findings under this method, the establishing by it of the psychogenetic origin of hysteria, the transitory nature of the results, the development of the theory of repression, which is the corner stone of psychoanalysis, and much more that the beginner ought to know, can of course be only mentioned, if they are not altogether omitted, by the author in the amount of space he has devoted to this important phase of his subject. Reference to works on the subject, as, for instance, Freud's *History of*

*the Psychoanalytic Movement*,<sup>1</sup> might have been made to stimulate the beginner to further study. In a few pages Stekel has summed up the progress of the psychoanalytic technique from its beginnings in 1880, when Breuer worked with his now famous patient, "Fräulein Anna O.", up to the present time. On page 8 we find the statement: "With these meager facts in hand, let us now proceed to a psychoanalysis, in order to learn the technique of the science by use of a practical example." It seems fair to say that a beginner cannot learn the technique of the science on the basis of meager facts. In the next fifteen pages, we are given a case report to illustrate "what psychoanalysis is". We are told that psychoanalysis is not a painful ordeal; it is not a sort of spiritual inquisition; it is not a continuous interrogatory. "Precisely the reverse is true." It is impossible to determine beforehand what is to be taken up at any psychoanalytical session; freedom of choice must be given to the patient, with close observation on the part of the analyst as to why the patient chooses certain subjects. This is all true enough, but these are matters that should not be introduced, in a textbook especially, in the midst of the description of a case report. They are matters that demand separate treatment. The author in the same way discusses various forms of resistance which the patient manifests in the course of his analysis; such matters also should be treated separately, and not in some fifteen pages devoted to a case analysis. In these few pages also, a dream is interpreted, the causes of the illness are laid bare, and an explanation is offered as to the cause of the patient's recovery. As a matter of fact, only a superficial aspect of the construction of the neurosis is given, except for the homosexuality concerned therein. The infantile elements responsible to a great extent for the conflict of the patient in respect to the two women with whom he was in love are not brought out. The result is a misconception as to the depths to which the roots of a neurosis extend into the patient's psyche. Then follows a good

<sup>1</sup> Authorized English translation by A. A. Brill. New York: The Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing Company, 1917.

description of suggestion and hypnosis; reference by the author might, with advantage to the reader, have been made to Ferenczi's account of these phenomena, in *Contributions to Psychoanalysis*,<sup>1</sup> translated by Ernest Jones, in the chapter headed *Introjection and Transference*, in which the affect responsible for the results in suggestion and hypnosis are traced to the early influence of the parents upon the children—namely, to the primary love of the children for the parents. For a description of the psychoanalytic therapy—how it differs from suggestion, and to what an extent suggestion enters into it—the reviewer would refer the reader to *A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis*,<sup>2</sup> by Freud (page 388). Freud takes up more space in these introductory lectures in describing the situation than does Stekel in the book under review. The additional time spent in reading the former will be amply repaid by the clarity and understanding that will result.

The next part of the chapter is devoted to a discussion of the various neuroses to which psychoanalysis is applicable, and a criticism of their classification by Freud into actual neuroses and psychoneuroses, Stekel claiming that all neuroses are psychogenetic in origin. This contention by Stekel has by no means been demonstrated, though it is the general belief among analysts that Freud's original classification should be modified in that the anxiety neuroses, classified by Freud among the actual neuroses, have been found to contain cases now classified under the term anxiety hysteria, a psychoneurosis. Stekel is mistaken in saying that Freud puts cases called "agoraphobia" under the actual neuroses, for in his *General Introduction to Psychoanalysis*, Freud distinctly describes this condition under anxiety hysteria, a psychoneurosis, not an actual neurosis.

In this part of the book under review one would expect to find a description, even if brief, of the morphology, pathology, and clinical picture of the various neuroses, but one looks in vain for a description of any of the neuroses as a clinical entity. Compulsion neurosis, hysteria, anxiety neurosis are

<sup>1</sup> Boston: R. G. Badger, 1916.

<sup>2</sup> New York: Boni and Liveright, 1922.



mentioned, but the laws explaining their genesis are not discussed. Instead, one finds such phrases as "patient's fear of cure" (page 53) and "the 'will to power' is the neurotic's all-powerful trend". On page 69, where the author attempts a very sketchy description of the dynamics of the neuroses, refuting what already has long ago been modified by Freud himself—namely, the importance of the infantile traumata in the origin of the neuroses—the author states: "The tendency to find excuses for himself" plays a great rôle in the dynamics of the neuroses. On page 65, we find reference to "the neurotic's faith in his 'great historic mission' ", and on page 82, the statement: "I have found that this fictitious goal [of Adler] is heaven and eternal bliss."

What the reviewer wishes to bring out is that various impulses, present in some form in all neurotics and likely enough to be found in normal people as well, are emphasized by the author as primary characteristic traits, he evidently not realizing that they are already reactions to repressed concepts; they are not characteristic of any one special neurosis. This method of presentation fails to give an adequate picture of the clinical entity of any one neurosis as distinguished from another. It fails to give the beginner, for whom the book is intended, a satisfactory concept of the disease that he has to treat. The emphasis is on results, without a clear understanding of the illness in regard to which the physician is seeking results. The same may be said with respect to the methods employed by Stekel in describing the psychoanalytic technique. In the first part of the book, he describes something of the technique of psychoanalysis, the resistances of the patient, and dream analysis. In the second part, *The Final Results of Psychoanalytic Treatment*, after a great deal of other material not related to psychoanalysis has intervened, more of the psychoanalytic technique is given. It were better to put the whole discussion of psychoanalysis, if not into one chapter, at least into some sort of sequence, chronologically or otherwise sequential. The unrelated material interspersed leads to confusion; there is not sufficient orderliness in the presentation.

So much for the orderliness and care in preparation of the

material presented. Let us now take up the technique of psychoanalysis and suggestion therapy.

The technique of hypnosis and suggestion, as well as their nature, are clearly enough described. In these two fields, it seems to make little difference what method is used to induce hypnosis; the effect depends upon the suggestibility of the subject or patient—namely, upon the nature of his transference to the hypnotist.

Concerning the technique of psychoanalysis, the reviewer feels that the author falls short of presenting a clear picture. It is true that not all analysts have their patients lying on a couch, the former sitting out of range of the patient's line of vision. Stekel states that some patients find it unpleasant to lie down, and therefore he allows them to sit facing him. As a point of technique it might be stated in this connection that this unpleasantness at lying down in the presence of the analyst is no reason for the operator changing his technique, if the reclining position is considered necessary for the analysis. As a matter of fact, the patient who finds it uncomfortable to lie down in the presence of the analyst, without at the same time being able to see the latter, evidences thereby well-defined resistances, which can best be brought to consciousness by keeping him or her in that position. Allowing such a patient to sit up disguises the resistance. The sitting-face-to-face position has the added disadvantage that the patient can watch the expression of the analyst and guide the material submitted for analysis accordingly. In this position strong hindrances to free associations are encountered. All in all, those analysts who have tried both methods unanimously choose the reclining position.

The author next takes up resistance, and states that it means that "every patient clings to his neurosis". He is afraid of good health and suffers from the "will to illness". On page 6—right at the very outset of the attempt to describe the most fascinating, the most delicately and intricately constructed mechanism on the part of the patient to defend and maintain his repression, unconsciously produced—Stekel further states: "Perhaps non-analysts, who are sceptical

about a 'will to illness' will understand me better when I say: The neurotic lacks the will to get well. . . . He is proud of his illness, and makes use of it as a means of insuring his power over his environment or of avoiding duty (work, care of sick, unwelcome visits, etc.)." The author here confuses the primary motive of a neurotic illness with what Freud has called the secondary gain of a neurosis. This secondary gain compensates in part for the emotional deprivation, or libido disturbance, which initiated the neurosis, the symptoms of which represent the repressed wish fulfilled. On page 53, under what might still be termed resistance, we find the statement: "Now I know that the neurotic is animated by one dread—i.e., the fear that he will get rid of his neurosis." On page 62, we are told that some analysts believe that the transference is broken when the patient is made aware of the emotional nature of his attachment to the analyst, but that nothing is gained thereby, the transference becoming inoperative only when the affect attaching to the analyst is traced to its primary origin—namely, to that of which the analyst is the imago. That, in essence, is true, but Stekel tells us that in the case under consideration the transference became dissolved when he was able to show the patient that because the patient's father did not believe that the patient's illness was serious, and the analyst thought the case not a serious one, the patient identified the analyst with the father, and became angry with the former, thus developing resistance in the course of the treatment. The deeper, more repressed sources of resistance, in so far as they emanate from the transference, in the form of identifying analyst with father, both in the negative and positive phases, the powerful motives present in the latter for getting well, are not mentioned. The impression one gets in reading of the transference is that the patient is a sort of rascal, trying to outwit, to fool the analyst, as if the analyst had to suspect the patient. That a patient wishes to get well is shown by his coming to the analyst. That there are deep-rooted motives, originating primarily in the repression, that block the treatment, every analyst knows by virtue of his knowledge of the construction of a neurotic illness. The patient cer-

tainly is in the main unconscious of these phenomena; his resistances to accepting the unconscious into consciousness are gradually made less strong as his ego ideal approaches more closely to the demands of reality. For a clear, short description of this matter, the reader is referred to Freud's *General Introduction*, page 372. As presented by Stekel, it all looks so easy, so simple, to be mastered with so little time and effort. For instance, on page 94, Stekel states, quite correctly, that patients will use subterfuges, such as attempting to discuss scientific matters relating to psychoanalysis, or other matters, in order to maintain the repression, to maintain the resistances against bringing to consciousness the unconscious material. But this is a minor incident in the recognition of the resistances of the patient. Stekel is also correct in stating that a patient is better off for not reading psychoanalytic material during the course of the analysis, for reading will undoubtedly "educate" his resistances, as some one has said. In spite of all the favorable points that one can find in this book, the reviewer feels that the presentation is of so superficial and fragmentary a nature that no beginner should rely upon it solely as an introduction to the technique of psychoanalysis.

A few words as to the applications of the various forms of therapy. The reviewer wishes to call the attention of the reader to the introductory remarks of the translator apropos of the scope of this little book: "It is most helpful and highly instructive to find one of the pioneers discussing so frankly the limitations and the possible dangers of psychoanalysis. That is a much needed lesson, and it should save many an over-enthusiastic beginner from regrettable errors." The reviewer has pointed out how in his opinion Stekel's presentation of the intricacies of the technique of psychoanalysis is superficial, giving the reader an impression of its being easily learned and applied. With this in mind, let us view the field of its application, and the prognosis, as the author discusses it. On page 41, we find: "Prognosis is favorable in anxiety neurosis; the condition is curable in from four to six weeks. The compulsion neuroses prove refractory in about one-third of the cases, and require a somewhat longer period. . . .



Excellent results are achieved in cases of psychic impotence, when verbal suggestion is often all that is necessary. . . . A certain amount of analysis may be required. . . . Sexual anaesthesia in women is more difficult to overcome, though it, too, is a most promising field for psychoanalytic endeavor. . . . The various forms of hysteria require longer treatment, sometimes as long as half a year. Stuttering is curable in a short time. The results are excellent. *Startling* results are also achieved in the treatment of epilepsy. Thus far I have indicated but a small portion of the field in which psychoanalysis and psychotherapy in general may be successfully applied." Then follows a long list of what in reality are symptoms—i.e., "baffling 'rheumatic' pains, ties, constipation, asthma of nervous origin, inability to work . . . in short, all disorders which indicate a psychogenous (neurotic) component." On page 44 still further fields for psychoanalytic therapy are indicated.

The reviewer's comment on the above has to do with the lack of moderation of the claims made and the great tendency that the beginner, in particular, will wax too enthusiastic over such favorable reports as Stekel gives here. For instance, in reference to hypnotic treatment, on page 33, he states: "I have been able to effect a cure, in the end, with every case that had not been subjected too long to other methods." Those who are actively, conscientiously engaged in treating patients with psychoanalysis would feel highly gratified if they could report such favorable results; moreover, the reviewer thinks that he is correct in stating that results are not obtained in so short a time as Stekel claims, from a few weeks to four months in the severe cases, even though as a rule analysts have not overlooked what he points out—namely, that a patient may be analyzed too long, that cutting the treatment short may stimulate the patient in his efforts to hasten the cure. That is true, but experience teaches that one should be careful in putting this procedure into operation in the face of persisting symptoms.

The author's discussion of the results of treatment have in the main been taken up in the preceding paragraph. It might be added that his bad prognosis in the treatment of the

perversions and the insanities is well justified. On page 109, in speaking again of results, the author says: "Looking over my results, I have reason to be *very well* contented. . . . On the whole, it may be affirmed that psychoanalysis has proved itself superior to all other forms of psychotherapy . . ." The reviewer agrees with the second statement, and would like to feel the same about the first. While psychoanalysis has done more than any other method, both in the way of therapy and in furthering the study of psychogenic conditions, yet so much still remains to be attained that it behooves one to be cautious in tabulating results, if for no other reason than that such caution stimulates one to improve one's deeper knowledge of the neuroses and psychoses and one's technique.

Stekel gives some consideration to the dangers of psychoanalysis, due for the most part to a lack of understanding of its nature, in the hands of those not qualified to treat patients by its agency. It is true of any branch of medicine—surgery, for instance—that it can do harm. But the important point is that the danger of any instrument depends upon the user, and not on the instrument *per se*. Psychoanalysis is a powerful agent. If any radical results are to be accomplished, one must have good tools, but one must know how to use them. As Stekel states, one who is to practice psychoanalysis must have good training, and a certain bent, to begin with, in the way of comprehending psychic phenomena. As a prime requisite, the future analyst must be himself analyzed by a competent analyst.

The reviewer cannot resist the temptation to enter at this point upon what may appear to be controversial matter. Freud and his followers maintain what appears to be an inactive attitude during the course of a psychoanalysis, allowing the patient, as Stekel (page 136) claims, "to pursue his own course". He adds that such a procedure is unworthy of "a science which calls itself psychotherapy", that the physician must be the patient's educator, must "point out to him the path to useful activity and health; with kind, but firm hand he must turn him away from the realm of his useless

phantasies and train him to carry on his work", and so forth. Even the Freudian school, he states, "has at last been compelled to recognize 'active psychoanalysis' ". It is of this "active psychoanalysis" that the reviewer wishes to speak briefly.

Psychoanalysis has as its object the bringing to the consciousness of the patient of the unconscious material that is the cause of his neurosis. The analyst watches the patient's difficulties slowly unfold, indicating to him at the proper time such material as he thinks the patient can grasp and understand, having in mind constantly the aim of making plain to the patient the nature and source of his resistances, setting free in this way libidinous fixations that are responsible for symptoms and hampering character traits, putting at the disposal of the patient energy previously consumed in symptom formation. The analyst is careful to refrain from giving advice to patients as to course of procedure in situations outside of the analysis. The object of the analysis is to get the patient to accept truths that he previously repressed. This he does gradually, as his ego ideal becomes less ascetic, approaching in this way the demands of reality. "Active therapy" is used when, for instance, a symptom persists in spite of the fact that the unconscious material responsible for its formation has been rendered conscious. In such a case it is found that if the patient exposes himself to the anxiety brought on by doing that which he fears—*i.e.*, if a patient who is afraid to cross a street alone does so on the advice of the analyst—the anxiety is increased and unconscious material connected with the symptom formation is activated and brought nearer to consciousness and investigation. The protecting measures (the patient crossing a street only if accompanied) have served to keep inactive the most repressed material having to do with the symptom, thereby diminishing the anxiety. The object of "active psychoanalysis" is not, as Stekel seems to think, an attempt to lead the patient or to make him feel better by active aid and advice, but to activate a sluggish process in order to give it a better opportunity to heal. The reviewer believes

it was Ferenczi who likened the process of "active psychoanalysis" to a counterirritant applied to a sluggish ulcer to promote healing.

To avoid "regrettable errors and excesses", the beginner in psychotherapy, who wishes to learn the value of the hard, patient work necessary to master the genesis and nature of neurotic phenomena, and the agencies employed in treating them, is advised to put off the reading of such books as this under review until he has studied standard works and mastered them, until he has been analyzed by a competent analyst. After he has gone through these steps, the reading of Stekel's book cannot lead him into over-enthusiasm, in spite of the glowing enthusiasm of its author. The beginner not so protected is not safe from danger. For one finds little in the book to indicate that more is known of the various psychotherapeutic measures, and of the illnesses to be treated by their means, than it contains. While the author does make some reference to the sources of his material, he nowhere suggests that it would be advisable for the beginner to consult these and other books in order to understand more clearly what the author himself has set forth briefly and incompletely. A book for beginners should contain a good bibliography. It should stimulate to further study. It should make clear on every possible occasion that it is a book for beginners and not a textbook containing nearly all that is known on the subjects treated. In addition to the shortcomings already pointed out, the book under review does not meet these requirements.



## THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE GROUP\*

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This book offers an interesting study of the emotional aspects of group phenomena, submitting them to an investigation from a psychoanalytic point of view. In his approach to this problem, the author brings to his aid his rich experience with the neurotically ill, and his previous efforts to throw light upon those aspects of primal man that seemed open to elaboration with the aid of psychoanalytic knowledge. There is here much food for thought. The author in working out his theme has broadened our conception of the emotional factors concerned in hypnotism and suggestion, not only in so far as they obtain between two people, but also as they apply to a group. Valuable insight into the psychology of normal love is afforded by the author in working out the relationship between being in love and hypnosis, and the application of this comparison to group psychology. The importance of the repressed (unconscious) sexual feelings of the child for its parent of the opposite sex, the feelings called "inhibited in their aim" (*zielgehemmt*), is here emphasized not only because of the part these play in the development of the normal love life and in neurotic illness, but also because of the influence they exert in such phenomena as suggestion and hypnosis, and in the emotional component of group psychology.

The herd instinct, as expounded by Trotter, is subjected to a constructive criticism by Freud in his contention that this instinct is psychologically further reducible; that it is not an instinct in the same sense as the sex and the self-preservative. Of a more technical nature are those features of the work in which the author throws added light upon the psychogenesis of homosexuality, and the rôle of the ego and

\* GROUP PSYCHOLOGY AND THE ANALYSIS OF THE EGO. By Sigmund Freud. Authorized translation by James Strachey. London: International Psychoanalytic Press, 1922. 134 p.

the ego ideal in melancholia, both subjects that Freud has previously written upon, and elaborates here. Of interest is it that the author, in his attempt to explain in particular the rôle of the leader and his influence over the group member, gained further insight into the already surmised "differentiating grades" (*stufe*) in the organization of the ego, with its libidinal attributes. The importance of the process of identification in group formation, and as a phenomenon of libidinal disposal, indicating a step from auto-eroticism to object love, are here given added value.

In a review that will be read in the main by those not actively engaged in the practice of psychoanalysis, it seems advisable to give more space to such aspects of the book as will interest the general reader, at the same time interspersing such features of a technical nature as will aid in the understanding of the general theme of group psychology as elaborated by the author.

Freud approaches his problem of the study of the group<sup>1</sup> by setting himself three questions to answer, viz.: "What is a group? How does it acquire the capacity for exercising such influence over the mental life of the individual? And what is the nature of the mental change which it forces upon the individual?"

Quoting liberally from Le Bon's *Psychologie de Foules*<sup>2</sup> Freud deduces that an individual, in a group that is not highly organized, differs in the following characteristics from that same individual when he is not one of a group. A group individual may yield to the highest, most heroic and generous emotional impulses, without taking any note of personal consideration; or he may yield to the crudest and coarsest impulses. He acts as if he had unlimited might and power; is troubled with no doubt or uncertainty; believes anything if said forcefully or authoritatively; is cruel, violent, fickle, hasty in judgment, extremely suggestible, imposes no inhibitions upon himself, is incapable of any sound reasoning; behaves like "an unruly child or an untutored savage". The

<sup>1</sup> German *Masse*, popularly "crowd". The translator's suggestion of the use of the word "group" is adopted in this review.

<sup>2</sup> *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind*, by Gustave le Bon. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1920.

group individual yields to force, power, and fear; he acts from unconsciously motivated impulses. As Freud suggests, these are no new characteristics. They reside in the unconscious of every individual, and as a member of a group, he finds he can without any punishment dispense with repression and indulge fully in otherwise prohibited impulses. Freud here draws an analogy between the hysteric, who accepts phantasy as reality, and the group individual acting on psychological reality, instead of objective reality. The two characteristics of the group would, then, be (1) a heightened affectivity and (2) an inhibition of intellectual functioning.

A group, then, acts as a unit because of some cementing influence, the individual members acting as if they were hypnotized or fascinated. Suggestibility is an outstanding group phenomenon. Contagion spreads through a group very readily, in the words of McDougall, by the process of "primitive induction of emotion", another term for "imitation". While Le Bon traces back the peculiar phenomena of the group to suggestion and the prestige of the leader, in the words of Freud, "prestige is only recognizable by its capacity for evoking suggestion". Freud is not satisfied with these attempts to explain group phenomena, especially in that the emotional element recognized in general by writers on group psychology is called "suggestion", and that this is treated as if it were an irreducible quantity. Another criticism offered by Freud in regard to the group psychology of the above writers is that the part played by the leader is not given sufficient recognition.

In seeking further light upon the suggestibility of the group, Freud has recourse to the libido theory of the emotions. Libido is the love force found in all people, and in psychoanalytical work it has been found that emotions (affects) not ordinarily grouped under the connotation "sexual" are discovered upon analysis to have their origin therein. This resulted in widening the range of the term libido or love to embrace emotional relationships and affect phenomena like the "Eros" of Plato; to quote Freud, "when the apostle Paul, in his famous Epistle to the Corin-

thians, prizes love above all else, he certainly understands it in the same 'wider' sense". The reference is to the following, quoted by Freud: "Though I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not love, I am become as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal." It is in this love relationship, in this emotional element, that Freud seeks to find that which is responsible for the power of suggestion influencing the individual in a group. To use his own words, "a group is held together by a power of some kind, and to what power can this feat be better ascribed than to the 'Eros' which holds together everything in the world?"

To illustrate the nature and direction of the emotional ties in groups, Freud instances the Christian Church and the army. Therein he illuminatingly develops that in the case of the former, the love that Christ bears His brethren equally without favor, and that every Christian bears Him, has much to do with Christians being brothers, brothers in Christ, loving one another as Christ loves them. In the army the same regard by the commander-in-chief for each soldier through the various sub-chiefs has its influence in maintaining an *esprit de corps*, in that all are treated with equal justice and concern. Panic in an army, for instance, breaks out more readily, and assumes more dangerous proportions, when the emotional ties between the various components are weak. Each one then looks out for himself; group ties are broken. In the same way the sudden loss of the leader, his being killed, may precipitate a panic, since the emotional ties that bind the chief to the soldiers is severed. The emotional ties on the one hand between the individuals of a group and the head, as in church and army, and on the other among the members of the group for one another, serve to limit the activity of the individual in the group except in so far as he acts in concert, because of his emotional attachment in two directions. Outside of the group, these ties are not binding, and the individual does act more independently. In the opinion of the reviewer, the above deductions on the part of Freud serve to illustrate the importance of the emotional ties in the maintenance of group cohesion and unity.

Love, then, is, in a "wide" sense, an important binding



element in a group. It accounts for the limitation or diminution of hostility among the group members, the sinking of differences and prejudices for the "sake of the cause", not preventing at the same time the exhibition of envy, jealousy, and the like, on the part of the group or its individuals toward other groups or individuals outside of the group in question. The limitations, the infringements upon the narcissistic self-love entailed by virtue of the existence of love for the leader and the other group members account at least in a measure for this. The process effects a development from egoism to altruism. This love, an important factor in the civilizing process of both individual and race, has in it none of the directly sexual aspect of love. It depends for its activity and efficacy upon the de-sexualized component of the love impulse, and represents a step in the development of the love impulse toward object love. To this step Freud has given the name of "identification", and defines it "as the earliest expression of an emotional tie with another person".

The most typical example of identification is that found as one of the first steps in the development of the Oedipus complex, in which the little boy wishes to be like his father in every respect, and do what the father does. The father becomes the child's "ideal". This characteristically masculine attitude goes hand in hand for some time with a sexual attachment to the mother, until the fully developed Oedipus complex appears, in which the father is looked upon as an intruder, to be displaced. This now implies an identification with hostility for the person serving as the model. In the psychogenesis of male homosexuality, in the case of a boy strongly fixated on his mother, when, with puberty or shortly thereafter, the need arises to detach himself from the fixation that he may be free to choose a stranger outside of the home as his new love object, the boy, unable to do so, instead of abandoning the love object upon which he is fixated—namely, the mother—identifies himself with her. With his ego thus sexually changed in character, he becomes feminine, and takes such an attitude toward the male as his mother at one time took toward him. Freud instances other forms of identification, including among them a process of identification on the

part of the ego with the lost love object which is concerned in the psychogenesis of melancholia. While this is of value to psychiatry, it need only be mentioned here to shed light upon the widespread existence of the process of identification, and its connection with the theme of group psychology. The point emphasized in this connection is that in the process of identification the libidinal (emotional) element is the wish to *be* (like) the love object, while in object love, the desire is to *have* the loved person.

While this is only the most meager account of the process of identification as found in psychoanalytic work and as enlarged upon by Freud in this book, the reviewer hopes that it will indicate the existence of the process in group psychology with sufficient clearness to enable the reader to understand the part it plays in the development of the theme.

Freud seeks to make this clearer by drawing upon findings in psychoanalysis with regard to normal heterosexual love and hypnosis, and comparing the emotional elements in the two fields. A condensation of the wealth of material offered in this connection is somewhat as follows: What is commonly called sensual love rarely yields, of itself, the most durable sort of union, or one that exists on a high plane. Combined with tender regard, in which the directly sexual elements are pushed into the background, love (heterosexual) approaches the ideal in proportion to the preponderance of the former over the latter. In children the directly sexual feelings directed toward the parents are repressed about the age of five, and the love ties for the parents from then on are based upon such emotions as are "inhibited in their aim", though the repressed still exists in the unconscious. These impulses, "inhibited in their aim", when joined at puberty with the directly sexual, are responsible for the existence of the tender (*zärtliche*) feelings for the love object, producing an "over-estimation" of the latter, bringing out the sentimental, spiritual side of love. The sexual may recede so far into the background that it plays apparently little or no part in the picture; the lover idealizes the loved object, in complete submission to his ideal. The love object is beyond criticism, takes on an idealization which may be in effect the idealiza-

tion accorded by the lover to his own ego ideal found in the love object, but not reached by his own ego. The ego satisfies its narcissism, in that "the perfection his own ego could not reach, he finds in the idealized love object". In extreme cases the love object becomes more and more "precious and sublime", the ego correspondingly smaller, so that the directly sexual plays little or no part, though in fact its repression is responsible for the idealization. Freud's formulation of this is as follows: "The object has taken the place of the ego ideal." This expresses a crystallization of the process.

To continue with the comparison between being in love and hypnosis, illustrating thereby the most important emotional ties present in group formation, in hypnosis, just as in the situation of being in love, there is a complete yielding to the influence and control of the hypnotist; there is a loss of initiative, regard is directed exclusively toward the hypnotist; there is the same absence of criticism, the same complete acceptance, as in the condition of being in love. The hypnotist steps into the place of the ego ideal, because of the idealization of the hypnotist by the subject. The similarity to "ideal" love is more apt because in both situations there is an absence of the directly sexual impulses. The subject is fascinated by the hypnotist, just as the lover is by the love object. "The hypnotic relation is the devotion of some one in love to an unlimited degree, but with sexual satisfaction excluded; whereas in the case of being in love this kind of satisfaction is only temporarily held back, and remains in the background as a possible aim at some later time." The hypnotic relation may be described as a group relation in which only two are concerned. It is the relation in a group of the individual to the leader. Freud then attempts to formulate the libidinal (emotional) constitution of a group with a leader, a group that has not undergone too much organization, in the meaning of McDougall's conception of organized groups. The formulation is as follows: "A primary group of this kind is a number of individuals who have substituted one and the same object for their ego ideal,

and have consequently identified themselves with one another in their ego."

Freud's comment upon his own deductions thus far is that they emphasize too much the relationship of the individual in a group to the leader, and relegate to an unimportant position that of mutual suggestion. To clear up this apparent neglect, he seeks to submit to a further analysis the herd instinct, "gregariousness", as defined by Trotter in *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*.<sup>1</sup> With reference to this attempt on the part of Trotter to explain the mental phenomena of the herd, Freud's criticism is that Trotter seeks the explanation of these phenomena in an irreducible herd instinct, and does not give sufficient emphasis to the leader in a group. In Freud's opinion this instinct cannot be accepted as a biological element in the same sense as the sex and self-preserved instincts. Freud readily admits the existence of the sense of guilt and duty, as well as the possession of repressive forces. "Psychoanalysis, however, has found these phenomena existing in the ego." In the study of the ontogenesis of the herd instinct, Trotter cites, as evidence of the existence of the instinct in a child, that it will exhibit dread (fear) when alone. Freud, on the contrary, attempts to explain this on the basis that it is not merely the being alone that excites the fear, but the absence of some familiar (loved) person, the mother; and adds that the fear of the child is not allayed by the sight of "any haphazard 'member of the herd', but on the contrary it is only brought into existence by the approach of a 'stranger' ". Freud suggests that we can see the origin of this herd instinct of Trotter in children, who at the start show little or no evidence of its existence, when they learn to repress the feelings of jealousy aroused by the advent into the family of newborn children. Since the child would forfeit or endanger the love of its parents for it by continued expression of jealousy for the newcomer, it will forego such expression to insure the continuation of the parental love, on the ground that all the children will share that love equally—that there will be no favorites. In school, where next in the life of the child it comes under

<sup>1</sup> New York: The Macmillan Company, 1916.



the influence of the group, the same mechanism aids in the maintenance of group spirit—namely, equal justice to all. In the “most generalized form of assemblage” in which man passes his life, and the one chosen by Trotter as the kind of group formation that he seeks to explain, man will submit to group formation, aided thereto in part by the feeling that “social justice means that we deny ourselves many things so that others may have to do without them, or, what is the same thing, may not be able to ask for them. This demand for equality is the root of social conscience and the sense of duty. . . . Thus social feeling is based upon the reversal of what was first a hostile feeling into a positively toned tie of the nature of an identification . . . . This reversal seems to be effected under the influence of a common tender tie with a person outside the group.” The group members, as we saw in the examples of the church and the army, identified themselves with one another on the basis of being equally loved by the leader. All the members are equal, and are ruled by one, the leader. “Many equals, who can identify themselves with one another, and a single person superior to them all—that is the situation we find realized in groups which are capable of subsisting. Let us then venture to correct Trotter’s pronouncement that man is a herd animal and assert that he is rather a horde animal, an individual creature in a horde led by a chief.”

True to his desire to probe into the validity of generally accepted phenomena, Freud attempts—to be sure, from highly conjectural and problematical material—to bring Darwin’s theory of the construction of primitive human society as a horde ruled over by a despotic leader, a powerful male, to aid him in finding therein a starting point for the group formation of to-day. In accord with this reasoning, the psychology of the primitive horde or group is like the regressive phenomena of primitive mentation of the not highly organized group individual of to-day, emotionally acting in concert with diminished intellectual and individual functioning. The leader of the primitive group acted independently, intellectually and emotionally. His self-love (narcissism) and independence were unlimited. “He loved

no one but himself, or other people only in so far as they served his needs." His subjects were awed by him; they feared him; they feared his magic eye, and avoided his presence; they were dominated by him. The primal man still exists and "emerges in every individual, and the primal horde in any random crowd". In such organizations as the church and the army, for instance, cohesion and unity owe much to the "illusion" that every individual is loved equally by the leader. "But this is simply an idealistic remodeling of the state of affairs in the primal horde, where all of the sons knew they were equally persecuted by the primal father, and feared him equally."

From the influence of the primal father upon the horde, Freud deduces further insight into the "enigmatic" effect of hypnotism and suggestion upon group formation. The hypnotist even to-day is invested with magic power, he is credited with emanating "animal magnetism" to his subject, similar to the "mana" of the savage, making it dangerous for the member of the tribe to be in his presence or to meet his glance. The hypnotist effects his results chiefly by the power of his gaze, his eye. There is complete submission of the subject to the will of the hypnotist; the former concerns himself with the person of the latter only, to the exclusion of everything else. The subject yields by virtue of his "passive-masochistic" attitude, this attitude being in part the result of his yielding in childhood to the parental influence, according to Ferenczi, and in addition, according to Freud, to the individual's archaic inheritance from the primal horde. This yielding or submission is the attitude of primal man to his chief or leader, to the primal father.

A summing up of the deductions in relation to the influence of the primal horde and the primal father upon groups of to-day, and of the part that suggestion and hypnosis play in group psychology, may be best done in Freud's own words, as follows: "The uncanny [traced by Freud, in his book, *Totem and Taboo*,<sup>1</sup> to the familiar of old] and coercive characteristics of group formations, which are shown in their

<sup>1</sup> Authorized English translation by A. A. Brill. New York: Moffat, Yard, and Company, 1918.

suggestive phenomena, may therefore justly be traced to the fact of their origin from the primal horde. The leader of the group is still the dreaded primal father; the group still wishes to be governed by unrestricted force; it has an extreme passion for authority; in Le Bon's phrase, it has a thirst for obedience. The primal father is the group ideal, which governs the ego in place of the ego ideal. Hypnosis has a good claim to being described as [taking place] in a group of two; there remains as a definition for suggestion a conviction which is not based upon perception and reasoning, but upon an erotic tie."

A study of the individual in a group shows that he has effected an emotional tie with the leader on the basis of an identification with him, by substituting the leader for his ego ideal and at the same time forming an emotional tie with the other members of the group by identifying his ego with theirs. Psychoanalytic study of the individual under other circumstances has also shown this "differentiating grade" in the ego. In the process of mental development, the individual separated a "coherent" ego from a repressed unconscious portion outside of this. Though protected by resistances, the unconscious manages on certain occasions to evade the ego ideal, acting as a censor, with a consequent gain of pleasure; in dreams and the neuroses we see partial success of the demands of the ego for pleasurable activity. In the opinion of Freud, the Saturnalia of the Romans, the festivals of some savage tribes, and our present-day carnivals, indicate the demands of the ego for a pleasure denied by customs in force at other times; at such times indulgences and transgressions are permitted of "what are at other times the most sacred commandments. . . . But the ego ideal comprises the sum of all the limitations in which the ego has to acquiesce, and for that reason the abrogation of the ideal would necessarily be a magnificent festival for the ego, which might then once again feel satisfied with itself", this last being a condition present as an absolute "self-sufficient narcissism" in intra-uterine life, suffering its first disturbance with birth and subject to restrictions by the ego ideal in the course of mental development.

This "differentiating grade" in the ego shows an interesting activity, according to Freud, in the manic-depressive psychoses. Without going into any technical detail, the gist of the deductions is that in the depressive phase the ego ideal rules with special strictness and severity the ego, into which has been incorporated the lost or given-up love object, now hated. The result of the relentless criticism and condemnation exercised manifests itself in the form of delusions of guilt and inferiority. In the manias—rather, when a depression changes to mania—an explanation of the change offered by Freud is that the ego ideal is fused into the ego, which has rebelled against the harsh treatment on the part of the ego ideal, and that now the ego reigns in place of the ego ideal. It now abolishes all inhibitions, indulging in a "festival" in the form of a mania.

The last chapter of the book embodies interesting elaborations of some points left incomplete in preceding chapters. Further investigation of the fate of the repressed sexual impulses (those inhibited in their aim) is made. The observation that the direct sexual tendencies and group formation are inimical to each other is further elaborated. In this connection Freud adds that the sense of shame is developed from a rejection of the influence of the group. Some suggestion is also made in this last chapter with regard to the development of normal love.

In closing, the reviewer wishes to say that because of the suggestive leads given in this book, a study of it ought to be of interest not only to the psychoanalyst, but to students who occupy themselves in other psychological fields. The widespread, profound, unconsciously exerted influence of the emotions in all sorts of human relationships receives in this book an emphasis that will be a stimulus to workers in the most varied fields of human activities.



## A FRENCH VIEW OF PSYCHOTHERAPY\*

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In a very pleasantly written and interesting little volume, published in Paris, Dr. Pierre Janet of the College of France, presents both his own views on the subject of psychological therapy and the history of semi-psychological and pseudo-psychological treatment of the mentally ill. Much of the material is summarized, as he states, from earlier works, and the volume would have profited by a more careful and systematic arrangement of the contributions. Nevertheless, the impression that the reader receives of the author's personality is very charming and much of an informative and enlightening nature is to be gathered from the three hundred pages. The book may be viewed as a summary of what this well-known and distinguished figure in the field of psychotherapy has contributed through his voluminous writings.

The introduction states that "the first part of this book will summarize briefly the evolution of various methods of mental treatment by showing their historical origin; the second part will study psychological phenomena and the laws on which are based the most interesting of these methods; and the third will indicate in what manner these methods of treatment can be applied with some chance of success".

Under the heading *The Evolution of Psychotherapy*, the miracles of magic and of the church are considered briefly, while much time is given to an account of the doctrine of animal magnetism. "Animal magnetism", Janet writes, "seems to me to have played the rôle of intermediary between religious and magical treatments and the psychological measures of therapy; the studies that it has caused have prepared analyses of pathological psychology and have given a distinctive orientation to a large part of the science of psy-

\* *LA MÉDECINE PSYCHOLOGIQUE*. By Pierre Janet, M.D. Paris: Flammarion, 1923. 288 p.

chology." The first period of animal magnetism began with Mesmer (1734-1815), who is considered the founder of mesmerism, but who is the least interesting of its writers. He was clever enough to talk of forces little known—of electricity, of nervous forces, of the influences of the planets which have an effect upon the human body by means of a universal fluid, and so forth. The second period began in 1886 or 1887 with the publications of the Marquis de Puységur or Dr. Pétetin. By accident Puységur produced a sleep in a patient which he termed somnambulism by analogy, and after this the study of producing somnambulism artificially was taken up. These early hypnotists felt that they were on the way to transforming a human spirit, to making it understand everything and know everything, but in spite of their philosophical hopes, they gave much careful attention to the patient, studying his mental states, the rôle of emotion, of attention and fatigue, so that for half a century these studies were preparing the way for contemporary psychology.

As modern varieties of animal magnetism, Janet considers Christian Science—of which he gives an entertaining account, including some analysis of the psychology of Mrs. Eddy and her debt to P. P. Quimby—and hypnotic suggestion. The action of charms and amulets was "understood" in the Middle Ages, while in the seventeenth century Malebranche studied the "contagious communication of strong imaginations", and at the end of the eighteenth Maine de Biran, the "father" of modern psychology, De Beauchene, and Demangeon connected facts of this sort with the general laws of thought. Soon began the celebrated quarrel between the animal magnetists and the fluidists. Bertrand, in 1820, was the first to state clearly that artificial somnambulism can be explained simply by the law of the imagination of the subject, who sleeps because he thinks he sleeps and awakes for the same reason. The hypnotists showed themselves as distinct from the animists by this attitude of discarding the miraculous and attempting to study the laws of mental life. Very soon suggestion and hypnotism were applied to the treatment of nervous troubles, and good results were

obtained by Lasegue, Morel, Georget, and Liebault. An attempt was made to study the anæsthetic value of hypnotism, but unfortunately at just this time the discovery of ether put an end to these researches, and about 1865 suggestion and hypnotism seemed forgotten as completely as animal magnetism itself.

For about twenty years hypnotism was scorned and left to charlatans, men of science not daring to concern themselves with it because of its being associated with the bad reputation of animal magnetism. From 1875 to 1883, however, a psychological school of hypnotism grew up about Charles Richet, which Janet considers of more scientific interest, although less known, than the ones that developed at the Salpêtrière and at Nancy. Charcot, by a veritable *tour de force*, made the Academy of Sciences, which had already three times condemned all research in animal magnetism, accept the result of his studies of the hypnotism of hystericals. The success of Charcot was extraordinary, but his conceptions were demolished to a great degree by the little manifesto which Bernheim of Nancy put out in 1884. The great battle was then on, but as Janet, himself a pupil of Charcot, says, the hypnotism of three phases, after Charcot, is simply "*un hypnotisme de culture*", and the victory has gone to Bernheim. Immediately after the death of Charcot, hypnotism fell again into decline, physicians ceased to speak of it, while Dubois (of Berne) felt that in this treatment the dignity of the physician was lowered so that he himself "*a le rouge au front quand il se souvient qu'il lui est arrive de suggestionner un enfant pour l'empêcher de pisser au lit*".

Under the heading of *La Liquidation des Souvenirs Traumatiques et la Psychoanalyse*, some interesting digs are made at the Freudians. In psychoanalysis, "there is a considerable development of a psychotherapeutic practice which recalls the enthusiasms excited by mesmerism, Christian Science, or hypnotism". Janet declares that in 1886-89 he himself stated that amnesia was often produced, not only for facts of the somnambulistic state, but for events of the ordinary life, when these events had been accompanied by a violent emotion, and that he studied cases by this method and

explained the particular modification of consciousness which had taken place in the forgetting under the name of "*sub-conscience par désagrégation*". At this time a "foreign doctor", Sigmund Freud, came to the Salpêtrière and became interested in these studies. He published new observations of the same sort, calling Janet's psychological analysis psychoanalysis. Janet's "psychological system" Freud termed "complex", and Janet's "psychological dissociation" he baptized by the name of "catharsis". "But above all he transformed a clinical observation and a therapeutic process of precise and limited indications into a vast system of medical philosophy." It is the "originality" of psychoanalysis that it finds, not in some neurotics, but in all, traumatic memories relative to sexual adventures. "The most bizarre interpretations and sometimes the most extravagant attitudes, of words and above all of dreams, have no other object than to discover at any price in the subconscious impressive memories of this sort." "Psychoanalysis is to-day the last incarnation of those practices at once magical and psychological that characterized magnetism. . . . It is probable that it also will . . . decline; but like magnetism and hypnotism, it will have played a large rôle and given a useful impulse to psychological studies."

In the chapter *Les Therapeutiques Issues des Pratiques Religieuses*, Janet treats the value of isolation for nervous troubles, first realized in convent life, as well as the significance of reëducation, which has always played a great rôle in religious and monastic institutions. "The idea of applying to pathological troubles the procedure of education seems to have acquired importance as a sequel to the work of Séguin (1837-1846) and of those who occupied themselves with the treatment of idiots and the mentally deficient." Charcot was responsible for the regular treatment of hysterical paralysis by the reëducation of movements. A second epoch was characterized by the application of similar treatment to the paralyzed and to disturbances in movement of organic origin. In a third epoch these treatments were applied to various troubles presented by the neurotic which are not attacks of hysteria, properly speaking—most often



to motor troubles and in particular to the ties of the psychasthenic. Persons with phobias are customarily maladroit and might be greatly benefited by this training in movement. This method of treatment is the opposite and the best criticism of the "rest cure" of Weir Mitchell.

The moral suasion of Dubois is likened to the treatment of Mrs. Eddy and is followed by a discussion of treatment by faith and by work. "In spite of the vague character of many of these studies, the authors have well displayed an idea which we have perhaps helped to establish—that nervous troubles arise from a fundamental alteration of activity. It is not a question of a trouble of sensibility, of memory, of reason, but of the functions of synthesis,<sup>1</sup> of the conception of reality, of psychological tensions." In France, Dejerine has followed the conception of Dubois and declares: "For me, the foundation, the sole basis on which psychotherapy rests, is the beneficent influence of one person upon another." Janet agrees that the personality of the physician may be helpful to the patient, and that the assumption by the physician of the direction of the patient's movements and activities is at times desirable, but he refuses to consider this method of treatment as at all sufficient for the various problems involved.

"Psychological troubles are troubles of conduct, and conduct is nothing but the *ensemble* of the external reactions of the living being. These external reactions cannot be regarded as totally independent of the internal actions of the organism. Among the physical symptoms that seem to have a particular importance in the evolution of the neurosis and of which the treatment should have more attention, "*troubles gastro-intestinaux*" are of the highest importance. Some of

<sup>1</sup> In this connection it is interesting to note that Dr. Kohs, in his *Intelligence Measurement* (Macmillan, 1923) uses for his concept of intelligence "the ability of an individual to analyse and synthesize" (p. 172), and that in the use of his "block-design test", which he believes constitutes a measurement of these capacities, there is the indication of a different factor entering into the results of the test when applied to subnormals. For normal subjects the correlation between the "block-design test" and the "Stanford-Binet" was +.81, and for feeble-minded subjects it was +.67. Kohs's contention is that the "block-design tests are a fairer index of their [the feeble-minded] functional efficiency in various occupations than the Binet". (p. 182.)

the patients do not eat enough, but many more eat too much. They show pathologic impulses to eat all day. This is in harmony with the feeling of depression and with the instinct that makes us associate feebleness with hunger and treat it with nourishment. These patients are the inert ones who suffer from feelings of incompleteness. The difficulties of digestion in the stomach and in the intestines that so often accompany the state of mental depression develop in the same conditions as mental troubles after fatigue and emotion. Among women disturbances of the menses appear also. "It is unusual to find a woman seriously attacked by a depressive neurosis who keeps her regular periodicity." Likewise are found the vasomotor troubles with vascular instability. These observations have given rise to a second group of physiological theories of neuroses. Dr. Savill in particular observes that serious modifications of functions can be presented without any modification of structure when there is insufficiency of blood. Studies of the glands of internal secretion have also shown that psychological difficulties are part of the symptoms determined by alterations in these glands.

The treatment of neuroses by repose is one of the most important methods of psychotherapy, for often these symptoms resemble those of fatigue and the circumstances that have precipitated them very frequently involve excessive labor and effort, whether of mental or physical work. Of course many neurotic troubles appear determined by emotions rather than by excessive work, but analysis shows that there is equally in the emotion an excessive expenditure of force and that in many ways the phenomenon of emotion is only a variety of fatigue. This conception, after Jackson and Mitchell and Playfar, was developed more rapidly in America than in France and England. Charcot partly adopted it, and in 1897 Magnan completed the reform of "no restraint" in mental hospitals, substituting treatment in bed for isolation in a cell. As a logical development, the use of hypnotism was tried, and Wetterstrand of Stockholm used the method of putting his patients into a hypnotic state, during which he

suggested to them repose and sleep, in which condition he left them sometimes for more than three weeks.

In the second part of his work, Janet attempts to extract from the previous history those principles of treatment the validity of which is established; hence he treats of much the same material from a slightly different point of view—not so different, however, as would have been possible had he reserved his criticisms for this section. The first chapter considers again “*l'action morale*”, with the conclusion that we cannot deny completely the power of the therapeutic measures used by Mrs. Eddy and Dubois. Often valuable observations are secured, but the danger lies in inexact generalizations. Janet denies, however, that an ill can be cured by telling the patient the truth about his malady, if for no other reason than because of the difficulty of knowing the truth.

In discussing the characteristics of suggestion, he states that the subject always responds by action of some sort, but that this action is never completely carried out. “*La suggestion est une réaction particulière à certaines perceptions. Cette réaction consiste dans l'activation plus ou moins complète de la tendance évoquée, sans que cette activation soit complétée par la collaboration du reste de la personnalité.*” Hypnotism is not so simple to explain; it is a “momentary and transient transformation of the mental state of an individual, sufficient to bring dissociations of personal memory and determined artificially by another man”. But for suggestion or hypnotism to operate, it is necessary that “the subject possess in himself a disposition to accomplish the action, which one can call a tendency”.

Under the heading *Psychological Economies*, Janet gives a number of interesting, if not entirely conclusive, views, particularly on the nature of fatigue and of psychological “*épuisement*”. “Fatigue is in reality a normal condition and not a disorder of the health; fatigue is nothing but the condition of the man who is resting, and the feeling of fatigue is nothing but a certain stage of the activation of this tendency.” This feeling is far from being in proportion to

the actual diminution of forces; it can exist in those who have plenty of reserve strength and can disappear in the ill who have exhausted their reserves. It is difficult to apply the idea of exhaustion to psychological functions, although easy to apply it to physiological, as in speaking of the exhaustion of the function of lactation. Nevertheless, the study of electricity would not have gone far had we waited to use it until we could understand the nature of the electric forces. "We must have the courage to speak of psychological forces, to assert their diminution, their exhaustion, or their increase before knowing what is their nature and on what organ they depend." All the symptoms of hysteria, of delusions, obsessions, phobias, can be summed up by the conception of an insufficiency of psychological forces. "*La notion d'épuisement semble fournir une expression intéressante de ces insuffisances et pour de nombreux auteurs les nevroses sont devenues des maladies par épuisement.*" The origin of emotional trouble is analogous to that of fatigue. "In each case the depression is produced by the expenditure of forces necessitated by action, whether adequate or inadequate."

The writer mildly scorns the physiologists who think to improve their technique by saying of hysteria that "the center of memory is dulled", instead of, "This patient shows forgetfulness", and declares himself wholly for a behavioristic consideration in terms of action and conduct, such as are found in studies of animals.

It is difficult to know what actions are most exhausting, although, as Dejerine put it, they seem to be those accompanied by emotions. There are certain difficult actions which arouse in many persons psychological difficulties, so that we speak of the illness of the first communion, of the engagement, of the honeymoon, and so forth, while changes in manner of living, travel, vacations even, are often causes of exhaustion. "Work, the occupation necessary for earning a living", Janet states, "exacts from almost all a great expenditure of forces. The life of the family, the reciprocal adaptation of persons who live together in the same house, is analogous to the occupational adaptations, and I believe that



this adaptation and its insufficiencies are of the greatest importance in mental hygiene."

"Mental disturbances are not always fatal things of which one carries the germ in oneself and which cannot be avoided. They depend in a great part on the life led by the subject and the situation in which he is placed." Many persons with inherited defects have renounced most of the activities that would precipitate their trouble, avoiding close associations, withdrawing into themselves, and leading fairly tranquil and satisfactory lives. These renunciations are acts of economy which result from the feeling of poverty, and are the equivalent of the fugue, of the impulsion which pushes the neurotic to leave this place at once, to go no matter where, provided he is no longer here. Fear of action in general comes from a recognition of insufficiency of psychological force, or it may be due to association of ideas, extensions of obsessions or delusions. A delicate diagnosis of phobias is required. Bed treatment and repose are for a time very useful, but continued too long, they produce undesirable effects, perhaps even new obsessions. The appearance of a feeling of ennui itself indicates a certain restoration of force. It is seldom necessary to reduce the patient to complete immobility. The true remedy is happiness, the returning of the individual to a simple life in which demands will not exceed his capacity to respond. Hystericals have been cured by a financial inheritance, and the renunciation of excessive ambitions, the acceptance of conditions sufficiently easy, will contribute to this happiness.

Often the removal of the patient from all society is of great benefit, for the relations with his family and friends, repeated every day, are often too costly for him and bring about his psychological ruin. Two particular symptoms are common: the mania for exercising authority when the person is quite incapable of this and the insatiable demand to be loved. By the first the patient seeks the assurance of his own superiority, and, on seeing others obey him, the assurance of their inferiority. By the other, persons incapable of loving any one seek to degrade the one from whom they demand love, thus

again assuring their own superiority. This need of love plays an extensive rôle among the sick; they must feel some one always at their disposal, to defend, console, and amuse them, some one for whose services they will never have to pay anything. This feeling explains the frequent desire to "be loved for oneself alone". Such patients make scenes in order to verify their own power over others. Living with such people is very costly for every one concerned, and although a neurosis is not "contagious", it may develop in a healthy husband or wife who is constantly under the strain of living with a neurotic person. We find often a great number of the neurotic united in the same family or the same place, and this cannot always be explained on the basis of heredity.

Psychically exhausted persons are unable to understand the inevitable and to resign themselves to it; this is an act outside of their powers. Hence they often repeat an act which is badly adapted to the situation. They cannot modify the badly adjusted act, since such modification requires invention and initiative; so they do the simplest thing, repeating again and again the act already started, but seldom bringing it to completion, approaching more and more closely the automatic act. "This lack of adaptation is characteristic of all these patients without exception and it is this that determines most of their troubles as well as their psychic exhaustion."

Janet comments upon the favorable results of discipline as used in the army, some patients having declared that their military service was their happiest period. This beneficent effect is often found also by neurotics who flee to convents, and may even be a characteristic of marriage, in which one partner to the marriage may direct the life of the other through many years of comparative health.

Under the heading *Psychological Acquisitions*, after a fairly commonplace discussion of learning by trial and error and the development of habits (which contains no reference to the conditioned reflex), Janet takes up the three principles of excitation. The first is attributed to William James as the principle of the mobilization of forces. We do not at all

times have at our disposal all the forces that we possess; the reserve is a fluctuating quantity. But in times of danger, of great emotion, and so forth, we perform energetic acts which could not take place without a mobilization of forces. Sick persons themselves tell of being exhausted by little things, while a great unhappiness returns to them all their energy. The more elemental the appeal, the greater the response. After such a discharge, the organism is obliged rapidly to furnish new forces to take the place of those used up, so that the use of these reserves, if not too often repeated, probably brings a desirable excitation of all the functions.

The second principle is that of psychological equilibrium. A woman who has passed through a crisis of emotion will become calm; a patient after an attack of convulsions will enter a quiet state in which he seems more normal than before the attack; patients who have quiet nights may have furious delirium in the morning. Of particular interest is the case of the patient who, as his bodily powers steadily decline, becomes calm in thought, loses his melancholia, and shows a renewed confidence in the future. Epileptics will often have no attacks while they are suffering from pneumonia, or even during convalescence. Through these various changes an equilibrium between the psychic force and the psychic tension is reached. The author's explanation of this is not particularly clear. The establishment of the normal state does not permit an unequal or partial rising of the functions, but requires all functions to be elevated at the same time.

This is expressed in the third principle of irradiation, or of "*syntonisation psychologique*". There must be a certain unity of tone in all the conduct. An energetic act not only puts at our disposition a greater quantity of force, but it also produces a higher tension, just as sleeping or resting produces a lower tension. The man who has committed a theft, a woman who has been told she is beautiful, a patient who has been complimented, will have an increased tension which will last for several days, an irradiation. Excitation that brings about a new disposition of forces may lift the normal person to a higher tension to which we apply the

name enthusiasm or inspiration, while the abnormal it may succeed in bringing back to the normal level below which their tension has sunk.

In his consideration of "applications", at the beginning of the third part of the book, Janet states that the familiar division of nervous maladies into organic and functional has no meaning from the scientific point of view, for there is no illness without some organic modification. In the treatment of the so-called "functional" diseases, he states that suggestion and hypnotism have very erroneously been considered dangerous methods. Unfortunately this is not true—unfortunately, because no treatment is really powerful if it cannot become dangerous and "it is difficult to conceive a method which is at the same time efficacious and inoffensive". In 250 cases treatment by appeal to automatism showed an incontestable value. Conditions under which treatment by education can be used are much the same as those in which suggestion can be used. A much larger group is that of those who present an exhaustion of psychological forces. These patients always show a certain lowering of psychic tension, but the important thing is the exhaustion. Suggestion is of little value to these people, who have retained their reflective powers. Many methods have to be tried, among them the reestablishment of digestive or circulatory functions, modifications of glandular secretion, and the like. The conditions under which it is useful to apply treatments by excitation are the least known and the most difficult to determine.

The following definition of psychotherapy is reached: *"Psychotherapy is an ensemble of therapeutic processes of all sorts, physical as well as mental, applicable to illnesses both physical and mental, processes determined by the consideration of psychological facts previously observed and above all by consideration of the laws which rule the development of these psychological facts and their association, whether among themselves or with physiological facts. In a word, psychotherapy is an application of the science of psychology to the treatment of disease."*

This psychotherapy has not contributed all that was expected of it. Nevertheless, it has brought us to understand



the relative nature of mental disease—that there is only a difference in degree between a slight disturbance of personality and a serious neurosis.

In conclusion, Janet quotes from his larger work on "*les médications psychologiques*": "Psychology is compelled to deal with the problem of the economical administration of the forces of the mind. . . . At present psychiatry is able to utilize well feeble resources through avoiding unnecessary expenditures and through directing effort exactly to the required point. It can do more—it can teach the sick to augment their resources, to enrich their spirit. I hope that these works will not have been entirely useless to those who will one day discover the rules of the efficient administration of the psychological fortune."

## THE RATIONAL BASES OF THE LAW\*

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"To our great regret", said Haeckel, "we must endorse the words of Alfred Wallace: 'Compared with our astounding progress in physical science and its practical application, our system of government, of administrative justice, and of national education, and our entire social and moral organization remain in a state of barbarism.' To convince ourselves of the truth of this grave indictment, we need only cast an unprejudiced glance at our public life or look into the mirror that is daily offered to us by the press, the organ of public sentiment. We begin our review with justice, the *fundamentum regnorum*. . . . We readily admit that the majority of judges and counsel decide conscientiously and err simply from human frailty. Most of their errors, indeed, are due to defective preparation. It is popularly supposed that these are just the men of highest education, and that on that very account they have the preference in nominations to different offices. However, this famed 'legal education' is for the most part rather of a formal and technical character. They have but a superficial acquaintance with that chief and peculiar object of their activity, the human organism, and its most important function, the mind. That is evident from the curious views as to the liberty of the will, responsibility, etc., which we encounter daily. . . . Most of our students of jurisprudence have no acquaintance with anthropology, psychology, and the doctrine of evolution—the very first requisites for a correct estimate of human nature. They have 'no time' for it; their time is already too largely bespoken for lighter pursuits and purposes. Their scanty hours of

\* RATIONAL BASIS OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS. Edited by Albert Kocourek. With an editorial preface by John H. Wigmore, professor of law in Northwestern University, and an Introduction by Oliver Wendell Holmes, justice in the Supreme Court of the United States. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1923. 600 p. (Modern Legal Philosophy Series.)

study are required for the purpose of learning some hundreds of paragraphs of law books, a knowledge of which is supposed to qualify the jurist for any position whatever in our modern civilized community."<sup>1</sup>

While it is evident that Haeckel greatly exaggerates in his denunciation of the legal profession, it cannot be denied that there is much truth in what he says. Haeckel was writing of conditions early in the century that leaders among the teachers of law and members of the bench and bar in America had long pointed out and deplored. But it was not until 1910 that the leading teachers of law in America, at the annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools, agreed that a "modern legal-philosophy series" ought to take its place on the shelves of lawyers and judges with the legal "reports", Blackstone, and other honored denizens of the lawyer's library. At that important meeting a resolution was passed "that a committee of five be appointed by the president, to arrange for the translation and publication of a series of continental master works on jurisprudence and philosophy of law". After much labor the Modern Legal Philosophy Series, including such significant pioneer foreign works as Von Ihering's *Law as a Means to an End* and Kohler's *Philosophy of Law*, and such quarries of foreign and local thought upon the rational (as well as, occasionally, the *rationalized*) bases of legal institutions as *The Scientific Basis of Legal Justice* and the work at present under review, have been added to the armory of the thoughtful teacher of law.

Whether such works are being imbibed, even in sips (not to speak of drafts) by practicing lawyers and judges is another question. There is among members of the legal profession a spirit of suspicion against "mere philosophy", which, as Novalis long ago observed, "bakes no bread". "Law is law" for most lawyers and judges, and not psychology, psychiatry, ethics, economics, sociology. Judges still delight in "strong decisions". We are still reminded that law has little to do with morals, as we were by Lord Esher, in his dictum:

<sup>1</sup> *The Riddle of the Universe*, by Ernst Haeckel. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1905.

"I agree that it is the law, though I think it is hard law; but we have nothing to do with the question of hardship." (*In re Perkins*, etc., 24 Q. B. D., 613, 618, 1890.)

The curricula of few of the American law schools include any course for undergraduate students of law like the inspiring and illuminating course in jurisprudence given by Dean Roscoe Pound to graduate students in law at Harvard. True, law schools of the better class to-day demand at least two years of collegiate work from applicants, but we all know that by the time students have arrived at the law school most of what they have learned in the fields of the social and natural sciences has been forgotten. Even if it were remembered, there are few colleges to-day that make any systematic attempt to *synthesize* the various subjects taught; there are few courses given with the primary object of coördinating the facts and methods adduced in the various disciplines. So the student arriving at the law school cheerfully sheds the multi-colored skin of "cultural subjects". This is undoubtedly one of the strongest indictments against the modern collegiate course of study. Most professors of law have not the training or the time to relate the decisions studied in the classroom to the prevailing social and economic philosophies.

At any rate, in the law schools of America (far more than in the Continental law schools) the tendency is to divorce the technical law from the other social sciences. The student still "reads law", as he did in law offices fifty years ago, albeit now in a much more systematic and orderly fashion; he is still taught "legal reasoning", and he naturally takes it for granted that the "ultimate principles", the "immemorial tenets" of his chosen profession, his intellectual instruments, are not open to criticism, or, at the most, can be criticized only by the law itself. It is still forgotten, in many legal quarters, that the law is but one of the instruments of social control, a means that is capable of constant improvement with the progress of science and of the "science of sciences"—philosophy. It is still not admitted that while it is perfectly proper to use the law itself as a critique of the law, the other social sciences must also make important contributions to the criticism of the law.



The present volume, therefore, supplies a crying need. "The object of the work", according to its distinguished editors, "is to set forth the principal reasons on which our fundamental and immemorial legal institutions have been rationally supported or assailed." The editors justifiably assert that "whatever questioning may have taken place in the realms of philosophy, of ethics, of economics, of social science, has not disturbed the peace of the legal profession, nor even come to its notice. . . . Of late, however, the theories of the philosophers, the economists, and the sociologists have passed out into the world of general debate and current politics. The fundamentals of the law are discussed by the Man in the Street. And so the lawyer can no longer afford to ignore them. They have ceased to be closet theses and have become popular themes. When the educated (or half-educated) public begins to discuss the rationality of fundamental legal institutions, the lawyer, too, must equip himself in those themes. They come home to him for reflection as a professional master of the law. Hence this book."

The book is a compilation of significant articles illustrative of definite trends of thought in the social sciences, as related to legal institutions. While some of the articles go back to the nineteenth century, many of them are the fruits of the thought of contemporary scholars and publicists. The book, moreover, is itself evidence of a rational approach to legal problems; indeed, it might be said that the topics selected and the manner of their presentation illustrate in themselves one of the rational bases of legislation and judicial decision—namely, the concept of *balance* between more or less conflicting social theories and social and individual interests. For the essays are presented in a calm and detached spirit; no types of thought, no schools of economics or sociology, are permitted to take the stage unopposed by others. The articles bear almost every conceivable philosophical brand. "Conservative" and "radical" both have their day in court; and one gets the impression that the actual legal institutions are pretty much the result of wise compromise on the basis of social experience.

The volume is divided into five fundamental topics with

which, among others, the law has to do: liberty, property, succession, family, and punishment.

It is impossible, within the compass of a review, to go into great detail about the numerous theses defended in this compilation. A brief statement of each of the classes of topics treated, with reference here and there to significant names in the roster of authors, might be instructive. Under the subject of *liberty*, the individualistic creed, ranging from its pristine state to its greatly modified modern complexion, is presented by excerpts from the works of Spencer, Mill, Sedgwick, and Jetho Brown. The pregnant and controversial concept of *competition* is next discussed by such writers as Burgess and Park. The utilitarian theory of the obligation of contract is represented by Bentham's views. This is followed by a pithy account of the breakdown of exclusive individualism, and by Professor Ely's well-balanced exposition of the fundamental theories of "distributive justice".

Dean Pound's scholarly and timely sketch of the subtle historico-philosophical influences that gave rise to modern judicial opinion as to "liberty of contract" is a striking demonstration of the fact that philosophical theories do pervade judicial opinion, as Dean Pound convincingly proves. But the trouble is that many of the philosophical theories current in modern judicial opinion have nothing but the respectability of age to commend them. Another difficulty is that most judges do not seem *conscious* of the fact that their decisions are made in conformity with the mental picture they have of the aims and ideals of the law. Dean Pound shows that many important "fundamental principles" which have formed the premises for such vital socio-legal concepts as "liberty of contracts", for example, have their roots in eighteenth-century philosophy of law. Much that lawyers of to-day regard as fundamental, unchangeable, and "immemorial" in the law was imported into it from the theories of eighteenth-century individualism; and "the pretended contempt for philosophy in law . . . keeps the legal profession in the bonds of the philosophy of the past because it is to be found in law-sheep bindings". Dean Pound's masterly commentary upon that famous example of judicial obstacle

building, the case of *Lochner v. New York* (198 U. S., 45), especially upon Mr. Justice Holmes' classical *dissenting opinion*, should be read by all workers in the social sciences.

Dean Pound's essay suggests one of the most important aims of a volume such as we are discussing—namely, to permit judges to take an occasional intellectual inventory of their possessions in fields other than the law. This would make them *conscious* of the influence of current or outworn philosophical theories upon their decisions, where they have been unconscious of the fact before, or have serenely disposed of "cantankerous" cases through the convenient fiction of "distinguishing" one case from another, where the facts may be different, but the principle behind them is the same.

Professor Carver's persuasive and logically sound exposition of his own concept of *laissez faire*, *The New Individualism*, concludes the series on the subject of liberty. The reviewer commends this article as one written by a scholar of ideals who at the same time is guilty of so much "conservatism" as to insist upon keeping his feet on the ground.

The articles under the four remaining heads of property, succession, family, and punishment are presented in a similarly logical manner. It would take too much space to present these essays in detail, but certain ones may be noted for various reasons. The two most important articles for the general reader, under the head of *property*, seem to the reviewer to be Laveleye's useful description of the fundamentals of the various theories of property which have been advanced, and Albion Small's outline of the sociology of property. Upon this background the reader may sketch such theories as he may be interested in. Similarly, Lecky's outline of the main socialistic theories may be used as a background upon which to paint the theories that are being put forward to-day.

Under the subject of *succession*, the reader will find McMurray's sketch of the various theories and practices of testation, Bentham's justification of the rights of succession from his utilitarian point of view, and Charmont's study of the practical social and economic consequences of the three principal types of inheritance (testamentary liberty, enforced

conservation by securing transmission of property to one person, usually the eldest son, and enforced partition among a large number of persons—i.e., the heirs as a whole). Charmont treats especially of the practical results of enforced partition of estates, arriving at the conclusion that it would be desirable to increase materially the number of instances "where an heir might be legally declared disqualified to inherit". He is of the opinion that some of these additional causes of disinheritance "would perhaps be the condition and consequence of marriage reform; while freeing it from family pressure, while releasing the son from the necessity of having the parents' consent, the latter would be allowed to leave him nothing".

The important topic of the *family* includes such well-known essays as Fiske's account of the "family as an instrument of social evolution", with reference to the psychological changes effected by family life. Professor Ellwood's essay on the social function of the family—its tasks in the continuation of the species; in conserving social possessions, spiritual and material; in acting as a school, wherein the rudiments of morality, of religion, of government, of law, and even of industry are transmitted; and as an instrument for social progress through the development of altruistic sentiments—is a lucid exposition, in an orderly and logical manner, of the forms of the family. Polyandry, polygamy, monogamy are considered from the point of view of the greatest spiritual and material good to be derived by the individual and the group under each of these institutions. The great obstacles to the achievement of these benefits—the mental conflicts between children and parents, between the old and the new generation, between the "only son" and his newly arrived, competing "baby brother" or sister, in other words, the vast number of *mental-hygiene problems of family life*—are not represented in this series.

Dewey and Tufts' much read *Ethics* contributes an essay on the biologic and economic aspects of the modern family. Havelock Ellis' glance into the future status of marriage constitutes a consideration of some of the subtle as well as open changes now taking place in the institution of marriage,



with a prognostication of whither the trends are leading. Howard's *Education as a Cure for Divorce*—the keynote of which may be found in his emphatic belief that "it is a very low moral sentiment which tolerates modern wife purchase or husband purchase for bread, title, or social position"—affords much food for thought. Doctor Cabot's delightful essay *The Spiritual Justification of Monogamy*, taken from his widely read *What Men Live By*, concludes the series on the family. In simple and earnest style, shot through here and there with optimism and wit, Doctor Cabot treats of those more spiritual fruits of the marriage relation which are too subtle and intangible for the law successfully to guarantee and secure.

Under the topic of *punishment*, the customary exposition of Oppenheimer is replaced by Willoughby's account of the various theories of criminal responsibility and justification for penal treatment. Bradley's conception of criminal responsibility as related to moral responsibility, Von Bar's "reprobation theory" of punishment, developed with Germanic rigor, and Hall's treatment of crime as a social product conclude this topic and the book.

The selection of topics comprised in this book was, on the whole, wisely made. Some differences of opinion as to the order of topics under the main problems might be raised, and reasons for the omission of certain articles might be demanded; but what similar compilation has escaped such criticism? On the whole, the arrangement is admirable, for *general sketches* of the main theories in each particular field are followed by individual views developed in more detail.

One or two criticisms seem justifiable, however. The reviewer was surprised to find not a single essay upon fundamental psychological principles, which are at the basis of practically all (if not all) the topics treated. Even in economics, where the fundamental concepts must always be *physical* (as, for example, the "law of diminishing returns"), the psychological factor cannot be overlooked. Nor do the leading economists ignore it. In the field of *liberty*, of *contract*, of *distribution of wealth*, and the like, many of the authors, such as Professors Ely and Carver, speak of the

fundamentals of "human nature". Again, theories of punishment cannot ignore "human nature", both healthy and morbid. But what is this "human nature"? What are the motives, the "springs of action", which operate individually and socially? What are the emotions and what part do they play in the various institutions discussed by the writers in this series? What are the sentiments? Are there "complexes"? And, if so, what is their rôle in the building of social institutions, and within those institutions? What is the place of mental hygiene in the life of the individual, the family, the community? Are its devices made use of by judges, in divorce and criminal cases, for example? Can modern psychology and psychiatry offer any *practical* suggestions for the reform of our penal institutions and the theories of punishment they imply? Is there so much unanimity upon these fundamentals as to justify the omission of one or two introductory essays on this subject of "human nature"? At least for the sake of clarity of exposition, is it not necessary that social ethicists and economists agree as to the meaning of the fundamental psychological concepts that they employ?

The reviewer believes that at least one or two essays on the subjects that these questions raise would have been helpful. A summary of Professor McDougall's opinions, on the one hand, and of Doctor Watson's views, on the other, while not covering the whole field suggested, would have added to the value of the compilation. In justice to some of the writers, however, such as Professor Ellwood, it should be said that here and there an occasional essay in the series contains a more or less clear exposition of the psychological premises upon which the writer proceeds.

In spite of the weakness mentioned, the volume would make a useful addition to the library of any socially minded lawyer, judge, physician, social worker, minister, or business man. Of course, it covers the rational bases of but one form or instrument of social control—the *law*—although, in doing so, it makes inevitable excursions into the realms of morality, religion, the home. For the social worker who desires a compilation covering social theory and practice, and embracing

some of the other instruments of social control, Professor James Ford's recent *Social Problems and Social Policy* should make an excellent companion volume to the present one.

There is another purpose to which this book on the rational basis of legal institutions might be put—i.e., as an experiment in legal education. It might be used as a reference or textbook in law schools, the assignments to be made and discussed before the various fields of law covering the different topics embraced in the book are taken up for *legal* study. By constant referring back to the rational basis of the various legal institutions while the reported cases are being discussed, the relationship between the institutions of law and social philosophies will be made part of the law student's point of view on these subjects.

"We are only at the beginning", says Mr. Justice Holmes, "of a philosophical reaction and of a reconsideration of the worth of doctrines which for the most part still are taken for granted without any deliberately conscious and systematic questioning of their grounds."<sup>1</sup> By the use of such books as the one under review, along the lines suggested, and by teachers trained both in the law and the social sciences, we can hope to develop a generation of legislators, lawyers, and judges possessed of the proper mental balance between a purely "conceptual" and ancestor-worship outlook on the law and a point of view that embraces the social demands of the day and age.

<sup>1</sup> *Collected Legal Papers*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Howe, 1920.

## NURSING EDUCATION AND THE MENTAL HOSPITAL\*

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In 1919 the Rockefeller Foundation appointed a committee to make a study of nursing and nursing education in the United States. The report of this committee, embodying the results of the study and recommendations based upon them, has recently been issued in book form by the Macmillan Company.

The special interest in the report, for those who are concerned with the treatment and prevention of nervous and mental disorders, lies in the appreciation shown of the importance of this subject, in the recommendation that all nurses should receive some instruction and training in the nursing of these disorders, and, last but not least, in the rather startling proposal that the independent schools of nursing connected with the hospitals for nervous and mental diseases, in the development of which so many hard years have been spent, should be discontinued and replaced by an affiliation system, with a two-months course for the students of general-hospital schools.

To be able to estimate properly the extent to which the views and recommendations presented in the report can be safely followed in the further development of nursing and nursing education, it is necessary to know something of the character and purpose of the study of which they are the result. The committee was appointed "to conduct a study of the proper training of public-health nurses", and the members were selected with reference to their particular interest and, in most instances, their active participation in public-health work. The chairman was a sanitary engineer and a professor of public health. Three of the other eighteen members were

\* NURSING AND NURSING EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES. Report of the Committee for the Study of Nursing Education and of a Survey by the Secretary of the Committee. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1923. 585 p.



physicians who were professors in medical schools, one of them a psychiatrist who had formerly been medical director of The National Committee for Mental Hygiene. Eleven were or had been actively engaged in public-health work, or were in purely educational work. Four only were engaged in the administration of schools of nursing or of hospitals, of whom two were physicians who were directors of university hospitals, one was director of a university school of nursing, and one only was director of an unattached general-hospital school. The hospital and training-school representation was added a year after the committee was appointed, and after it had become clear that "the entire problem of nursing and nursing education, relating to the care of the sick as well as to the prevention of disease, formed one essential whole, and must be so considered if sound conclusions were to be attained". It was found advisable, therefore, to broaden the scope of the inquiry so as to include "a study of general nursing education" and "to survey the entire field occupied by the nurse and other workers of this type". The zeal of the committee for its task may be gathered from the following statement which appears in the discussion of the first topic dealt with in the report, *The Rôle of the Nurse in Public Health*: "We have sought during the past twenty years for a missionary to carry the message of health into each individual home; and in America we have found this messenger of health in the public-health nurse." The committee very truly adds: "It was, therefore, to the question of the necessary and desirable equipment of the teacher of hygiene in the home that we first directed our attention." This fundamental purpose exercised a controlling influence in all the activities, views, and recommendations of the committee and of its secretary. The report of the survey of "the entire field occupied by the nurse and other workers of this type" occupies 146 of the 585 pages of the volume. Of these, 122 pages are devoted to public-health nursing, 23 to the work of the nurse in private practice, and one page is considered sufficient for the work of the nurse in institutions. In regard to the latter it is said: "It consists primarily of the duties of bedside care", which "in no way differs from other bedside care and therefore needs no separate treatment". As there is in hospitals and other institu-

tions, and in private nursing, an immense and varied field of special nursing for much of which additional or separate training is more and more clearly perceived to be necessary, and much difficult and delicate nursing which is not bedside care at all, it is evident that the report can hardly be depended upon for information and safe guidance in regard to the nursing needs of all classes of sick persons. Similarly, in the section on postgraduate courses, 41 of the 61 pages are devoted to courses in public-health nursing, 10 to courses for teachers and administrators in schools of nursing, and 10 to the Teachers College of Columbia University. Elsewhere in the report, reference is made to the desirability of postgraduate training in social work, but no mention is anywhere made of the courses that are given or needed in other branches of nursing.

It was, of course, necessary for the committee to limit the scope of its work. The "entire field occupied by the nurse and other workers of this type", including the question of their education, is, moreover, of very wide dimensions. It is not surprising, therefore, that careful consideration could not be given, by the committee, to many important parts of it. These limitations, while they do not seem to have been clearly discerned by the committee, must, however, be kept in mind if the valuable information and suggestions presented are to be applied without jeopardizing the present standards and future progress of the nursing of large classes of sick persons. Notwithstanding the paramount importance of prevention of disease, the study and treatment of the sick are equally important and are an essential part of the work of prevention. It is, then, neither wise nor necessary to swing into line for the training of public-health nurses all the hospital and other resources for teaching and training nurses.

In its presentation of the extent and serious effects of nervous and mental disorders and the need of enlisting, in dealing with the problem, the services that can be rendered by nurses in public-health work and in general nursing, the committee has made a real contribution to the advancement of mental hygiene. The report does not indicate, however, a full understanding of the difficult nature of the problem, or of the study and experience required for adequate dealing with it.

It also fails to show a realization of the impossibility of making much progress toward prevention without conserving and improving the existing agencies for study and treatment and for education. The discovery that, "with psychiatry definitely entering the field of prevention", nervous and mental diseases have become "special points of attack in the public-health campaign" doubtless accounts in great measure for the consideration given by the committee to a subject that, only a few years ago, would have received no notice whatever. The committee find that "it is evident that some knowledge of the principles of mental hygiene and of the resources that are available for dealing with mental illness and the mental factors in general illness must increasingly be part of the public-health nurse's equipment". The value and necessity of some training in the nursing of nervous and mental disorders for all nurses is, however, also recognized. "The mental factors in all diseases, the need of reckoning, for physical as well as mental health, with humanity's instinctive reactions and cravings, is receiving a constantly growing recognition and emphasis. All the more necessary has become the training of nurses in the mental and nervous field", states the report, and it adds that "for the nurse whose future work is to be characterized by a peculiar intimacy in human contacts, obviously an initiation into the newer ways of attacking these subtle problems of mental health is indispensable". This clearness of perception does not, however, seem to extend to the standards and methods that are essential to adequate training and nursing in this field.

The committee found, as a result of its "study of the functions and performances of the nurse in her various fields of service", that "there is need of a basic undergraduate training for all nurses alike". A course is outlined which, the report states, "would furnish a complete education for a student desiring to practice as a bedside nurse in private duty, or in hospitals or other institutions". The course proposed covers the "four accepted services, medical, surgical, pediatric, and obstetrical", to which are added communicable and nervous and mental diseases. The details of the course, and of the committee's views and recommendations concerning nurse training and the hospital school of nursing, cannot be dis-

cussed within the limits of a review that aims to consider only what is important in the field of nervous and mental disorders. It may be briefly stated, however, that the course is based on the view that the student's relationship with the hospital is solely educational and that a paid service "for the care of the sick in the hospitals . . . will have to be provided". The student is to be relieved of all duties and activities that do not contribute directly to her education. In this way, the committee believes, the course of training can be reduced below the three years now required. The theoretical instruction is to be given by trained teachers and carefully correlated with the practical training. The ward training is to be "planned to give a progressively graded and integrated course". Much emphasis is placed on "teaching and instruction in case records, and case reports by students should be regularly required". The course is designed for the education "of the graduate nurse trained to care for acute disease". "Chronic services" are regarded as "of little benefit to student training" and "of negligible value to students at all times". The precise meaning to be attached to the words "acute" and "chronic" is not, however, made clear. Any illness that is protracted may be regarded as chronic, though not necessarily irremediable, and the knowledge, skill, and personality required to carry a chronic illness to a successful issue can hardly be considered inferior, and may, indeed, be superior, to the qualifications required in nursing acute illness. It seems strange, too, that the committee should so subordinate chronic disease in their plan of nurse training, as it is beginning to be recognized that the public-health problem that will receive most attention in the future is the prevention and control of the degenerative conditions of middle and later life. It is evident that, while the committee has endeavored to outline a basic course that would be suitable for the training of all nurses, the course actually suggested was shaped principally with reference to training the nurse for the emergency situations in nursing and "above all", as the report states, in her rôle of public-health nurse, responsible for the teaching of health to the families in her charge. The apprenticeship features of the present system find little favor with the committee, and they certainly leave lacking much that the committee seeks to



supply. They furnish, however, experience and training in practical facility and in responsibility, similar to the practical experience that the physician gains in his internship and the engineer and the architect, with whose education the committee compares that of the nurse, in the lean years spent immediately after graduation in subordinate capacities. A nurse, on the other hand, ordinarily goes at once into remunerative occupation on leaving school. One cannot but feel some doubt as to the results of a system of training that eliminates along with the defects the obvious advantages of the present system. Much is contained in the section *The Hospital School of Nursing* that should be given careful study by the directors of hospitals and schools of nursing, but it should be viewed in the light of the knowledge that has been gained by experience with practical needs. The volume is not suitable for the students' library.

It may be of some significance and importance to the future of practical psychiatry and mental hygiene that, in the schedule of theoretical instruction specified for the basic course, as many hours are assigned to nervous and mental diseases as to medical, surgical, and communicable diseases. For practical training, it is recommended that affiliations be made with special hospitals for a two-months course, or, if this is not possible, that the opportunities offered at the school hospital by neurological and delirium cases be utilized for clinics and classes of instruction in "the modern nursing and treatment of mental disorders". This is a distinct advance on what has heretofore been provided in courses of training for nurses. The report no longer refers to it as an "initiation", however, but as "the thorough training in the specialty recommended", and no suggestion is anywhere made that there should be additional training. Unfortunately, the survey made for the committee did not include the careful study of a hospital for mental disorders or of a school connected with one of these hospitals. The views and recommendations presented are, therefore, not based on a study of the nursing needs of the patients in these hospitals, or of the training required for nurses in the large and ever-widening field of mental nursing. The views expressed were formed as the result of information secured from an examination of the reports on five schools

obtained at the office of The National Committee for Mental Hygiene. These reports disclosed to the committee "how far these institutions will have to go before they will be equipped to offer safe affiliations". The principal defects found were that (1) the educational requirements for admission were at too low a level; (2) there was a joint training for attendants and nurses, without differentiation until the third year; (3) understaffing, overcrowding, and totally inadequate supervision put a premium on the subordination of educational standards to the immediate urgencies of the work, even in several of the schools in which the curricula compared favorably with those of general hospitals of good standing; (4) the time allotted for affiliation for medical, surgical, pediatric, and obstetrical training (six to twelve months) was "hopelessly inadequate"; (5) no definite assignments to specific services were made for such medical and surgical training as could be given at the hospital. It is unfortunate that the committee, before making its drastic recommendations, did not at least study carefully one or more of the most successful schools discoverable in the public hospitals for mental diseases. The success of even one such school, not only in furnishing graduates for its own service, but as one of the principal sources of supply for graduates for private general nursing in the district, might have suggested the possibility and advantage of overcoming the defects instead of discontinuing the schools, for the continuing of which there is a need that cannot be overestimated.

The plan of nursing education advocated by the committee is only for schools connected with general medical and surgical hospitals, with "wide extension of affiliations with special hospitals such as maternity and childrens' hospitals, institutions for mental and nervous cases, for tuberculosis, etc., and the restriction of these special hospitals to training in their specialty". The committee believes "that such hospitals can perform a better service by giving special training to affiliates than by attempting to conduct independent schools". It was also found that "comparatively few, again, of the special public hospitals for mental diseases have been in the past, or are to-day, of a calibre or equipment fit for the training of nurses". Deprived, therefore, of their independent schools,

and condemned as places for affiliation courses, these hospitals are entirely left out of the general scheme of nursing education proposed. As they provide for 90 or 95 per cent of the cases under hospital treatment, the significance of this to the nursing requirements of this immense group of sick persons, and to nursing education as well, is grave.

The situation would seem to require the careful consideration of all who are interested in the treatment and prevention of nervous and mental disorders. It might very well be made the object of a special study by such organizations as The National Committee for Mental Hygiene and the American Psychiatric Association. The report of the Rockefeller Committee states that the number of beds in hospitals for mental disorders exceeds that in all the other special hospitals combined. It has also been said to equal, if not to exceed, the number of beds in the general hospitals. The patients cared for present a variety of disorders, in which the whole personality is involved. In their study and treatment, all the resources of general medicine and surgery, of some of the specialties, and of the agencies for personal and social readjustment must be employed. This immense field, with its growing relation to the problems of illness generally, must be regarded as somewhat different from that of the more limited specialties. Experience shows that it is extremely doubtful if an adequate nursing service can be supplied, for the hospitals and for the nursing of nervous and mental cases in private practice, in any other way than by means of independent schools, which will, by thorough affiliations, as well as by a proper utilization of their own resources, give a complete training. Nothing has contributed more to the improvement that has been made in the personal care of the patients in these hospitals than the present schools, which have, by long and hard effort, been developed to their present stage without much help from outside the hospitals. Since the early unsuccessful attempts to employ general-hospital graduates to organize these schools, it has been found that the training of such graduates—as Dr. Cowles, who established the first school, has written—in a measure unfitted them for understanding and dealing with the mental problems of sickness. Experience has proved that only by starting the student with

mental cases and getting her viewpoint well established on that basis can the best results be obtained. No one can at present anticipate to what extent the growing perception of the mental aspects of illness and of the contributions of psychiatry to the understanding and treatment of sick persons and the prevention of illness may result in modification of the education of both physicians and nurses. The "four accepted services" of the training of to-day may be revised. They have been "accepted" not so much because of their educational value as to meet the practical demands of the period. One can conceive that in a few years a student nurse may, if she so elect, be permitted to omit such a subject as obstetrics, if she expresses her intention of declining such cases in practice, and to substitute nervous and mental diseases on account of their basic educational value, and because cases of nervous and mental disorders, and the mental problems of illness generally, cannot be avoided in any kind of nursing practice. That the schools in the special hospitals for mental disorders should be placed on a better footing and generally improved is clearly an urgent necessity. The difficulties in securing adequate understanding and support for the work are, however, enormous. They are in some measure revealed in the lack of clear understanding and of helpful, sympathetic support displayed in this report. They are fully known only to those who are actually engaged in the work and their immediate supporters, who must continue earnestly to endeavor to maintain what has been thus far gained and to remove the obstacles to further progress.

Several other topics of importance besides those reviewed are discussed in the report, as well as many details relating to nursing and nursing education, which should receive careful consideration. Concerning the relationship between the school and the hospital, the committee states that "to make clear the fundamental fallacy in the relationship of hospital and training school is in a sense the center and focus of our study", and it recommends that the management of the school be made independent. More specific and adequate support for the educational work of the hospitals is, indeed, greatly to be desired. It seems quite unlikely, however, that any competent board of hospital managers will consider it feasible, as



long as any part of the nursing of the patients is carried on by student nurses, to relieve the hospital superintendent of the ultimate responsibility for their supervision and control.

The report of this committee cannot fail to influence greatly the further development of nursing education. The revelation made of defects and needs cannot be ignored. The value of the views and recommendations offered will, however, be determined by the consideration and trial given them by those who are charged with the practical responsibilities of conducting such education, and nothing will be adopted that will impair the quality of the service furnished the sick of all classes. As the committee says, "to the imperative demands of suffering all other considerations must yield". The report has, however, received the enthusiastic approval of the nursing periodicals and organizations of the country, and is likely to be looked upon as a reliable and authoritative guide in the shaping of legislation and of the official regulations that now control the standards and methods of the schools of nursing and of nursing education. For this reason, if for no other, it should be carefully studied by those who are interested in the great field of nervous and mental disorders, and such steps as may be necessary should be taken to insure careful attention to the needs of this field in any measures contemplated, and to prevent the substitution of inferior schemes of training and practice for those that experience and sound judgment have shown to be essential.

## A SELECTED LIST OF BOOKS ON MENTAL HYGIENE AND ALLIED SUBJECTS

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There grows slowly a literature on the subject of mental hygiene. Judging from the number of titles announced by publishers, one might think that the amount of literature available was very large indeed, but this is hardly the case. Many of the books on the subject of mind and mental health that have come from the presses in the last three or four years are of little value. Recognizing the increased interest in matters of mental health, individuals with a facility for composition, if little knowledge, have readily prepared their wares, and publishers have not been slow in accepting them. The result has been considerable confusion as earnest people have tried to find their way about, unguided, among the attractive titles and book jackets.

The following list of books has been prepared as a partial guide for those who seek information, but who are not sufficiently familiar with the field to choose unaided. The list is, of course, a selected one. In its preparation a very large number of books have been considered. It is not to be inferred that because a book does not appear upon this list it is a worthless book. It is hardly possible that every book of value has come to our notice. It can be assumed, however, that any book that has been widely advertised which does not appear has been omitted because it was not considered of sufficient value to be admitted. One would like to print a list of much advertised books that are not reliable in their presentation of data—but such a plan is hardly feasible. However, from titles obviously omitted readers can easily make up such a list for themselves.

In what may be called fields allied to mental hygiene, such as anthropology, biology, psychology, intelligence testing, and the like, it will be apparent at a glance that no effort has

been made to give anything approaching a complete list of dependable books. An understanding of mental hygiene presupposes a knowledge of the fundamental principles in these fields. For those who have not had formal training in these fields, however, a few books are listed.

The term "mental hygiene" is used as if it were an entity in itself. To an extent that is true; but it is not entirely true. Mental hygiene is slowly building a body of knowledge that is particularly its own, but, like "medicine", many of its data are derivative. Medicine draws its material from the fields of anatomy and physiology, pathology, chemistry, and the like. Medicine itself is the application of all this knowledge to the understanding of physical disorganization, its reorganization, repair, and the prevention of disorganization. Just so mental hygiene finds its material in medicine and its contributory sciences, in psychopathology and neuropathology, and likewise in psychology, sociology, education, and other fields having to do with human behavior and the conduct of life. For a true understanding of mental hygiene, all these relationships and interdependencies are to be understood. The placing of knowledge and activities in compartments, it is to be remembered, is not in accordance with actuality, but is artificial, arbitrary, and for convenience only. The foundation is as much a part of the house as the dining room; biological data are as much a part of mental hygiene as "complexes". A list of books embracing this broad concept is, of course, not possible—at least, not feasible, as it would become a catalogue. While no new data in the fields of anthropology, biology, psychology, are without their significance to mental hygiene, mental hygiene uses for its purpose those data that would seem to have an immediate and direct bearing on the problems of mental life. There results a synthesis which, as applied to human conduct and human relationships, to mental and social disorganization, may be said to constitute the particular field of mental hygiene. It is with books dealing with data in this narrower field that this list is chiefly concerned.

In the preparation of this list no effort has been made to force to the front any particular point of view. Books pre-

senting quite contradictory points of view are listed where both points of view would seem to deserve thoughtful consideration. That there should be different points of view is a matter of distress to some; but only to those who are not familiar with the processes by which knowledge grows, or those to whom nothing is valuable until it forms a "sure" peg upon which they can hang their faith.

It is realized that the present form is not the most serviceable. A more specialized selected list or a series of lists having in mind the particular needs of various groups—the social worker, the teacher, the parent, and the like—would be better. Such lists are in preparation and will be published, if completed, in the April number of *MENTAL HYGIENE*. As the most recent information is not to be found in books, but in journals, the new lists will include references to particularly valuable articles in the current literature. It is felt, however, that the list in its present form will serve a useful purpose in making known at this time those books which—in varying degrees, to be sure—may be considered of value and worthy of consideration. The only attempt at a finer selection has been to place an asterisk before those books most likely to be useful to the general reader.

#### GENERAL

##### *Anthropology*

- \*Frazer, Sir James. *The golden bough; a study in magic and religion*. Abridged ed. N. Y., Macmillan, 1923. 752 p.
- \*Kroeber, A. L., and Waterman, T. T. *Source book in anthropology*. Berkeley, Univ. of Calif. Press, 1920. 565 p.
- \*Wessler, Clark. *Man and culture*. N. Y., Crowell, 1923. 371 p.

##### *Biology*

- \*Burlingame, L. L., and others. *General biology*. N. Y., Holt, 1922. 568 p.
- \*Cannon, Walter B. *Bodily changes in pain, hunger, fear and rage*. Rev. ed. N. Y., Appleton, 1920. 311 p.
- Child, Charles M. *Individuality in organisms*. Chic., Univ. of Chicago Press, 1915. 213 p.
- The origin and development of the nervous system from a physiological viewpoint*. Chic., Univ. of Chicago Press, 1921. 296 p.
- \*Conklin, Edwin G. *The direction of human evolution*. New ed. N. Y., Scribner, 1922. 247 p.
- \**Heredity and environment in the development of man*. 4th ed. Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, 1922. 361 p.
- Doncaster, L. *An introduction to the study of cytology*. N. Y., Macmillan, 1920. 280 p.



- ✧ \*Downing, Elliot R. The third and fourth generation; an introduction to heredity. Chic., Univ. of Chicago Press, 1918. 164 p.
- ✧ \*Guyer, Michael F. Being well-born; an introduction to eugenics. Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1916. 374 p.
- \*Holmes, Samuel J. The trend of the race; a study of present tendencies in the biological development of civilized mankind. N. Y., Harcourt, 1921. 396 p.
- International Congress of Eugenics, Second. Scientific Papers, Vol. I, Eugenics, genetics and the family; Vol. II, Eugenics in race and state. Balt., Williams, 1923.
- Loeb, Jacques. Forced movements, tropisms and animal conducts. Phila., Lippincott, 1918. 209 p.
- \*Morgan, T. H., and others. The mechanism of Mendelian heredity. Rev. ed. N. Y., Holt, 1922.
- \*Newman, Horatio H. Readings in evolution, genetics, and eugenics. Chic., Univ. of Chicago Press, 1921. 523 p.
- Popenoe, Paul, and Johnson, Roswell H. Applied eugenics. N. Y., Macmillan, 1918. 459 p.
- \*Saleeby, Caleb W. The eugenic prospect; national and racial. N. Y., Dodd, 1921. 239 p.
- \*Walter, H. E. Genetics; an introduction to the study of heredity. Rev. ed. N. Y., Macmillan, 1922. 354 p.

*Psychology* (Intelligence Testing)

- Binet, Alfred, and Simon, Thomas. The development of intelligence in children and the intelligence of the feeble-minded. Balt., Williams, 1916. 336 p.
- Brown, William, and Thomson, Godfrey H. The essentials of mental measurement. Camb. (Eng.), Univ. Press, 1921. 216 p.
- Dewey, Evelyn, Child, Emily, and Ruml, Beardsley. Methods and results of testing school children; manual of tests used by the psychological survey in the public schools of New York City, including social and physical studies of the children tested. N. Y., Dutton, 1920. 176 p.
- Kohs, S. C. Intelligence measurement; a psychological and statistical study based upon the block-design tests. N. Y., Macmillan, 1923. 312 p.
- Kuhlman, Fred. A handbook of mental tests. Balt., Warwick, 1922. 208 p.
- Melville, Norbert J. Standard method of testing juvenile mentality by the Binet-Simon scale with the original questions, pictures, and drawings. Phila., Lippincott, 1917. 142 p.
- Mitchell, David, and Ruger, Georgie J. Psychological tests; revised and classified bibliography. N. Y., Bureau of Educational Experiments, 1918. 116 p. (Bull. IX.)
- Monroe, Walter S. Report of Division of Educational Tests for 1919-1920. Urbana, Ill., Univ. of Ill., 1921. 64 p.
- National Research Council. National intelligence tests. (By M. E. Haggerty, L. M. Terman, E. L. Thorndike, G. M. Whipple, and R. M. Yerkes.) Yonkers, World Book Co., 1920. 32 p.
- Pintner, Rudolf. The mental survey. N. Y., Appleton, 1918. 116 p.
- Intelligence testing; methods and results. N. Y., Holt, 1923. 406 p.
- Yerkes, Robert M., and Foster, J. C. Point-scale for measuring mental ability. Rev. ed. Balt., Warwick, 1923.

*Miscellaneous*

- \*Beers, Clifford W. *A mind that found itself*. 5th ed. rev. N. Y., Doubleday, 1923. 411 p.
- ✠\*Bisch, Louis E. *The conquest of self*. N. Y., Doubleday, 1923. 326 p.
- \*Bridges, James W. *An outline of abnormal psychology*. 2d ed. rev. Columbus, O., Adams, 1921. 226 p.
- \*Brigham, Carl C. *A study of American intelligence, with a foreword by Robert M. Yerkes*. Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, 1923. 210 p.
- ✠\*Bronner, Augusta F. *Psychology of special abilities and disabilities*. Bost., Little, 1917. 269 p.
- ✠\*Carroll, Robert S. *The mastery of nervousness; based upon self-reëducation*. 3rd ed. rev. N. Y., Macmillan, 1918. 348 p.
- \*Our nervous friends; illustrating the mastery of nervousness. N. Y., Macmillan, 1919. 258 p.
- Cook, William G. H. *Insanity and mental deficiency in relation to legal responsibility; a study in psychological jurisprudence*. N. Y., Dutton, 1921. 192 p.
- Craig, Sir Maurice. *Nerve exhaustion*. Phila., Lea, 1922. 143 p.
- ✠Dercum, Francis X. *An essay on the physiology of mind; an interpretation based on biological, morphological, physical and chemical considerations*. Phila., Saunders, 1922. 150 p.
- ✠\*Dewey, John. *Human nature and conduct; an introduction to social psychology*. N. Y., Holt, 1922. 336 p.
- ✠\*Drever, James. *The psychology of everyday life*. N. Y., Dutton, 1921. 164 p.
- \*Duclaux, Emile. *Pasteur: the history of a mind; trans. by Erwin F. Smith and Florence Hedges*. Phila., Saunders, 1920. 363 p.
- ✠\*Edman, Irwin. *Human traits and their social significance*. Bost., Houghton, 1920. 467 p.
- \*Franz, Shepherd I. *Nervous and mental reëducation*. N. Y., Macmillan, 1923. 225 p.
- Gilbreth, Frank B., and Lillian M. *Fatigue study; the elimination of humanity's greatest unnecessary waste, a first step in motion study*. 2d ed. rev. N. Y., Macmillan, 1919. 175 p.
- ✠\*Groves, Ernest R. *Personality and social adjustment*. N. Y., Longmans, 1923. 296 p.
- ✠\*Haldane, John S. *Mechanisms, life and personality*. 2d ed. Lond., Murray, 1921. 152 p.
- \*Hall, G. Stanley. *Life and confessions of a psychologist (an autobiography)*. N. Y., Appleton, 1923. 623 p.
- \*Hart, Bernard. *Psychology of insanity*. 3rd ed. N. Y., Putnam, 1919. 176 p.
- ✠\*Hollingworth, Harry L. *Judging human character*. N. Y., Appleton, 1922. 268 p.
- ✠\*Hollingworth, Harry L., and Poffenberger, Albert T., Jr. *Applied psychology*. N. Y., Appleton, 1918. 337 p.
- International conference of women physicians. *Proceedings*. N. Y., Women's Press, 1920. 6 vol.
- \*Jackson, Josephine A., and Salisbury, Helen M. *Outwitting our nerves; a primer of psychotherapy*. N. Y., Century, 1921. 403 p.

- \*James, William. *Habit*. N. Y., Holt, 1890. 68 p.
- \*On vital reserves, the energies of men and the gospel of relaxation. N. Y., Holt, 1911. 78 p.
- Jones, E. Kathleen, ed. *The hospital library*. Chic., Amer. Lib. Assn., 1923. 190 p.
- \*Knight, M. M., Peters, Iva L., and Blanchard, Phyllis. *Tsboo and genetics; a study of the biological, sociological and psychological foundation of the family*. N. Y., Moffat, 1920. 301 p.
- \*MacCurdy, John T. *The psychology of war*. Lond., Heinemann, 1917. 68 p.
- \*Martin, Everett D. *The behavior of crowds; a psychological study*. N. Y., Harper, 1920. 311 p.
- \*May, James V. *Mental diseases; a public health problem; with preface by Thomas W. Salmon*. Bost., Badger, 1922. 544 p.
- \*McDougall, William. *An introduction to social psychology*. 14th ed. Bost., Luce, 1921. 418 p.
- The psychology of behavior*. N. Y., Holt, 1912. 254 p.
- \*Munson, Edward L. *The management of men; a handbook on the systematic development of morale and the control of human behavior*. N. Y., Holt, 1921. 801 p.
- \*Myerson, Abraham. *The foundations of personality*. Bost., Little, 1921. 406 p.
- \*The nervous housewife. Bost., Little, 1920. 273 p.
- \*Parmelee, Maurice F. *Science of human behavior; biological and physiological foundations*. N. Y., Macmillan, 1913. 443 p.
- \*Paton, Stewart. *Education in war and peace*. N. Y., Hoeber, 1920. 106 p.
- \*Human behavior in relation to the study of educational, social, and ethical problems. N. Y., Scribner, 1921. 465 p.
- \*Signs of sanity and the principles of mental hygiene. N. Y., Scribner, 1922. 235 p.
- A Psychiatric milestone; Bloomingdale hospital centenary, 1821-1921*. N. Y., Soc. of the N. Y. Hosp., 1921. 220 p.
- \*Riggs, Austin Fox. *Just nerves*. Bost., Houghton, 1922. 87 p.
- Rivers, W. H. R. *Mind and medicine; a lecture delivered at the John Rylands Library*. Lond., Longmans, 1919. 23 p.
- \*Robinson, James H. *The mind in the making; the relations of intelligence to social reform*. N. Y., Harper, 1921. 235 p.
- \*Robinson, Victor. *The Don Quixote of psychiatry*. N. Y., Cosmopolis Press, 1922. 339 p.
- \*Sands, Irving J., and Blanchard, Phyllis. *Abnormal behavior; pitfalls of our minds; an introduction to the study of abnormal and antisocial behavior*. N. Y., Moffat, 1923. 482 p.
- \*Shand, Alexander F. *The foundation of character: being a study of the tendencies of the emotions and sentiments*. 2d ed. N. Y., Macmillan, 1920. 578 p.
- \*Southard, Elmer E., and Jarrett, Mary C. *The kingdom of evils; psychiatric social work presented in one hundred case histories together with a classification of social divisions of evils; introduction by Richard Cabot*. N. Y., Macmillan, 1922. 708 p.
- \*Tansley, Arthur G. *The new psychology and its relation to life*. Rev. ed. N. Y., Dodd, 1922. 279 p.
- \*Trotter, William. *Instincts of the herd in peace and war*. Rev. ed. N. Y., Macmillan, 1920. 264 p.

- \*Wallas, Graham. The great society; a psychological analysis. N. Y., Macmillan, 1919. 383 p.
- \*Our social heritage. New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1921. 307 p.
- \*Walsh, James J. Cures: the story of the cures that fail. N. Y., Appleton, 1923. 291 p.
- Watson, John B. Psychology from the standpoint of a behaviorist. Phila., Lippincott, 1919. 429 p.
- ✓ \*Wells, Frederic L. Mental adjustments. N. Y., Appleton, 1917. 331 p.
- White, William A. Foundations of psychiatry; with an introduction by Stewart Paton. N. Y., Nerv. and Ment. Dis. Pub. Co., 1921. 136 p.
- \*Insanity and the criminal law. N. Y., Macmillan, 1923. 281 p.
- \*The principles of mental hygiene. N. Y., Macmillan, 1917. 323 p.
- \*Thoughts of a psychiatrist on the war and after. N. Y., Hoeber, 1919. 137 p.
- \*Williams, Tom A. Dreads and besetting fears. Bost., Little, 1923. 217 p.
- \*Woodworth, Robert S. Psychology; a study of mental life. N. Y., Holt, 1921. 580 p.

### CHILDHOOD

See also sections, *General (psychology)*, *Psychoanalysis*, *Mental Defect*, *Delinquency*.

- ✕ \*Blanchard, Phyllis. The adolescent girl; a study from the psychoanalytic viewpoint. N. Y., Moffat, 1920. 242 p.
- \*Blanton, Margaret G., and Blanton, Smiley. Speech training for children; the hygiene of speech. N. Y., Century, 1919. 261 p.
- \*Cabot, Ella L. Seven ages of childhood. Bost., Houghton, 1921. 321 p.
- \*Cameron, Hector C. The nervous child. N. Y., Oxford Press, 1919. 202 p.
- \*Evans, Elida. The problem of the nervous child; introduction by C. G. Jung. N. Y., Dodd, 1920. 299 p.
- \*Gallichan, Walter M. Sex education; a textbook of sex education. Bost., Small, 1921. 294 p.
- \*Galloway, Thomas W. Biology of sex for parents and teachers. Rev. ed. N. Y., Heath, 1922. 149 p.
- W \*Gesell, Arnold L. Exceptional children and public school policy; including a mental survey of the New Haven elementary schools. New Haven, Yale Univ. press, 1921. 66 p.
- \*Pre-school child from the standpoint of public hygiene and education. Bost., Houghton, 1923. 264 p.
- \*Gordon, Kate. Educational psychology. N. Y., Holt, 1917. 294 p.
- \*Gruenberg, Benjamin C. I., ed. Outlines of child study. Prepared by the Federation for Child Study. N. Y., Macmillan, 1922. 260 p.
- ✕ \*Haviland, Mary S. Character training in childhood. Bost., Small, 1921. 296 p.
- Jennings, Herbert S., Watson, John B., Meyer, Adolf, and Thomas, William I. Suggestions of modern science concerning education. N. Y., Macmillan, 1918. 211 p.
- \*King, Irving. The high school age. Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1914. 233 p.
- \*Mackie, Ransom A. Education during adolescence; based partly on G. Stanley Hall's "Psychology of Adolescence"; with an introduction by G. Stanley Hall. N. Y., Dutton, 1920. 222 p.



- \*Menzies, K. Autoerotic phenomena in adolescence; an analytical study of the psychology and psychopathology of onanism; with a foreword by Ernest Jones. 2d ed. N. Y., Hoeber, 1921. 100 p.
- \*Moll, Albert. The sexual life of the child; translated by Eden Paul. N. Y., Macmillan, 1918. 375 p.
- \*Patri, Angelo. Child training. N. Y., Appleton, 1922. 434 p.
- \*Pierson, Clara D. Living with our children: a book of little essays for mothers. N. Y., Dutton, 1923. 250 p.
- \*Stowell, William L. Sex for parents and teachers. N. Y., Macmillan, 1921. 204 p.
- \*Terman, Lewis M. Hygiene of the school child. Bost., Houghton, 1914. 417 p.
- \*Intelligence of school children; how children differ in ability, the use of mental tests in school grading and the proper education of exceptional children. Bost., Houghton, 1919. 317 p.
- \*Tracy, Frederick. Psychology of adolescence. N. Y., Macmillan, 1922. 246 p.
- \*Waddell, Charles W. An introduction to child psychology. N. Y., Houghton, 1918. 317 p.
- \*White, William A. The mental hygiene of childhood. Bost., Little, 1919. 193 p.
- \*Woolley, Helen T., and Ferris, Elizabeth. Diagnosis and treatment of young school failures. Wash., Govt. print. off., 1923. 115 p.
- \*Yeomans, Edward. Shackled youth; comments on schools, school people, and other people. Bost., Atlantic monthly press, 1921. 138 p.

### PSYCHOANALYSIS

See also sections, *Childhood, Mental Disease, War Neuroses.*

- Adler, Alfred. The neurotic constitution; trans. by Bernard Glueck and John E. Lind. N. Y., Moffat, 1917. 456 p.
- A study of organ inferiority and its psychical compensation; trans. by Smith Ely Jelliffe. N. Y., Nerv. and Ment. Dis. Pub. Co., 1917. 86 p.
- \*Barker, Elsa. Fielding Sargent (a novel). N. Y., Dutton, 1922. 319 p.
- \*Bjerre, Poul C. History and practice of psychoanalysis; trans. by Elizabeth N. Burrow. Rev. ed. Bost., Badger, 1920. 349 p.
- Bradby, M. K. Logic of the unconscious mind. Lond., Oxford press, 1920. 316 p.
- \*Psychoanalysis and its place in life. N. Y., Oxford Press, 1920. 266 p.
- \*Brill, Abraham A. Fundamental conceptions of psychoanalysis. N. Y., Harcourt, 1921. 344 p.
- \*Psychoanalysis; its scope and limitation. Phila., Lippincott, 1915. 14 p.
- \*Psychoanalysis; its theories and practical application. 3rd ed. rev. Phila., Saunders, 1922. 468 p.
- Brown, Sanger H. Sex worship and symbolism. Bost., Badger, 1922. 149 p.
- \*Coriat, Isador H. The meaning of dreams. Bost., Little, 1915. 194 p.
- \*Repressed emotions. N. Y., Brentano, 1920. 213 p.
- \*What is psychoanalysis? N. Y., Moffat, 1917. 127 p.
- Ferenczi, Sandor. Contributions to psychoanalysis; trans. by Ernest Jones. Bost., Badger, 1916. 288 p.
- Sex in psychoanalysis; authorized trans. by Ernest Jones. Bost., Badger, 1916. 338 p.

- Ferenczi, Sandor, Abraham, Karl, Simmel, Ernest, and Jones, Ernest. *Psychoanalysis and the war neuroses*. Lond., Internatl. Psychoanal. Press, 1921. 59 p.
- \*Flügel, J. *Psychoanalytic study of the family*. Lond., Internatl. Psychoanal. Press, 1921. 259 p.
- Freud, Sigmund. *Beyond the pleasure principle*; authorized trans. from 2d German ed., by C. J. M. Hubback. Lond., Internatl. Psychoanal. Press, 1922. 90 p.
- \*A general introduction to psychoanalysis; authorized trans. by G. Stanley Hall. N. Y., Boni, 1920. 406 p.
- Group psychology and the analysis of the ego; trans. by James Strachey. Lond., Internatl. Psychoanal. Press, 1922. 134 p.
- \*The history of the psychoanalytic movement; trans. by A. A. Brill. N. Y., Nerv. and Ment. Dis. Pub. Co., 1917. 58 p.
- The interpretation of dreams; trans. by A. A. Brill. 3d ed. N. Y., Macmillan, 1913. 510 p.
- Origin and development of psychoanalysis. Worcester, Mass., Clark Univ. Press, 1910. 38 p.
- \*Psychopathology of everyday life; trans. by A. A. Brill. N. Y., Macmillan, 1914. 341 p.
- \*Reflections; trans. by A. A. Brill and A. B. Kutner. N. Y., Moffat, 1922. 71 p.
- Selected papers on hysteria and other psychoneuroses. 3rd ed. enl. N. Y., Nerv. and Ment. Dis. Pub. Co., 1920. 225 p.
- Three contributions to the theory of sex; trans. by A. A. Brill. 3rd ed. rev. N. Y., Nerv. and Ment. Dis. Pub. Co., 1918. 117 p.
- Wit and its relation to the unconscious. N. Y., Moffat, 1916. 388 p.
- \*Frink, Horace W. *Morbid fears and compulsions; their psychology and psychoanalytic treatment*. N. Y., Moffat, 1918. 568 p.
- \*Green, George H. *Psychoanalysis in the classroom*. N. Y., Putnam, 1920. 272 p.
- Hitschmann, Eduard. *Freud's theories of the neuroses*; trans. by Charles R. Payne. N. Y., Nerv. and Ment. Dis. Pub. Co., 1913. 154 p.
- \*Holt, Edwin B. *The Freudian wish and its place in ethics*. N. Y., Holt, 1915. 212 p.
- Jelliffe, Smith Ely. *The technique of psychoanalysis*. N. Y., Nerv. and Ment. Dis. Pub. Co., 1918. 163 p.
- Jones, Ernest. *Papers on psychoanalysis*. 3rd ed. rev. N. Y., Wood, 1923. 731 p.
- Jung, Carl G. *Analytical psychology*; trans. by Constance Long. N. Y., Moffat, 1917. 492 p.
- The psychology of the unconscious; a study of the transformation and symbolism of the libido; a contribution to the history of the evolution of thought; trans. by Beatrice M. Hinkle. N. Y., Moffat, 1916. 566 p.
- Theory of psychoanalysis. N. Y., Nerv. and Ment. Dis. Pub. Co., 1915. 135 p.
- Kempf, Edward J. *The autonomic functions and the personality*. N. Y., Nerv. and Ment. Dis. Pub. Co., 1918. 155 p.
- Psychopathology. St. Louis, Mosby, 1920. 762 p.
- \*Lay, Wilfred. *Man's unconscious conflict*. N. Y., Dodd, 1917. 316 p.

- \*Low, Barbara. Bearings of psychoanalysis upon education. N. Y., Harcourt, 1922.
- \*Psychoanalysis; a brief account of the Freudian theory. N. Y., Harcourt, 1920. 199 p.
- MacCurdy, John T. Problems in dynamic psychology; a critique of psychoanalysis and suggested formulations. N. Y., Macmillan, 1922. 383 p.
- Maeder, A. E. The dream problem; trans. by L. M. Hallock and S. E. Jelliffe. N. Y., Nerv. and Ment. Dis. Pub. Co., 1916. 43 p.
- \*Miller, H. Crichton. New psychology and the parent. N. Y., Seltzer, 1923. 255 p.
- \*New psychology and the teacher. N. Y., Seltzer, 1922. 225 p.
- Nicoll, Maurice. Dream Psychology. Lond., Frowde, 1917. 194 p.
- \*Pfister, Oskar. Psychoanalysis in the science of education. N. Y., Moffat, 1922. 176 p.
- The psychoanalytic method; trans. by Charles R. Payne. N. Y., Moffat, 1917. 588 p.
- ~~Some applications of psychoanalysis. N. Y., Dodd, 1923. 252 p.~~
- Prince, Morton. The dissociation of a personality; a biographical study in abnormal psychology. N. Y., Longmans, 1920. 575 p.
- Psychogenesis of multiple personality. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, v. 14, p. 225-80, October, 1919.
- The unconscious; the fundamentals of human personality, normal and abnormal. N. Y., Macmillan, 1921. 654 p.
- \*Putnam, James J. Addresses on psychoanalysis; with a preface by Sigmund Freud. Lond., Internat'l. Psychoanal. Press, 1921. 469 p.
- \*Human motives. Bost., Little, 1915. 179 p.
- Rank, Otto, and Sachs, Hanns. The significance of psychoanalysis for the mental sciences; trans. by Charles R. Payne. N. Y., Nerv. and Ment. Dis. Pub. Co., 1916. 127 p.
- Ricklin, Franz. Wish fulfillment and symbolism in fairy tales; trans. by William A. White. N. Y., Nerv. and Ment. Dis. Pub. Co., 1915. 90 p.
- Rivers, W. H. R. Conflict and dream; with a preface by G. Elliot Smith. N. Y., Harcourt, 1923. 195 p.
- Instinct and the unconscious; a contribution to a biological theory of the psychoneuroses. 2d ed. Camb. (Eng.) Univ. Press, 1922. 277 p.
- Silberer, Herbert. Problems of mysticism and its symbolism; trans. by S. E. Jelliffe. N. Y., Moffat, 1917. 451 p.
- Stekel, Wilhelm. Bisexual love; the homosexual neurosis. Bost., Badger, 1922. 359 p.
- \*Tansley, Arthur G. The new psychology and its relation to life. N. Y., Dodd, 1922. 297 p.
- Von Hug-Helmuth, H. A study of the mental life of the child. N. Y., Nerv. and Ment. Dis. Pub. Co., 1919. 154 p.
- \*White, William A. Mechanisms of character formation; an introduction to psychoanalysis. N. Y., Macmillan, 1916. 342 p.
- Wundt, Wilhelm M. Elements of folk psychology; trans. by Edward L. Schaub. N. Y., Macmillan, 1921. 532 p.

#### MENTAL DISEASE

See also sections, *Psychoanalysis*, *War Neuroses*.

- Collie, Sir John. Malingering and feigned sickness. 2d ed. N. Y., Longmans, 1917. 664 p.

- Diefendorf, Allen R. Clinical psychiatry; a textbook for students and physicians abstracted and adapted from the seventh German edition of Kraepelin's "Lehrbuch der Psychiatrie". N. Y., Macmillan, 1921. 562 p.
- Franz, Shepherd I. Handbook of mental examination methods. 2d ed. rev. and enl. N. Y., Macmillan, 1919. 193 p.
- \*Goldberg, Jacob. Social aspects of the treatment of the insane; based on a study of New York experience. N. Y., Longmans, 1921. 247 p.
- \*Hart, Bernard. The modern treatment of mental and nervous disorders; a lecture delivered at the University of Manchester, 1918. Manchester, University Press, 1918. 28 p.
- Hoch, August. Benign stupors; a study of a new manic-depressive reaction type. N. Y., Macmillan, 1921. 284 p.
- Janet, Pierre. The major symptoms of hysteria; fifteen lectures given in the medical school of Harvard University. N. Y., Macmillan, 1920. 345 p.
- Jelliffe, Smith Ely, and White, William A. Diseases of the nervous system; a textbook of neurology and psychiatry. 4th ed. rev. and enl. N. Y., Lea, 1923. 1119 p.
- Keogh, Sir Alfred. Medical and surgical therapy. Volume 2: Neuroses. N. Y., Appleton, 1918.
- Kirby, George H. Guides for history taking and clinical examination of psychiatric cases. Utica, State Hospitals Press, 1921. 83 p.
- National Committee for Mental Hygiene—Bureau of Statistics. Statistical manual for the use of hospitals for mental diseases. 3rd ed. rev. N. Y., 1923. 48 p.
- Patrick, Hugh T., and Pollock, Lewis J. Practical medicine series; volume 10: nervous and mental diseases. Chic., Chicago Year-book Pub. Co., 1918. 223 p.
- Rosanoff, Aaron J. Manual of psychiatry. 5th ed. rev. N. Y., Wiley, 1920. 684 p.
- Ross, T. A. The common neuroses; their treatment by psychotherapy. N. Y., Longmans, 1923. 256 p.
- Rows, Richard G., and Orr, David. Functional mental illnesses and the interdependence of the sympathetic and central nervous systems in relation to the psychoneuroses. Edin., Oliver, 1920. 63 p.
- \*Solomon, Harry C., and Maida. Syphilis of the innocent; a study of the social effects of syphilis on the family and the community; with 152 illustrative cases. Wash., U. S. Interdepartmental Social Hygiene Board, 1922. 239 p.
- Southard, Elmer E., and Solomon, Harry C. Neurosyphilis; a modern systematic diagnosis and treatment, presented in one hundred and thirty-seven case histories. Bost., Leonard, 1917. 496 p.
- \*Stokes, John H. The third great plague; a discussion of syphilis for everyday people. Phila., Saunders, 1917. 204 p.
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**THE DOCTOR LOOKS AT LITERATURE; PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF LIFE AND LETTERS.** By Joseph Collins, M.D. New York: George H. Doran Company, 1923. 317 p.

This book is worthy of extended comment, inasmuch as it is one of a class of books that have been appearing in some numbers of late, although its immediate object is different. We refer particularly to the attempts of psychologists and intelligent laymen to popularize psychoanalysis. The present work was written by an experienced neurologist. There are thirteen chapters, the first embracing a thesis on psychology and fiction. The other twelve give us an idea of what the doctor thinks of the works of James Joyce, Feodor Dostoievsky, Dorothy Richardson, Marcel Proust, Katharine Mansfield, Rebecca West, Georges Duhammel, and others.

The critical analyses will not seem so very startling or interesting to the average reader, inasmuch as they are but superficial running comments of a quasi-scientific character. An estimate of their literary value we must perforce leave to the trained critic, who, we believe, has more aptitude and natural capacity in this field than most physicians. Although litterateurs have been accused of possessing "psychopathic traits", their productions belong in the domain of literature; hence there is no good reason why they should be given a special critique by a neuropsychiatrist. It is a matter for regret that the first thirty-four pages of the book could not have been more carefully and temperately written. One can hardly credit William James—whose two-volume work on psychology is still in use as a textbook in many colleges—as saying that psychology "was a nasty little subject", at least as a serious reference to his own teachings or the present-day science taught by McDougall, his worthy successor at Cambridge. Nor can we believe that Woodworth, who is confessedly without practical experience, has "scientifically or sympathetically utilized the materials of the arsenal of the introspectionist", if by that statement the dynamic psychology of Freud is meant. We cannot subscribe to the author's statement that psychologists "are the most indolent of scientists". However we may dislike the character of their studies, we should not slander their assiduity or perseverance. That their work concerns purely objective and measurable data is another matter. There are 5,000 books and periodicals on psychology in the library at Princeton University, and the main collection at Harvard comprises a like number; to this has recently been added a portion of the library of William James, made up of 1,338 volumes and 375 pamphlets. Further, we cannot agree with the author that it is the novelist's province to "collect human experiences of various



sorts" and "put it up to the psychologist as a challenge". Though fiction, as many claim, may be an inferior form of literary art, certainly it is in no sense a science, nor would the psychologist welcome such data to work upon. Moreover, it will give the student a jolt to read that Professor Dewey's carefully worked out book *Habit and Conduct*, is but a touch "on the edges of the subject". We cannot help but believe that the cocksureness attributed to Freud in "offering a complete outfit of knowledge and an inductively derived theory that the novelist has been sighing for" is a gross misstatement, and one thoroughly at variance with fact. The restraint of Freud's attitude in attempting to give a critical analysis in his prefaces to *Gradiva* and *The Life of Leonardo Da Vinci* is an instance in point. It is also unfair to say that "Freud or his disciples can explain anything in the character and conduct line while you wait". Or, again, "If you want to know why a given person is what he is, or why he acts as he does, Freud can tell you." And still again, "If he [the novelist] is not completely carried off his feet, he may grin at some of the formulas as he might at a smutty joke."

If one may say that progress in mental science is summated in a richer subtlety of mind and a more flexible and adaptable organism, it is hard to accept the author's statement that "there is no reason to suppose that the current doctrines of the subconscious will do more for civilization or art than the older doctrines of consciousness", because it is exactly to the end of our understanding mental science more completely that the new psychology owes its origin and growth. If the present trends of dynamic psychology have no new message to offer in interpreting literature and life, why this book or the author's "look" at his subjects? There are innumerable tendencies here and there to encourage one to look at the dynamism of the new psychology as a species of pornographic tendencies on the part of its adherents. Take, for instance, the following quotation: "For a time it seemed to the casual observer that the New Psychology was so steeped in pruriency that it could not be investigated without armor and gas mask." This is as debasing an attitude as if one were to treat gynecology or obstetrics in the same manner. The author infers that psychoanalysis is chiefly of service to the psychologist, facilitating his understanding of the workings of both the normal and the unbalanced mind. While it is true that what the analyst gets to know of his patient is of great importance, what the patient learns about himself is of far greater importance and the ultimate worth of psychoanalysis must rise or fall by this standard. It is apparently the function of many neurologists to predict the passing of psycho-

analysis, even to setting a time limit to its demise, but Dr. Collins is satisfied to indicate simply that it is a procedure of no great therapeutic moment, that it is often poisonous, and that it is doomed to go the way of all "isms". On the whole the initial chapter shows a sufficient degree of misinformation and bias thoroughly to discourage one from hoping that a fair, discerning, and patient analysis has been given to the psycho-literary efforts treated in the succeeding chapters.

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**CURES: THE STORY OF THE CURES THAT FAIL.** By James J. Walsh, M.D. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1923. 291 p.

*Cures*, although quite obviously written for the layman, contains much of value for the physician, and no one can read the book without chuckling at the credulity of human nature which Dr. Walsh so amusingly describes. The quackeries of all time are marshaled before the reader—cures by drugs, magnetism, mesmerism, hypnotism, spiritism, and other forms of mysticism. Most interesting are the chapters on the various personal healers—Elisha Perkins, Dowie, Andrew Jackson Davis, Greatraker, Schlatter, and Phineas Quimby. Christian Science has not been neglected, nor have New Thought, chiropractic, and osteopathy.

Just why psychoanalysis and Coué come in for discussion under the same heading the author does not make clear except to state that "both of them expect patients to tap their subconscious or their unconscious—something quite different, anyhow, from their ordinary consciousness—and by that means make themselves better". To any one who is at all familiar with Couéism and psychoanalysis, this attempt on the part of the author to force the two schools into the same general category must appear a bit ridiculous.

Dr. Walsh states that his "own experience with cases treated by Freudianism has been rather limited", but he has no hesitation in condemning the practice as harmful; he cites a number of well-known opponents of psychoanalysis to back up his own views, but he makes no mention of a host of prominent physicians and educators, including the professors of psychiatry in most of our leading medical schools, who endorse the Freudian principles either in entirety or in part. This attitude is manifestly unfair.

The author's style is entertaining and amusing, although he is a bit verbose and given to repetition. Most of the material could have been got into a volume of much smaller size without serious loss. The biased attitude toward the psychoanalytic school, the reviewer

regards as unfortunate. But there is a place for such a book; there is need for it. As Dr. Walsh puts it, referring to the gullibility of human nature in the past, "Why should not the present generation have a right to share in some of the fun?" And the physician cannot be too often reminded of this gullibility on the part of his patients. The late Sir William Osler has made mention of such frailty in his *Æquanimitas*:

"Deal gently, then, with this deliciously credulous old human nature in which we work, and restrain your indignation when you find your pet parson has tritulates of the 1,000th potentiality in his waistcoat pocket, or you discover accidentally a case of Warner's Safe Cure in the bedroom of your best patient. It must needs be that offenses of this kind come; expect them, and do not be vexed."

When "offenses of this kind come" to the doctor, the reading of Dr. Walsh's book may help him to understand and to take heart.

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**CRUCIBLES OF CRIME; THE SHOCKING STORY OF THE AMERICAN JAIL.**

By Joseph F. Fishman. Written in collaboration with Vee Perlman. New York: Cosmopolis Press, 1923. 299 p.

Mr. Fishman's conception of our jails as "crucibles of crime", together with a declaration that "the jail makes criminals", will suggest the tone and character and the restricted scope of his approach to a study of these institutions. The book consists of twelve chapters with the following headings: *A Human Dumping Ground; Characteristic Conditions; No Business of Mine; Inside the Crucible; Treatment of Women; Narcotics; Taking the Vinegar Out of 'Em; The Heart of Maryland; Personnel, Escapes, Administration; Years of Horror; Specific Remedies; Establishing a New Order*. The chapter headings are not always an index to the text; there is much repetition; and one chapter, representing 52 of the 299 pages, is given over to a description of ingenious methods by which prisoners have attempted to "break jail".

The following phrases, culled at random, are characteristic of the language of the morbidly curious and of the professional "reformer", and may in a measure account for the rather wide advertisement that the book has received through the lay press. "A debauch of dirt, disease, and degeneracy", "damp, clammy caverns", "a sink of iniquity", "a crucible of corruption", "guaranteed criminal; made in America", "whipping women", "unspeakable Missouri", "grim crucibles", "loathsome conditions", "miniature Siberia", "Chester-

town's watery rat hole", "Salisbury's sty", "a neglected tomb", "pest holes". The language is vivid and picturesque, but when the conditions that call forth these descriptive phrases have been examined in a coldly scientific fashion in at least one of the institutions dealt with in the book, the reviewer is forced to the conclusion that the author's zeal and enthusiasm and his desire to jolt the indifferent public into consciousness of the evils that often exist right at our front doors may have led him to rhetorical exaggeration which may explain some of the antagonism on the part of officials and newspapers that he speaks of in several places.

The chief subjects discussed are filthy cell houses, overcrowding, rats, bedbugs, types of jailer, politics and jails, more rats and bugs, the "Trusty System", drug addiction, more filthy cells, "Kangaroo Courts", official indifference, public ignorance, more rats and bugs, more stench and filth, occupational and recreational programs, the "Snitch System", bathing of prisoners, the "Fee System", infectious diseases, prison doctors, prisoners' compensation, prison inspection, more rats and bedbugs, classification of prisoners, whipping of prisoners, treatment of women, newspaper publicity and politics, more rats and filthy cells, hospital care of prisoners, methods of heating, lighting, and ventilation, the "night bucket", the insane and the mentally defective, the indeterminate sentence, identification bureaus, sexual pervers, ignorance of the judiciary, "pampering" prisoners, more vermin and filth, more bad odors, idleness, darkness, disease, politics, graft, torture, indifference, filth, punishment, bedbugs, rats, and lice. We are almost tempted to write: "A sadistic-masochistic matinée, equal to a trip through the old British convict ship, *Success*, with the admission fee elevated!"

According to Mr. Fishman's investigations, few of the features that are recognized by trained penologists as essentials in a decent, properly organized, and well-managed institution are to be found in the American jail; and, conversely, every vicious feature, custom, and degrading condition possible of development and toleration under our penal system exists to the nth degree and flourishes almost unchallenged. The author, according to the title page, sees these deplorable conditions through the eyes of a man "For Many Years Only Inspector of Prisons for the United States Government in Territory Embracing the United States, Alaska, and Porto Rico, and Independent Prison Investigator and Consultant for Federal, State, and Municipal Governments". The book indeed indicates the well-known "weak spots" in the system as it exists; but these deficiencies are presented with a flavor that smacks of the professional propagandist, and many thinking people may be loath to utilize this channel until



a dignified, unemotional appeal has been made on the basis of conservative, scientific investigation and with full consideration of the wide background of facts, economic, social, and psychiatric, that must be evaluated in developing and extending a program for the treatment of our criminals.

In the final chapter a plea is made for the real indeterminate sentence, for the special training of prison officers, and for a "receiving prison" in each state where every person convicted of a felony might receive study from a broad psychiatric viewpoint. The writer urges these constructive approaches in a concise, earnest, and refreshing fashion.

As a comprehensive scientific report on conditions in our jails, presenting data of value in developing and improving technique in the field of penology, the book is of course inadequate. As a piece of militant propaganda, if this is indicated at this time, it is excellent; and perhaps that is all the author had in mind when he gave it to the press.

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**NERVOUS ILLS: THEIR CAUSE AND CURE.** By Boris Sidis, Ph.D., M.D.  
Boston: Richard G. Badger, 1922. 279 p.

The introduction to this book is a pessimistic analysis of our times, apparently evoked by the rise of psychoanalysis. I am no lover of psychoanalysis, myself, but the temper with which Freudism is here assailed is entirely foreign to science. Surely the liberal-minded reader to whom Dr. Sidis addresses himself will be as much offended by the spirit of his criticism of Freud as he is by the "mediocrity of the herd". Dr. Sidis emphasizes the rôle of fear in introducing the psychoneuroses. Nevertheless, it is not true to say that "neurosis is a disease of self-preservation and fear", without at all dwelling on the fact that the phrasing "neurosis is a disease" is bad. We have only Dr. Sidis' dogmatic assertion that it is a disease of self-preservation and fear.

Chapter VII, which purports to be "a brief outline and classification of mental and nervous diseases", is highly original and in my opinion is highly misleading. I hope no lay reader, especially the social worker, will take it seriously. I am quite sure that no medical man will. For example, the author says that "functional nervous and mental diseases are in turn subdivided into neuropathies and psychopathies. Neuropathic diseases are disturbances of functioning activity due to defective neuron metabolism brought about by external stimuli and more especially the harmful internal stimuli—glandular

secretions, hormones, toxic and auto-toxic agencies. The pathological neuropathic process produces few, if any, anatomical changes in the structure of the neuron. The pathology of neuropathic diseases probably of the cytoplasm is essentially chemico-physiological in nature."

The neuropathic diseases include "maladies in which the neuron undergoes degenerative changes". How one reconciles the definition of functional diseases with the statement that "the neuron undergoes degenerative changes" is beyond understanding. Any change in a neuron produced by toxic substances of whatever sort is organic, regardless of whether it is permanent or temporary, regardless of whether it is chemico-physiological (what else would it be?), and so forth. From this point on the definition becomes too complicated for me to follow, and the diagram with which the author concludes this chapter is no help at all to me.

A group of chapters concern themselves with the hypnoidal state, which Sidis brought into prominence and which constitutes a real contribution to psychopathological thought. That his separation of normal and abnormal suggestibility, however, is a correct one, I doubt very seriously. I do not believe that there is any evidence to show that abnormal suggestibility is so completely reversed from normal suggestibility, or that the subconscious personality (whatever that may be) is so unlike the normal personality.

Chapter XVII, dealing with the fundamental principles of psychopathic or nervous ills, is interesting. There are apparently fifteen principles, which is one more than a famous statesman used in laying down rules for peace. I cannot enter into any extended criticism because the development of the principles does not seem to follow any definite law or order. I doubt very much whether the layman would get much out of this chapter.

I rather enjoyed the chapter entitled *Neuroses and the Eugenists*. I think that Dr. Sidis says some very good things about the eugenists. He remarks very pertinently: "The eugenists pile Ossa on Pelion of facts by the simple method of enumeration which Bacon and the great thinkers coming after him condemned as puerile and futile."

Much of the latter part of the book can meet only with the approval of any reader. Dr. Sidis' ideal of mental health as possible to all may or may not be correct, but the statement that "banishment of credulity, the cultivation of the upper, critical consciousness, the rational control of the subconscious, the moderation of the self-impulse, the regulation of the fear instinct, and the access to the vast doors of subconscious reserve energy, all go to the formation of a strong, healthy-minded personality, free from fear and psychopatho-

logical maladies", is one to which all who wish to see human beings grow in dignity and power can subscribe.

A. MYERSON.

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AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF PSYCHOPATHIC DELINQUENT WOMEN.

By Edith R. Spaulding, M.D., with an introduction by Katharine B. Davis. New York: Bureau of Social Hygiene, 1923. 368 p.

This work contains chapters on the management and treatment of the psychopathic delinquent woman, with an outline of the problem as found at the New York State Reformatory for Women at Bedford Hills. A description is given of the cases that were treated at the psychopathic hospital connected with the laboratory of social hygiene, the facilities and resources that were available, the methods used, and the conclusions to which the experiences of the staff led. A social worker followed up each subject who left Bedford, and so far as possible the present status of the subject is appended to each case report.

"Like two contending in a dream" is the controversy between those who have tried to settle the question: Can human nature be changed? At the recent World Court Lord Brice thought so, and Dewey, in his *Human Nature and Conduct*, maintains that it can, while the genetic biologists like Davenport and Morgan say that it cannot. As a contribution to this academic postulate, Dr. Spaulding's study is an interesting document. We should rather infer from her book that human nature really cannot be changed, *but*—and the but is highly important—it may be induced to seek other goals than outrageous delinquency, to the contentment and happiness of all concerned.

On the whole, the outcome of the experiment was not encouraging. Although some of the subjects under observation and study became fairly good citizens, the majority did not greatly change, and their propensities toward delinquency were exhibited only less frequently and perhaps were not so openly antisocial. In addition to the fact that they probably possessed innate social faults, most of these women had reached the age of twenty-five years or over, a time of life when character and social custom are fairly well set. The roots of their delinquencies were too firmly planted in early, if not congenital, soil, so that to meet properly the entire problem, before and after study, prevention, and follow-up were absolutely necessary.

It is important to note that almost all the workers in this field were psychiatrically trained, yet the needs of the future, as Dr. Spaulding suggests, stretch far beyond the ordinary province of the older train-

ing in psychiatry. The worker needs the widest viewpoint possible, in social, mental, and physical science.

The fact that this study is put into book form, instead of the paper-bound monograph usual for intensive studies of a particular and selected group, possibly gives the impression that the work covers the entire field. However, it is quite worth while, and its very durable make-up will undoubtedly contribute to its being a more lasting presentation than others of its class.

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**THE HOBO: THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE HOMELESS MAN.** By Nels Anderson. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1923. 302 p.

Mr. Anderson has contributed, in this book, a most valuable and excellent description of the homeless man, his mode of life, and his habits. The work is the result of a series of investigations made by Mr. Anderson for the Chicago Council of Social Agencies in coöperation with the Juvenile Protective Association of Chicago, and the preface tells us that the author gathered much of the data by living in Hobohemia for twelve months. That he observed well cannot be doubted when one reads the book.

The author has set down his observations in four major sections: I. *Hobohemia, the Home of the Homeless Man*; II. *Types of Hoboes*; III. *The Hobo Problem*; IV. *How the Hobo Meets His Problem*. An appendix, containing a summary and recommendations and a very comprehensive bibliography, completes the work.

There is only a slight attempt to offer a real analysis of the problem of the homeless man. This is in Chapter V of Part II entitled *Why Do Men Leave Home?* The author here (page 61) gives the six general reasons why men leave home: (a) seasonal work and unemployment, (b) industrial inadequacy, (c) defects of personality, (d) crises in the life of the person, (e) racial or national discrimination, and (f) wanderlust. In the succeeding pages of this chapter there is discussion of each of these reasons, together with short case-history examples. One becomes just a bit confused at the author's separation of industrial inadequacy from defects of personality. Under the latter caption he considers feeble-mindedness, epilepsy, insanity, and psychopathy, while under the heading industrial inadequacy he discusses alcoholism, drug addiction, the deterioration of senile years, and physical handicaps. Why drug addiction, alcoholism, and senile deterioration should be considered under a different etiologic heading from epilepsy, insanity, feeble-mindedness, and psychopathy is not clear, especially in view of the accepted psychiatric view of these conditions.



Case No. 39 (page 82), cited to illustrate the operation of the author's sixth reason, wanderlust, leaves one wondering if he is not here dealing with a psychopathic personality who should more properly be considered from the point of view of his defects of personality.

In considering how the hobo meets his problem, speaking of the failure of hobo organizations (page 248), the author tells us that "the hobo, like other egocentric types, is suspicious", and, later, "while the man of property secures himself best by associating with his neighbors and remaining in one locality, the hobo safeguards himself by moving away from every difficulty". Some factor or factors, then, in the personality of the individual hobo must be present to operate with other reasons of "unemployment", "seasonal work", "industrial inadequacy", and the like, in the production of his homelessness.

Part III, *The Hobo Problem*, divided into three chapters dealing with health, the sex life of the homeless man, and the hobo as a citizen, is somewhat disappointing if one expects more than a presentation of some of the problems of the individual hobo. The appendix containing recommendations as to methods for meeting the problem is excellent, and the bibliography is very full and comprehensive.

As an intensely realistic description of the hobo and his habits, we recommend the book most highly.

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PRIMITIVE MENTALITY. By Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, translated by Lilian A. Clare. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1923. 458 p.

If one hopes to find in this book a rationale of the so-called primitive mentality, one is doomed to disappointment. In the first place, there are not, in the strictly scientific sense, any primitive peoples on earth to-day. Reckoning man's existence to have been some four hundred thousand years, anything in the way of customs or manner of life that has occurred in the past twenty thousand may be considered quite up-to-date. As prehistoric data on man's ways of acting and thinking go back no further than thirty thousand years, we cannot say that we have any records of real primitive peoples. So far as the out-of-the-way inhabitants who are still knocking about are concerned, they are really our contemporaries in all sorts of ways. When Rivers was asked if the Melanesians were very strange, outlandish folk, he replied: "Oh, not at all. In the two years I lived among them, I came to consider them as colleagues of mine." Professor Lévy-Bruhl, on the contrary, seems to think that all of us so-called modern Christians are quite different from the peoples who live beyond the pale of the radio and the movies. For instance, he states

that primitive people have mystical minds and use pre-logical modes of thinking. He states that they live in two diametrically opposed worlds—an everyday, concrete world and the, to them, real, but unseen realm of magic and spirits. The fusion of these two worlds results in a life of contradiction. Well, isn't that the kind of life we all live, in this very modern world? A sort of hazy reverie is the type of thinking we all indulge in during the greater part of our waking moments, and certainly in our dream life, when we are asleep, we are veritable Alices in Wonderland. Logical and scientific reasoning practically began with the Greeks, so we haven't been at it so very long. This may be offered as a partial excuse for the fact that we do so little "rigorous thinking" in our daily living. Even approximate genuises cannot sustain continuous, intensive, rigorous thinking for a long period without great fatigue, and most of us but play at the process. Lévy-Bruhl's statement that so-called primitives engage in more mystical or pre-logical thought to the square inch than we moderns seems hardly credible. The only difference is that we have a different variety of mystical thought. Instead of trying openly to commune with unseen spirits, we do it more surreptitiously by way of mediums, ouija boards, fortune tellers, and the like camouflaged human and mechanical means. Moreover, our numerous periodicals and books on mental subjects are more expeditious ways of disseminating mystical lore. Lévy-Bruhl's fear lest the so-called primitive ways of thinking will disappear before we can understand and record them is quite unfounded. They have been with us for ages and will continue to be with us for many more. Fashions in them are bound to change; witness the prevailing halos, human auræ, and ectoplasm now worn. Any one of us might give personal witness to data on any one of the author's subjects. For instance, believers in mystic and invisible forces, in dreams both pro and contra, are always with us. The practice of divination by means of prayer and its varied ceremonials is of daily occurrence. The use of ordeals and tests to find out what the mystic force is that lies behind the show of things plays a part in all our lives, not in that of the psychic researcher alone. So we might go through all the chapter headings, even to the final one on the primitive's distrust and dislike of the unknown and his antagonistic attitude toward more advanced cultural peoples—we have it all. Of course, we may rationalize better, but give the barbarian a chance and he will learn to make quite as good a list of his daily activities as those cited by Stefanson, Rivers, and Boas, who have already given instances of these in their works on so-called primitive society.

Now to the main bone of contention in this review—and we are

giving the matter extended treatment for the reason that there are similar works steadily appearing in these days of psychologic vogue: Nowhere in this book is there the slightest hint that the author knows that there is an *unconscious*; much less does he mention that at least one great department of psychology is busily engaged in the daily analysis of unconscious mentation, and that the richness and variety of the resulting material, which is being published in dozens of scientific journals, far outweighs in interest and value the bizarre primitive or archaic thought that Lévy-Bruhl presents. Moreover, how could he produce his book when the matter has been treated so very much better by Fraser in his masterful work, *The Golden Bough*? If Lévy-Bruhl had but thrown some light upon how these simpler types of thought came into existence and why they are still so tenaciously employed by all of us, his book would have been a boon. Even his "collective representation" is an odd mixture of the *herd instinct* of Trotter, the *collective unconscious* of Jung, and the *infantile unconscious* of Freud. The last two scientists have long since formulated theories of how and why the collective unconscious has come about.

The work as a whole is but a further elaboration of the consciously obvious, and lacks condensation, finality, and suggestive interpretation. The book will be thoroughly disappointing not only to the scientist and the psychological expert, but even to the "veriest tyro" in the study of mentality, for whom it was apparently written. Those who hope to find a solution to our many psychologic problems regarding the early workings of the human mind must go elsewhere.

L. PIERCE CLARK

New York City.

CONSTRUCTIVE CONSCIOUS CONTROL OF THE INDIVIDUAL. By F. Matthias Alexander. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1923. 317 p.

The individual who attempts to read Mr. Alexander's book without preliminary knowledge of his earlier works and general theories can hardly fail to be confused by it. In fact the author asserts that the present volume is a sequel to an earlier book, *Man's Supreme Inheritance*, to which the reader is frequently referred.

Basing man's tribulations upon a decay of his sensory appreciation and his deplorable dependence on subconscious guidance, Mr. Alexander proceeds to outline his program to reëducate sense registration and substitute rational conscious control for chaotic and dangerous subconscious leadership. In this process he wavers between laboratory precision and esoteric vagueness, presenting strange contradictions.

Affirming that soul and body are inseparable in human processes, he uses the phrase "psycho-physical" throughout the book, but in elaborating on this, he ignores the psyche and confines his explanations to a sort of neuro-physiology. This is well illustrated by his handling of the subject of fear, which he treats not as an emotion, but as a reflex. Nevertheless, in the last analysis, Mr. Alexander's book would be abandoned by physiologists as well as psychologists, on account of the vagueness and inconclusiveness of his arguments.

His principle of coördination of the individual as a method of cure in place of a resort to specific "cures" is admirable, but can hardly be termed original except in its extravagance. In his tirade against panaceas, psychoanalysis is placed in the same category as liver cures and the like, being an example of "end gaining" rather than "means whereby". Thus, he writes: "Will psychoanalysis, as practised, restore a reliable sensory appreciation to the patient and coördinate and reëducate his psycho-physical mechanisms on a general basis? Certainly not. The psycho-physical condition which permitted the establishment of the first phobia will permit the establishment of another. All that is needed is the stimulus."

Perhaps Mr. Alexander's sensory appreciation was unreliable (with all the incorrect experiences, beliefs, and judgments that we now know to be inevitably associated with this condition) when he drew this and similar conclusions.

There are times when Mr. Alexander comes perilously near the brink of psychology in spite of himself, but each time he turns his back and steers carefully into his own circumscribed realm. This attitude is easily understood, for Mr. Alexander has good reason to fear that his theories would be absorbed, after a diffusion that would render them unrecognizable, by the more plastic and comprehensive concepts of this ever-widening field.

RUTH LIEBMAN.

Stamford, Connecticut.

PROTOPLASMIC ACTION AND NERVOUS ACTION. By Ralph S. Lillie.  
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1923. 400 p.

This volume presents in compact form, carefully analyzed and scientifically ordered, a most excellent body of experimental material on the physico-chemical aspects of protoplasm. Much of the material of the book bears directly upon the physiology of nerve functions and will be of great value to psychiatrists and psychologists as well as to more general students of experimental physiology. The author does not attempt to cover the same ground as will be found in the masterly work of Bayliss or Loeb, but he does present essentials in a thoroughly



scientific and interesting fashion, and in the particular field of the transmission functions, the analysis is thoroughgoing and complete.

Lillie's fundamental thesis is that the organism presents a regularity which is manifestly dependent upon the regularity of its component physico-chemical processes, and that analysis shows these to present the same constant and reproducible results in living organisms as in non-living systems. Growth, development, and an integrative correlation of activities are the chief distinguishing characters of organisms. The essential problem in the physiology of growth rests upon the conditions of specific chemical synthesis in protoplasm. The problem of integration resolves itself into the problem of transmission. Lillie makes special use of "models"—artificial systems in which the action of single factors may be isolated and observed—in his analysis of these problems, and one of the most interesting and helpful of these models is the one he has developed to show the physico-chemical nature of nervous transmission.

The book contains a total of fifteen chapters, which will be grouped somewhat in our discussion. The first two chapters deal with the general characteristics of living matter. Here are found excellent short discussions of metabolism, growth, heredity, irritability, regulation, and adaptation (in the general biologic sense), spontaneous activity, and general physiology. The second chapter deals with the problem of cellular organization. There the author presents in very clear fashion the modern conception of membrane function, where the older conception of the membrane as an insulating or protecting device is supplemented by the modern conception of semi-permeability built upon the observation that the membrane is only slightly permeable to the water-soluble substances present in the protoplasm, while freely permeable to water. At the boundary between the surface membrane and the surrounding medium, all the phenomena characteristic of phase boundaries are found, such as electrical properties, surface tension, and adsorption. Chapter three deals with the general and specific characters of living organisms, and the maintenance of metabolic equilibrium is discussed in simple, yet adequate manner. The author takes the notion of adaptation from its general biologic setting—where it is largely that mysterious something that makes for survival—and shows that it is physiologically a sequence of regulations dependent upon irritability of tissue. He gives attention to the problem of specific form determination and discusses its relation to the problem of the chemical constitution of compounds and their crystalline or molar structure. His discussion of the experimental modifications of growth and heredity is particularly interesting. Certain stimuli—electricity, light, temperature—are responded to by

changes in rate or manner of growth, and the author points out that these changes in metabolic synthesis are called forth under the same conditions as the more familiar types of response, such as muscular contraction in animals. He also shows the influence of Child's recent work in his contention that in many instances normal physiological activity is a prerequisite for normal growth and development. The need of activity for normal growth is most evident in the adult stages of higher organisms, as is shown by intermittently active voluntary muscle. Another interesting part of the chapter is devoted to the general features of the stimulation processes.

Chapters four, five, six, and seven deal with the physical character of protoplasm. The author presents here the catabolic nature of physical diffusion and the chemical processes of oxidation and hydrolysis, and the compensations by which living protoplasm is kept in a state of permanent existence. The general conception of living matter, as a system holding its own through a balance of constructive and disintegrative processes, is fundamental in modern physiology. The author discusses here the chemical activity of living matter as related to structure and shows the dependence of the former upon the latter. In all cases the synthesis of specific proteins, the reactions essential to growth and maintenance, require the intact protoplasmic structure. The structural breakdown characteristic of death, or due to the presence of lipid-solvent compounds like chloroform, apparently indicates that during life there exists a partitioned or alveolar structure in protoplasm. Many of these breakdown phenomena are shown to involve the loss of the normal semi-permeability of the plasma membrane. Since it is generally recognized that colloids form the basis of protoplasmic structure, Lillie gives us an analysis of colloidal phenomena with the emphasis upon the emulsions. His discussion of adsorption phenomena is splendid. It covers about twenty-five pages of the book. The discussion of permeability of protoplasmic membranes is thoroughgoing. He draws considerably from the work of Overton, Hober, and Osterhout.

Chapter eight is devoted to an analysis of the relation of inorganic salts of the medium to the physiological processes of protoplasm. Chapter nine presents the action of lipid alterants and chapter ten discusses catalysis in relation to the chemical processes in living matter. Chapter eleven deals largely with the electrical factors in catalytic action of protoplasm.

Chapter twelve on stimulation and transmission is introductory to the remaining chapters of the book, which take up bio-electric phenomena, membrane changes during stimulation, and the physico-chemical basis of nervous transmission. These chapters will be con-

sidered by many to be the contribution of the book, largely because of Lillie's well-known work in these fields. However, the reviewer is of the opinion that those who attempt to make use of the material on nervous transmission without due consideration of the preceding chapters will make a serious mistake. Just here lies the fatal defect in present-day physiological psychology, for example. There is too much citing of this definition of inhibition or that theory of conduction, and altogether too little of the general appreciation of that splendid body of science of which these terms form only the skeleton.

The reviewer is impressed with the enormous amount of experimental material that the author has classified and placed in accessible form, and he ventures the opinion that nowhere in English will one find a more scholarly treatment or one more likely to be of real service to those sciences which can make use of the researches of experimental physiology.

GEORGE S. SNODDY.

University of Utah.

PRACTICAL PSYCHOLOGY FOR BUSINESS EXECUTIVES. By Lionel D. Edie. (The Modern Business Executive's Library.) New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1922. 392 p.

*Practical Psychology for Business Executives* is a book of abstracts, a compilation of notes from many sources, brought together by the author and loosely strung along under various chapter headings. In reviewing a book of this nature, several approaches are possible. One can consider the choice of the abstracts, their coherency and relation to the title of the book, the validity and potency of the sources, the care and appropriateness of the selection, and other matters of that nature; or one may consider whether or not the book answers the purpose for which it was intended—namely, whether it is a really good guide in practical psychology for business executives; or, finally, one can make the approach from a more general point of view and ask what is the value of such a book as this. Perhaps the best way to present an all-round view of the book is to discuss it from each of these angles.

In the first place, the effect of a book of abstracts is to produce a certain amount of confusion. It is difficult to jump from a paragraph of Goddard's, for instance, on "levels of intelligence" to one by Filene on "successful application of psychological principles", with no intervening paragraph to prepare one for the shock. Nor is it quite fair to the authors quoted to pick them up in the midst of a thought and drop them again without following through their argument, as we so often find the author doing in this book. The abstracts them-

selves are arranged according to some sort of a scheme, no doubt, which Mr. Edie had in mind at the time of compilation, but on first perusal they give very little orientation even to one who has read much in the field in question. Were there some connecting link of explanation to tide the reader over from one abstract to the next, to absorb the shock of shifting from the literary style of G. S. Hall to that of C. H. Cooley, the distracting effect might be mitigated. The general effect of the book in its present form is that of a crazy quilt in which patches of calico lie side by side with remnants of an old silk gown.

There is one more serious criticism of the general make-up of the book, and that is in regard to the print. It is fine and lightly inked, a tax for eyes of even strong endurance. What "business executive" would plow through 387 pages of fine print, especially in the form of abstracts? Of course he is at liberty to read only a few of the abstracts here and there, could he be certain that he would accidentally light upon the very few that would really prove of benefit to him. And this brings up the second point—of what real value is this book to business executives?

It seems to me that the only really practical bit of psychology in the book is the choice of the title, which makes it easy bait for the modern business man interested in getting the material that psychology has to offer to industry. It probably sells well under that title. But upon close examination, one finds little that is really psychology in the scientific sense, and assumes that the author means by "practical psychology" that loose interpretation of the term which simply makes psychology synonymous with "common sense". It would have been simpler to have referred to *Poor Richard's Almanac*, which the business executive would find delightful in style and full of valuable suggestions.

Of the nineteen chapters of the book, the first fourteen are for the most part concerned with general discussions, and the abstracts selected are from authors known best in the fields of sociology and economics, along with some from successful business executives. The last five chapters are really concerned with the problem of applied psychology. Chapter XV considers the value of psychological tests, with abstracts from Walter Dill Scott, H. L. Hollingworth (this is quite long and sufficient to give a real idea of the argument of the original author), Charles S. Meyers, Henry C. Link, Yoakum and Yerkes, Thorndike, R. W. Kelly, H. D. Kitson, and J. Crosby Chapman. The last mentioned, by Chapman, is a good instance of the unsatisfactory character of abstracts. The author quotes a paragraph of introduction and leads one up to the most interesting part of Chap-



man's contribution—the description of the various tests—and then passes on to the article by Kitson.

Chapter XVI concerns itself with “the far-reaching consequences of fear in industry”. Here, again, we have psychological terms with economic and sociological treatment. Chapter XVII again comes back to the subject matter of psychology in discussing fatigue control and industrial efficiency; Chapter XVIII takes up the pathology of the worker, with abstracts from Southard, Jarrett, Adler (Herman), Hart, and Healy; Chapter XIX treats of the contributions of abnormal psychology to business problems.

Mr. Edie's own introductions to the various chapters, as when he gives his opinions of the trade-union movement, are undoubtedly sound from an economic point of view, but in the matter of psychology his statements—as, for instance, when he speaks of the “drives”—sound unfortunately like an acquired set of phrases from current psychological literature without any real personal research or conviction behind them.

In trying to get out a book that would be of real value to business executives, had the author reviewed his material, selected ideas and suggestions from the various sources, and put them together in some coherent, unified way—re-created them, as it were—much time and fatigue would have been saved the “tired business man”. The real value of the book lies in its suggestions for further reading. For a student or one interested in doing research work on the problems in question, the abstracts are sufficient to give an idea of the treatment of the subject matter by various authors and to stimulate further reading of the books from which the abstracts are taken. But the business executive is not looking for a long reading list, the material of a large part of which is not pertinent to his problems. That is the job of the student.

SADIE MYERS SHELLAW.

Smith College School for Social Work.

LE CERVEAU ET LA PENSÉE. By Henri Piéron. Paris: Felix Alcan, 1923. 328 p.

This book covers the ground one would expect in a rather complete analysis of the relationship between the brain and the thought processes. The treatment in the main is popular and interpretative, and in many instances scientific accuracy is sacrificed to gain illustrations likely to appeal to the general reader. Fortunately, however, this criticism does not apply to all portions of the work. On the whole the treatment is much more anatomical than psychological and,

except for those sections given over to the analysis of aphasia, the emphasis is upon anatomy rather than upon physiology.

An example of Piéron's popularization is seen in the first chapter. A free translation of a paragraph will suffice to show the point: "Another characteristic of nervous functioning is the organization of nervous elements into levels. The first stage in the organization and division of labor is the setting aside of certain parts for receiving only and others for sending only. This is comparable to the communication department of a large, highly specialized commercial establishment. Besides employees who send only and those who receive only, there are those who elaborate the orders (the chiefs) and those who communicate between the chiefs and the other employees. In the process the orders and messages are worked over, carefully classified, criticized, and elaborated. Some messages are turned over to the lower employees because the responses necessary are simple and not in need of elaboration. The level messages reach depends upon their need of elaboration. This need is soon recognized if the message has appeared many times before; in which case it is transmitted to the proper level without delay."

Some years' experience in teaching elementary psychology has convinced the reviewer that this kind of anthropomorphism is the worst possible when put in the hands of beginning students. It is doubtful if an author is ever justified in using such simplifications. The frequent appearance of such careless illustrations vitiates many chapters in the book.

The book is divided into four parts, each consisting of from three to five chapters. The first part deals with the general conception of "neuro-mental" functions. Three chapters are given to this, two of which are introductory, while one is given over to the problem of localization. There is very little new material in the section. The chapter on localization is carefully done.

Part two deals with the sensori-motor functions. The discussion of the receptors is in general what one will find in textbooks on physiology, with the addition of paragraphs on coördination, which are noticeably anthropomorphic. One chapter presents some of the author's ideas on the shifting of coördinations from one stimulus to another. In this chapter one finds an attempt made to use the experimental work of Lapicque, Sherrington, and Lillie. It seems to the reviewer that little is accomplished here aside from the assembling of material on the physiology of nerve conduction.

Part three takes up verbal functions and thought and deals largely with aphasia, of which it is a very complete analysis. A total of eighty-five pages are given to the analysis of the aphasias alone.

Part four is devoted to the affective regulation of the mental life. This is largely an assembling of the ideas that have appeared for many years in the *L'Année Psychologique* from the pen of the author.

On the whole, Piéron presents to the American reader what seems to indicate the static condition of French psychology. The high lights that bring into clear outline the various phases of American psychology to-day seem to be entirely absent. One finds no significant references to the work of American behaviorists, no use of the conception of developmental levels (mental ages), no references to the recent German approaches to the thought processes. To one who has become interested in Pavlov's work Piéron will appeal, since he has made real use of Pavlov's experiments throughout his book and has added much material to what is current in America at the present time.

GEORGE S. SNODDY.

University of Utah.

THE PHYSICAL BASIS OF LIFE. By Edmund B. Wilson. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1923. 51 p.

THE COMING OF MAN. By John M. Tyler. Boston: Marshall Jones Company, 1923. 147 p.

STUDIES IN EVOLUTION AND EUGENICS. By S. J. Holmes, Ph.D. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1923. 261 p.

These three books are significant examples of a growing tendency. They are fair representatives—neither the best nor the worst—of what is being done to meet the increasing realization that there exists an intimate relation between the doctrines of modern biological science and the practical affairs of human life. And it cannot be said that they are wholly satisfactory; for, as usual, there is evident failure to effect complete communication. The biologist, no doubt, must write biology, but scientific soundness, while it may content the special student, will never, of itself, be sufficient to attract and hold the attention of the intelligent public. The stage is set for the entrance of the biologist with genuine literary ability.

Professor Wilson's little book is a *de luxe* pamphlet on protoplasm as represented by cell structure and behavior in mitosis, fertilization, and early embryogeny. It is clearly written and well illustrated and concludes with an appeal for loyalty to the tottering mechanistic conception of life. The scientific, but non-biological reader will find this book of value chiefly in consolidating and unifying his grasp of a subject the details of which must be sought elsewhere.

In *The Coming of Man* we have an attempt to present the evolutionary story in terms fit for the general ear. The first half of the book briefly sketches the rise and fall of successive types, from the

beginning of life to the coming of historic man; the second is devoted to setting forth at some length Professor Tyler's own philosophy. It must be recorded that this philosophy, from *The Logic of Evolution to Perfect Health* (!) is platitudinous, inconsistent, and, to this reviewer, uninspiring. The dominant forms of one age, we are told, never give rise to the rulers of the future; but man, unfortunately, seems to be the dominant species of the present! Thus, to avoid the logical conclusion, the moral and religious powers of humanity are viewed as the sole elements in future evolution—"personality" is the goal; "rightness of will and effort"; "not carefree enjoyment, but struggle"—and yet at the end "those who seem to think that the chief reward of life, if not its chief end, is the joy of living" are mentioned with approval as likely to usher in the new dawn. In literary style the book is extraordinarily repellent. The short and jerky sentence structure soon tires the reader and renders him unable to cope with recurrent unintelligibility; nor does a sparse and rudimentary humor suffice to revive the flagging spirit.

Dr. Holmes' book is a series of unrelated articles, reprinted in part from magazines; hence the book is disorderly, lacking in unity. And this constitutes a real defect, for the reader is uneasily conscious of a fundamental continuity in principle, which might have been properly brought out with a little effort in the direction of integration. Moreover, grace of style is again withheld and humor is almost wholly lacking. But the sociologist will find something of interest in these essays, for Holmes understands the social significance of biology and his facts and applications are reliably and judiciously set forth. There are sixteen chapters, each complete in itself, dealing with such topics as our deteriorating inheritance, heredity and mind (on this see Kellogg's excellent little volume, recently published<sup>1</sup>), the question whether early marriages produce inferior offspring (discussing Redfield's notions), birth control, immigration, the Negro.

Of the three volumes under review, the last alone will prove to be a valued item in the psychiatrist's working library.

H. M. PARSHLEY.

Smith College.

LIVING WITH OUR CHILDREN: A BOOK OF LITTLE ESSAYS FOR MOTHERS.

By Clara D. Pierson. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1923. 250 p.

This book comes from an author who has already demonstrated her ability to hold the attention of small hearers with *Dooryard Stories*,

<sup>1</sup> *Human Life as the Biologist Sees It*. By Vernon Lyman Kellogg. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1922.



*Among the Forest People, Three Little Millers*, and other tales for rainy-day and bedtime entertainment. It is not surprising that she should write for mothers a few suggestions as to the handling and management of common childhood problems which she as a mother and teacher has met and apparently solved in a satisfactory manner. The book contains only 250 pages, which are divided into twenty-four short chapters, with such attractive titles as: *Enjoying the Job, Concerning Teasing, On Having to Mind, Laughter, Motives, Fatigue Problems, The Gentle Art of Management, All-Aroundness, Retribution or Reformation, Joyful and Steadying Responsibility, Where-withal Shall We Be Fed?* and the like. In these chapters the writer tactfully clothes many wise and wholesome truths which frequently escape recognition by sponsors of child guidance because of the dreary, homiletical manner in which they are too commonly presented. For example, in the chapter on "all-aroundness" she says: "There is a general and pernicious tendency to consider certain kinds of necessary work as beneath our dignity. Most of us outgrow this tendency more or less completely as we increase in years and presumably in wisdom, but as a rule we do not outgrow it until it has cost us much inconvenience, expense, and unhappiness. How desirable a thing it would be if our children could start in where we leave off in this matter." Then follow several concrete plans by which the busy, but resourceful servant-keeping mother can manage this training in homely accomplishments. "Pegasus, the winged steed of fable, was most wonderful, of course, and there is much pity aroused by the thought of Pegasus at the plow, but there must ever be plow horses in this world, and their life is not unmitigated drudgery. They labor shoulder to shoulder with their fellows in doing their master's will, and their food is eaten with the workers' zest. They do not soar as Pegasus does, yet the rich brown earth is wholesome and sustaining, and there are many sweet and refreshing nibbles of grass to be seized at the end of the furrow. Suppose, while we are supposing, that Pegasus should lose some feathers from his wonderful wings and come tumbling to earth. Might he not find comfort there among his fellows at the plow? And why should he not occasionally trudge beside them between flights, even though his pinions be intact, if only for the sake of the companionship and the deepening of his sympathies? Think what an incentive it would be to the colts!"

Another happy feature of *Living with Our Children* is the fair and simple way in which the child and parent points of view are presented with argument that is convincing and devoid of sentimentality. In the chapter *Concerning Teasing* one reads: "Normal children reason

fairly well concerning matters in their own little world. If they want a certain thing which seems especially desirable to them, why should they not ask for it? They do. If they do not receive it for the first asking, why should they not ask again? They do. And as long as there is a chance that persistence will bring them the coveted object, they persist. That is perfectly natural. Regarded in one way, it is even commendable. Whence would the world draw its supply of canvassers, promoters, even of reformers, if there were no such thing as reward for persistence?" "If there is absolutely no chance of success, why should a child tease? He does not. At least he does not after he has proved the matter to his own satisfaction. Of course, he tries the method out pretty thoroughly before drawing his conclusions. We all would. Conclusions are worthless unless based on ascertained facts, and of course they may be reversed later if the facts are altered. He may find that teasing never works with his father. He may find that it does work with his mother. If so, he continues to tease. Why not? Or he may find that, when she is well and not too hurried, he cannot harass her into conceding to him that of which her judgment disapproves, but that, when she is half ill or rushing to make a train, he can do so. In that case he acts accordingly." "If we take time to consider the first request fairly and give the answer distinctly, it is unjust to both the child and ourselves to change the decision unless some new element arises to alter the situation. If he learns that the first decision is to stand—learns it, not from assertions of the fact, but from its standing—teasing will cease. Fortunately for all of us, human nature is so constituted that it yields to whatever is proved to be inevitable."

It is also worthy of note that the words "psychology," "complex," "repression" do not appear throughout the text, and yet its pages deal most helpfully with concrete problems of behavior adjustment involving instinct, habit formation, emotional states, and reasoning processes. This book supplies a very definite need on the part of family physician, pediatrician, and other medical specialists for sane and understandable reading matter to put into the hands of parents, teachers, public-health nurses, and social workers who are daily confronted with perplexing issues in the realm of child guidance. For after all it is well to remember that the laity is little interested in our respective theories of behavior curatives unless these theories are accompanied by corrective exercises and common-sense suggestions.

ESTHER LORING RICHARDS.

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**THE UNCONSCIOUS; AN INTRODUCTION TO FREUDIAN PSYCHOLOGY.**

By Israel Levine. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1923.

215 p.

If one discards the numerous literary weeds, the effusions of the hosts of scientific pretenders, and the purveyings of sensation-mongers that have gathered about psychoanalysis, there remains an amount of literature so vast that it almost overwhelms one who seeks to plumb its depths. This literature may be roughly divided into two parts: that contributed by Professor Freud and—all the rest. Aside from the fact that he gave it life, it is hardly an exaggeration to say that he also gave to psychoanalysis all of its body and most of its form. One may count on the fingers of one hand the men who added anything original to what Professor Freud has created, and perhaps on the fingers of both all of the straws they contributed to the main structure. Nevertheless, an extremely valuable literature of the second order has grown up, a literature that has for its purpose the popularization, interpretation, and both the practical and theoretical application of psychoanalysis.

Perhaps the most important and possibly the most enduring part of psychoanalysis is its contribution to normal and abnormal psychology. Not that its practical application to the treatment of the neuroses has not proved to be the best, if not the only, scientific approach to the problem; but it is on its theoretical side and as an applied science in all fields of mental endeavor that psychoanalysis has stirred the thoughts of men and at the same aroused the most violent criticism and stubborn antagonism. Academic psychology has been especially violent in its criticism, even though (or perhaps because) it has been rather slow in accepting the real significance of the dynamic concept of the unconscious. The main shafts have been leveled against the unconscious because it is conceived to have its mainsprings in the sex instinct, to lead almost an autonomous existence, and to exercise the greatest power in the psychic life of the individual. Failure to accept the Freudian concept of the unconscious in its relation to the fore-conscious and conscious and to concede its roots in the sex instinct means to deny the significance of its dynamism, and to make empty the phrase, dynamic psychology. It is, therefore, on the field of the theory of the unconscious that the hardest psychologic battles have been and are still destined to be fought.

Realizing its importance, Mr. Israel Levine has devoted a whole volume to the psychology of the unconscious. Although his work falls into the second group—that is, the literature of interpretation—it is none the less a very useful contribution. The author divides his book into five parts and devotes the first to a consideration of “the uncon-

scious before Freud". Here he gives a rapid and all too brief sketch of the views held by philosophers, beginning with Leibnitz, then skipping to Schopenhauer, and on to Hartmann and Nietzsche, not leaving out Samuel Butler. Both the positive and the negative views on the unconscious held by psychologists, especially of the academic schools and the "dissociationists", are scantily alluded to if not altogether ignored.

In the second part Mr. Levine defines the unconscious, dwells on its dynamic character, and takes up the question of resistance and repression. He then proceeds with the evidence derived from dreams, errors, wit, and a consideration of the psychoneuroses. The third part takes up the "validity of the unconscious", and considers the conscious and unconscious mental processes, the relation of the conscious to the unconscious, and the theoretical interpretation of both. Part four, which deals with the "setting of the unconscious", is the most important part of the book. Here metapsychology, or the psychology of psychoanalysis, is carefully considered. The dynamic, topographical, and *economic* relations of the psychic life are discussed; repression, development of the unconscious, the characteristics of unconscious process, the relations between the conscious and unconscious system and, finally, the nature of the ego and sexual instincts are analyzed in turn. In part five, under the title, *The Significance of the Unconscious*, Mr. Levine finally discusses applied psychoanalysis. Himself a philosopher, he could not forego the implications and wide ramifications of psychoanalysis. In turn are discussed psychoanalysis and education, crowd psychology, personality (including Jung's views), hedonism, the free will, art, philosophy, the problem of meaning, and, finally, reason and the reality principle.

From this brief review it is evident that the author has undertaken a fairly comprehensive study of the most important problem of psychoanalysis—namely, its psychology. The book is a good digest, but somewhat choppy. It is based almost entirely on Professor Freud's works, which is much to its credit. Most of the quotations—and they are to be found on every page—are from the *Introductory Lectures* and the *Sammlungen*, and there are not a few references to all the other important works of Professor Freud. The author knows his subject and reveals his learning in philosophy. Part five, although the longest chapter, is rather sketchy. It is a question whether it really forms an integral part of the book. The tremendous influence of psychoanalysis on human thought can merely be outlined in a few pages; it cannot be thoroughly discussed. Perhaps this is all that the author intended to do. However, Mr. Levine has succeeded in compiling a very useful book. It is no discredit to say that it is not



original; what is important is that it is an accurate presentation of the theoretical considerations of the unconscious. It has an honest title. As an introduction, it can be used with profit by all who are earnestly interested in psychoanalysis. Those who want to know the subject should follow the trail to the original sources.

ISRAEL S. WECHSLER.

New York City.

THE HOSPITAL LIBRARY. By Edith Kathleen Jones. Chicago: American Library Association, 1923. 190 p.

This book, published during the past year, is a very carefully prepared outline on the subject of the use of books in hospitals. Miss Jones's long experience in a mental hospital makes the chapter on the library of a mental hospital especially complete and authoritative. The enthusiasm of the writer is evident throughout the book. Rarely it oversteps the bounds of moderation, as when the librarians at Camp Devens are described as wearing gas masks. Undoubtedly they wore gauze protectors during the influenza epidemic, but why gas masks? On the whole, the enthusiasm of the writer is contagious, and we are made to realize not only the great opportunities that lie all about us in the wealth of literature available, but also the fact that the hospital that does not make use of the cheering and informing presence of books is hardly ministering to its patients to the full extent of its ability.

Throughout, the book is full of practical suggestions as to the books best suited to various age periods, to the various ills of mind and body, and to the trying period of convalescence. Also, we are told in a practical way how books can be selected, purchased, classified, and distributed. Practical hints are given for the provision of books in hospitals operated under the group system and advice is offered as to the qualifications necessary in the librarian and the requirements of the model library. Especially valuable is the section entitled *What Can I Read Aloud?* Here we are brought face to face with many old friends whom we had almost forgotten and whose delights the reviewer at least found to be no way tarnished when he subjected them to a rereading.

At the end of the book we have a list of titles classified and arranged in such a way that the doctor, nurse, or social worker may, in the briefest possible time, make adequate selection of reading for all types of patients. The completeness of this little volume may be judged from the fact that it also furnishes us with a list of books and periodicals for the nurses' library and with a comprehensive bibliography of hospital library service. In brief, *The Hospital Library* is a most

complete and up-to-date *Who's Who* of books not only for the sick, but for the well who are associated with hospitals and hospital work.

Butler Hospital.

ARTHUR H. RUGGLES.

**EXPRESSIONISM IN ART: ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL AND BIOLOGICAL BASIS.**

By Oskar Pfister. Authorized translation by Barbara Low and M. A. Mügge. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1923. 272 p.

The headings of the chapters of this book are as follows: *Introduction; From the Analysis of an Expressionistic Artist; The Psychological and Biological Background of the Analyzed Pictures; The Psychological and Biological Background of Expressionism; Conclusion.*

The term expressionism, as technically used in the art world, is confined to the form of art that may be described as the subjective replacement of the individual artist's mood for the reality that he contemplates; therefore, the mood is really the picture. Obviously, such a phase of art can be understood only by a subjective psychological investigation of the deeper or unconscious motives and desires of the individual artist. In other words, in order to study expressionistic art in a scientific manner, there must be a knowledge of all the acts and thoughts, and the union of these, in the total life experience of the artist. One must not make the mistake of thinking that such studies are synonymous with an æsthetic appreciation of reality. Rather, it is the essence of the mood generated in the artist by his contemplation of the object that he desires to reproduce. Nearly all psychologic studies of art have been too casual and are not sufficiently detailed for us to grasp the creative effort used in such art studies. Pfister has not escaped this criticism, inasmuch as his data were drawn from but sixteen sittings of a single expressionistic artist, whose identity is disguised under the pseudonym José. These analyses were not strictly analytic, as the subject was never in full rapport; the séances were undertaken under the most trying environmental conditions, and so soon as the main conflicts were fairly well exposed, they were discontinued as being too painful or were thought not to be worth while. The author, however, has succeeded fairly well in outlining the main difficulties in the life of his subject, and has shown how these conflicts have modified, if not developed, the artistic expression in his work. Too much stress seems to have been laid upon the symbolic interpretation of dreams rather than upon a direct analysis of the infantile unconscious in bringing into consciousness actual memories of situations and thoughts personally experienced by the artist.

The author finally undertakes to point out some of the main factors that go to integrate the individual artist's background of expressionism. This is carefully studied in the descriptive and causal attitude; the biological investigation of art; the æsthetic element; the functional norm of artistic activity; the subliminal origin and the automatic character. He gives a few reflections on the autistic aspect and some discussions of the relationship of genius and madness in creative effort, the conscious elaboration of intuitive elements, and the relationship of expressionism to æsthetic norms. The final hope of art is expressed in the author's statement: "Let us hope that out of the powerful concentration and inwardness of this art movement, and out of its heroic breach with the burden of historical tradition, with its daring emphasis of the individual's necessities, will arise a new painting, a new sculpture, a new poetry, which, anointed with a prophetic spirit, will combine the deepest sense for realities with the possession of ideal forces. For art at its best is, and ever will be, a message of Advent, an announcement of the Great Joy that will come to all peoples, a symbolic preparation for Peace upon Earth. Art at its best is always a wordless, fervent prayer: 'Thy Kingdom Come'."

The study is fragmentary, as a single case, incompletely analyzed, must be. The book is very interesting and quite well worth reading. It is a frank and sympathetic handling of the psychological approach to expressionism in art.

L. PIERCE CLARK.

New York City.

**A PLEA FOR MONOGAMY.** By Wilfred H. Lay, Ph.D. New York: Boni and Liveright, 1923. 300 p.

This book on the subject of marriage demands more than a passing consideration. It is intended for the general public, and it is written by a man who has assumed a leading place in the popular exposition of modern medical psychology. The question considered is one of the really great social and medical problems of the day. The title of the book and its publishers' methods of advertisement and sale stir curiosity and imagination and promise a large circulation.

Part of the author's discussion is entirely sound, timely, and altogether fine. On the other hand, much of it is unnecessary, inaccurate, and misleading. A casual inspection of the volume by the ordinary man, either lay or medical, will be likely to leave a bad impression. He will note the circumlocution of style, the poetic flights of fancy, the sentimentality, and the open discussion of matters most intimately personal. A more careful reading is necessary to discover the sincerity of treatment, the sound truths presented, and the general ennobling conception of the marriage relationship which is achieved.

Dr. Lay faces squarely the sex problem in relation to the success and happiness of matrimony. He maintains that sexual adjustment in marriage should not be left to the play of blind forces and chance influences, but that the factors involved are amenable to control through appropriate education, self-understanding, and conscious direction. The business of love, according to him, requires deliberate thought and attention, the same as any other business of life. To consider that all planning and effort can cease at the altar, and that some sort of spontaneous adjustment in the love relationship will then take place, is a method of procedure unworthy of civilized man and potential of disaster. Intellectually, man has developed to the stage of 1923. Emotionally, he is apt to have remained at a prehistoric level. And it is from this emotional equipment, operated largely without direction, that he has been accustomed to weave the central fabric of his married life. Dr. Lay pleads that there should be brought to this task the understanding and skill which twentieth-century medical and psychological knowledge make possible.

According to the scheme of the book, man and wife meet on two levels—the egoistic-social and the erotic. The latter is defined as “sex plus love”. On the egoistic-social plane the two should be fully equal. In the erotic realm there is no equality—the husband must be dominant to insure the happiness of both. This erotic dominance is a subtle thing, based upon the deep-seated differentiation of the sexes. It is the real standard for masculine virility. It has to do only incidentally with physical strength and vigor, but is an intangible something, more of the spirit than of the body. The wife achieves real happiness only when she receives such domination, and the husband, in like manner, is satisfied only when he gives it. Any other relationship is in just so far inadequate and becomes, not that of man and wife, but a union of undeveloped psychological levels.

As a sidelight on domestic harmony, it is stated that lack of real dominance in the erotic field often motivates the petty tyrannies of the husband in the egoistic-social relationship of the daily home life. The need for this type of self-assertion is not felt by the truly virile male. By a somewhat similar determining mechanism, the erotically undominated woman may strive blindly for her elusive goal by the method of nagging disagreeableness. As marital happiness fundamentally depends upon appropriate adjustments in the erotic realm, and as the husband is the dominant factor in such adjustments, therefore upon him rests the major responsibility for success or failure. It is he in particular who needs education and who must give intelligent direction to the business of marriage.

The physical side of marital sex life is discussed frankly, although



medical detail is omitted. For supplementary elucidation the reader is referred to various writers on the subject of "erotology", at least one of whom by no means represents the leading medical and social viewpoints of the day. Dr. Lay considers the marital sex act to be the central part of an episodic union between husband and wife, in which are involved the highest psychic and spiritual qualities. A chapter on the love episode deals with this topic. The union should be complete in all its phases for both parties. Sexual gratification by the husband without response by the wife, even if she be a willing partner, is but an "auto-erotic" act on his part, and carries with it many of the unfavorable features which are connected with auto-erotism in general. Fulfilment of the marital love episode is outlined as something so complete and far above any substitution that it is in no way comparable with extra-marital love adventures. For the truly mated pair there is no wandering polygamous interest, even in the innermost recesses of thought. There is complete satisfaction for each in the other.

The author is extravagantly optimistic as to the possibility of successful marriages. Directed by the intelligent management which he believes can be employed, he feels that there would result perfect adjustment in the erotic field. With erotic adjustment once attained, satisfactory harmony on the egoistic-social level of everyday life would be easy of accomplishment, and consequently the question of divorce would become a relatively unimportant one. He comments as follows (page 158): "By happy marriage is meant one in which the partners never have a really serious temptation to depart from the monogamic ideal. If thoroughly fused, neither will have the slightest temptation, for each will fill every erotic need of the other, and will continue to do so. . . . If men universally used this method, there would be no possibility of prostitution or any other form of infidelity, for no man, even following the lead of his own unconscious, would find anything better than perfection, and every man would find, because he had himself developed, perfection in his wife."

Under the spell of the author's eloquence, one is reluctant to mar his Utopian dream by a breath of skepticism, but so the stern call of duty demands. To set forth such enthusiastic claims in regard to solving the marriage problem by teaching the philosophy of love and a few principles of sex hygiene challenges common sense and ignores the basic fact that the biological, psychological, and spiritual equipments which individuals bring to matrimony vary too widely to permit of generalization.

The material of this book could be condensed to fifty pages, instead of being spread over three hundred, with advantage from every point

of view. Hyperbole, allegory, repetition, and sentimentalism add little to the presentation of the subject matter, but on the contrary tend to bury sound doctrine under avalanches of words. There is an unnecessary burden placed upon the reader in forcing him to winnow for himself the wheat from the chaff.

Perhaps the most lamentable fault of the volume is in confusing the issues of psychoanalysis and sex hygiene. Analytical psychology has thrown much light on the sex life of man as well as on all other phases of human existence. There most certainly have not been developed therefrom any standardized formulæ for behavior, sexual or otherwise. On account of a careless use of terms, the ordinary lay reader will be apt to accept the work as an exposition of psychoanalytic principles, thereby adding to the heavy burden of misunderstanding already borne by the new psychology.

After all is said in criticism, there is in the reviewer's opinion more good than harm in the book. It lifts marriage to a lofty plane, from which even the author's own bombardment of panegyrics does not dislodge it, and paints, not unconvincingly, possibilities of sustained glamour and richness in the marriage relationship beside which any illicit amours seem dull and insipid. The publishers of the book comprehensively recommend that the work be read by every married person and by those contemplating marriage. The psychiatrist need feel no compelling reason to disagree with them.

MARTIN W. PECK.

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**THE COMMON NEUROSES: THEIR TREATMENT BY PSYCHOTHERAPY.**

By R. A. Ross, M.D., F.R.C.P.E. New York: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1923. 256 p.

In this day of voluminous—and often, too, indiscriminate—writing on all phases of the general subject of the neuroses, it is refreshing to find so much that is satisfactory in a single contribution. In the first place, the author has a very happy style. His ease of diction, clear mode of exposition, and apt explanation of theory and practice by means of appropriate case reports make the reading of this volume an enjoyable task and therefore easily double its instructive value. The chapters that cover the symptomatic discussion of neurasthenia, the hysterical reaction, and the compulsion neuroses, while they do not offer anything particularly new, are nevertheless concise and at the same time comprehensive delineations of the various clinical pictures ordinarily encountered. Ardent psychoanalysts, who regard the Freudian doctrine as *ex cathedra* infallible dogma, will probably feel that Ross falls far short of a true evaluation of their therapeutical

practices, just as rabid anti-Freudians will no doubt assert that he has grossly overrated their importance and application. Those who have not feared to point out some of the shortcomings of the so-called new philosophy and yet have not hesitated to possess themselves of its advantages will be in accord with the author's "middle-of-the-road" policy. He would in the majority of instances confine his treatment efforts to the presenting symptoms and their immediate source rather than unrestrictedly explore the murky depths of the unconscious. In his method the author finds, and not without justification, "the difference between cutting down accurately on a foreign body, whose exact position has been localized by the X-rays, and cutting up the patient at large because we have no X-rays. The latter might sometimes be necessary, but if the unavoidable injury can be confined to a narrow range, it will be better." Ross would add to the list of those on whom analysis should not be practiced, as tabulated by the foremost American Freudians, the very considerable group of neurotics who may be relieved of their symptoms by simpler means.

The classification may give rise to antagonism, but it is ingenious, interesting, and not devoid of merit. Briefly, "there are three bad ways of reacting to difficulties: (1) by over-reaction, (2) by under-reaction or failure to react at all, and (3) by pretending that the difficulty is not present. The first attempt at escape evolves into neurasthenia, which includes the anxiety neuroses or anxiety hysterias of many writers; the second results chiefly in conversion hysteria; and the third produces the compulsion neuroses." The theory of the neuroses revolves around positive or negative responses to an emotional state and the conditioned reflex. The former argues principally from the standpoint of exaggeration of physiological reaction to anxiety, and the latter is based on the oft-cited Pavlov dog and introduces the conception of an unconscious in which the seeds of deviating mental processes have been previously planted and conditioned. The student of psychiatry and psychology is familiar with these premises, and they require no further elucidation.

It is difficult to criticize the author's management of the neurasthenic. The physician's ultimate object is to restore the faith of the patient. The history taking and examinations, including the physical survey, should be detailed and complete and above all *never hurried*. To retract an opinion once given concerning the somatic state is fatal. The patient should be encouraged to talk freely. The conscious mind and its neighboring territory should be "pumped dry" before soundings are taken in subconscious waters. The explanation to the patient should be simple, but ample, and should be repeated until it is profoundly impressed. The author, who was once a devotee of Weir

Mitchell, has departed from his former considerable utilization of the rest cure, but is still inclined to keep the patient in bed for a few weeks. His reasoning on this point is a bit faulty. When he believed in the Mitchell plan, it was highly successful, but when he doubted its potency, it began to fail. In the reviewer's opinion this has nothing to do with the success or failure of the rest treatment, as the author seems to think, but is merely a roundabout way of stating that he himself has had a change of heart.

The following quotation embodies the therapeutic attitude toward the local symptoms of the neurasthenic state; in the main it is sensible and useful: "The principle on which the treatment depends is simple. The symptom has started originally as an emotional reaction: it has been perpetuated till it has become a habit because it was misunderstood. It was looked on as a manifestation of organic disease, and a remedy was sought for this. Sometimes that remedy was apparently found, but often it was not; the search, if it involved much disappointment, caused further emotional reaction—that is, prolongation of the symptom. When, however, the patient was led to perceive all this, it disappeared. As has been stated elsewhere, this is not the whole explanation of the perpetuation of symptoms, but it is clinically one of the most important, and it is the explanation which the patient is at this stage most ready to grasp. The different clinical manifestations should therefore be dealt with after this fashion *seriatim* from the beginning of the treatment while he is in bed being built up."

The author warns against the employment of dodges and tricks. If they fail, or even if they succeed at first and then become less potent, as is often the case, the situation created is apt to destroy, or at least seriously to endanger, the *rapprochement* between patient and physician. Relapses in neurasthenia are due to anxieties which should be focused in the consciousness, or probed for in the unconscious with the help of free association. A neurasthenic residual is an abnormal phenomenon which is retained because it confers an advantage on the individual. It is to be sought for and handled in much the same way, but not infrequently an adjustment of environmental and extraneous handicaps becomes imperative. Here, again, the technique of the author differs sharply from the usual psychoanalytic procedure.

Since 179 of 256 pages are devoted to neurasthenia, the discussions of hysteria and of the compulsion neuroses are necessarily less thorough. In both conditions the history and examinations must be carried out conscientiously and exhaustively. In hysteria the therapeutic approach is very similar to the one employed in neurasthenia.



Somatic manifestations are readily removed by persuasion, but of course the patient must not be left to his own resources after they have been made to disappear. Auto-suggestion would only make him the prey of new disabilities. The author deplors the tendency of certain writers to give hysteria a kind of moral implication and confuse it with malingering. Neither does he agree with the idea of the "reflex paralysis" of French neurologists, which they try to distinguish from true hysterical motor loss by assuming a degree of organic neuropathology.

Ross is somewhat pessimistic concerning the compulsion or obsession neurosis. The compulsive or obsessional act or thought is a substitute for unacceptable material which has largely fallen into the unconscious, or even more often has become detached from its moorings in the conscious mind, so that the patient is protected from disagreeable associations and consequent recognition. This material is to be brought into the scope of awareness, or, failing this, adjustment or reëducation is to be accomplished by a process of minimizing the obsession or compulsion. Frequently these two plans may be wisely combined.

There are a few minor criticisms. The definition, "a functional nervous disorder or neurosis is a nervous disorder where no physical lesion has been found", exceeds the premises of much constructive neuropsychiatric thought. The definition would have lost some of its dramatic value, but gained in accuracy, if the word "specific" had been inserted before "physical lesion".

The reviewer believes that in the presence of constantly shifting criteria it is scarcely progressive or scientific to demarcate sharply and somewhat dictatorially the organic-functional boundary. Neither does the distinction between neurosis and psychosis rest on such sure grounds that the following statement may be unreservedly accepted: "The psychotic lives, in so far as he is a psychotic, in a world of fantasy; the neurotic lives in the real world; its difficulties are greater by far for him than for normal people, but they are the same difficulties which all of us have. The difficulties of the psychotic arise from the fact that he is living in quite another world, in one which is not subject to the ordinary physical laws. Any psychotherapy which he is capable of receiving would require to be of a different order from that offered to a neurotic; of an order that would need to vary with the peculiarity of his own special fantastic universe."

Finally, the author has the exceedingly bad habit of using the term "lunatic" when he refers to the mentally sick. In this connection

the words of Pierre Janet may be fittingly quoted: "The word 'lunatic' is now a term of police language, and indicates only an embarrassment felt by the police before certain persons' conduct."

These slight deficiencies do not detract seriously from the teaching value of *The Common Neuroses*. It is particularly recommended as a textbook for the general practitioner of medicine.

EDWARD A. STRECKER.

Pennsylvania Hospital, Philadelphia.

**MENTAL HYGIENE AND THE PUBLIC-HEALTH NURSE; PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS FOR THE NURSE OF TO-DAY.** By V. May Macdonald, R.N. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1923. 67 p.

The public-health nurse is a large and growing force in the war against disease and in the promotion of health. Public-health authorities are beginning to include mental disorders and their prevention among their health problems; and here and there public-health administrators have the vision of mental hygiene as an integral part of the general health which they are trying to build up in the community. But when they would instruct the public-health nurse in this branch of her work, they have sought in vain any one source of information. Abundant material is published in books and articles treating of one phase or another of the subject, but nowhere is it brought together and organized into a coherent and consistent whole. This situation is partly met by the helpful and stimulating little book under review.

The subject of mental hygiene is large, and even such part of it as can be used by the public-health nurse, cannot be covered in a book of less than seventy pages. But into this little volume the author has compressed a surprising amount of elementary information and practical suggestion, in clear, concise, and readable form. She touches on the prevalence and cost of mental diseases, the possibilities of preventing them, and the obstacles to carrying out preventive measures. The need of psychiatric training for every nurse, a few of the basic facts of psychology, the importance of odd or unusual behavior as possible symptoms of mental disease or defect, and a brief, but well-selected list of such manifestations, are then noted. A short chapter tells concisely the chief sources through which the nurse may learn of incipient or suspected cases of mental disorder in the community she serves, and another advocates her familiarizing herself with the mental-clinic resources of the community and methods of enabling patients to use them. The next three chapters deal respectively with the mental health of children, preventable forms of mental disease, and the mental defective, emphasizing in the latter the importance of other traits than intelligence and the value of careful training. The

final chapter gives practical suggestions as to ways in which interest in and knowledge of mental hygiene may be spread in the community. There are reading lists at the ends of some of the chapters. The emphasis throughout is on prevention and on education of the public. Some readers might feel that the nurse was encouraged to be too much of a social worker. But the two fields overlap, and any right-minded social worker would only welcome the aid of such nursing as the author advocates.

To be disagreeable, the table of contents is not consistent with the chapter headings in the text. "Psychothenia" for "psychasthenia" (page 17) and "Bient" for "Binet" (page 59) are unfortunate misprints. There is no index. The price—\$1.50—seems large for so small a book without cuts or tables.

Dr. Salmon writes a foreword. The reviewer echoes heartily his sentiments that such a book as this is needed, and that it should prove helpful, not only to the public-health nurse, but to that much larger public which consists of all who work or are otherwise interested in the social and medical fields.

E. STANLEY ABBOT.

Boston.

A B C DE PSYCHOLOGIE. By Armand Cuvillier. Paris: Delagrave, 1923. 159 p.

This small book succeeds in doing what it sets out to do, presenting an exceedingly clear-cut treatment of the elements of psychology as understood by French scientists. It might well be translated into English, for it contains a good summary of the essential contributions of the French school. There is an air of modernity in it not always found in scientific contributions from France—modernity in spite of the fact that little attention is given to recent structural work in Germany and America, while American behaviorism and the researches of Pavlov are practically ignored.

The writer illustrates what seems characteristic to a considerable extent of French science—a national introversion, which appears not intentional, but inevitable. William James is the only American mentioned to any extent, while Wundt is referred to in the statement that Ribot introduced his work to France. Ribot is often used as authority; Maine de Biran is quoted a few times; Bergson receives much attention, not all of which is approving; while Pierre Janet is the psychologist whose influence is most marked. Whenever a problem arises recourse is had, not to logic, as is often the case with American and English psychologists in attempting to bridge unrelated evidence from different branches, but to research in abnormal

psychology, and through this Cuvillier is able to apply a genetic method that is refreshing.

In the first chapter the facts of consciousness, studied scientifically, are considered the subject matter of psychology. The writer feels it necessary to lift the science of psychology out of the domain of metaphysics, and approves the phrase "a psychology without a soul". From James he adopts the "current of consciousness" as the best symbolic representation of mental states. He considers dispassionately the views of Bergson that psychological phenomena cannot be measured; that a sensation has no intensity and cannot increase, but becomes instead another sensation; and that it is a vain pretension to try to establish quantitative differences between subjective states. Bergson also holds that language cannot express the mental reality, that it but distorts this, for language is fixed, static, while the mental life is in flux, in process of development. These theses of James and Bergson are held to be useful reactions against the empiricists, and notably against Taine (Bergson's views applying also against the extreme theories of mental measurement), but the author declines to accept any absolute opposition between the external and the internal world, such as Bergson sees.

Chapter II enlarges the definition of psychology to include unconscious mental phenomena. Consciousness and unconsciousness are likened to degrees of attention. The activity of the unconscious in us is revealed by the sudden irruption of unexpected ideas into consciousness. However, the chief activity of the unconscious is in the domain of the feelings, as is particularly shown in cases of the semi-normal or abnormal, in hysteria, in cases of dual personality, and in hypnosis. The idea of the unconscious is valuable in that it removes the appearance of discontinuity in the stream of consciousness and permits us to accept a psychological determinism.

Indicating that the French psychologist is concerned with problems of scientific boundaries which have largely passed into the background in this country, the relation of psychology to sociology and physiology is considered, the writer declaring for complete independence from these two subjects which threaten to absorb psychology. Comte, he points out, denied the existence of an independent psychology and accepted the phrenological doctrine of the German doctor, Gall. While granting the importance of society, especially as indicated in the work of Durkheim, the writer holds that, although for primitive life the individual consciousness loses all independence under the collective consciousness and psychology is only a branch of sociology, in civilized life, as Durkheim himself pointed out, the individual becomes more and more of a separate entity, thus assuring the auton-



omy of psychology. Cuvillier here follows the views of Durkheim, and it is certain that no American psychologist would have considered this defense necessary—the tendency in this country often being toward denying sociology—while the researches of American anthropologists would seem to contradict the theory of the elimination of personality and individual psychology in primitive social groups. In regard to the relation of psychology and physiology, the author considers the parallelist doctrine very useful to psychology, for it causes us to explain mental phenomena so far as possible by purely mental causes, while at the same time we seek for the parallel physiological cause.

Introspection does not fare too well at the hands of the writer, the prevalence of this method at the time of Comte being regarded as in part the cause of his hostility to psychology. Introspection is held to be insufficient, although indispensable. Binet is quoted as regarding introspection as the basis of psychology and Ribot's phrase is used as summary: "*sans elle, rien ne commence; avec elle seule, rien ne s'acheve*". Ribot is accepted as the creator in France of scientific psychology. Chief importance is attached to the genetic and comparative approach, the latter having been originated by the biologists, among them Georges Bohn and Bouvier. Lévy-Bruhl has made peculiarly his own the psychology of primitive peoples, while infant psychology has been studied by Preyer, Sully, Baldwin (where is Watson?) and Perez and Binet. Freud has produced conclusions from the study of dreams, lapses of speech, and so forth, which appear often "*un peu systématiques*". All these writers are considered under the heading "objective psychology".

In pathological psychology the work of Ribot and Charcot is cited, along with the contributions of Janet and Georges Dumas. Binet's work in connection with "*les tests*" is regarded as of more significance than the contributions of Wundt and his students. Binet is held to be the chief representative of the school of psychometric measurements, his work in attempting to measure memory and intelligence being classed with the German studies in reaction time and intensity of sensations.

Consciousness is considered to develop up the animal scale according to the complexity of the conditions of life and to be originally an instrument of use in the adaptation of the living creature to his environment, disappearing when the adaptation is realized (as in habit). The writer quotes Bergson's view that consciousness is proportionate to the power of choice, and Abel Rey's that consciousness develops in strict relation to biological evolution. Consciousness is an activity of synthesis, as Janet points out, taking two forms, one

purely mechanical, the other involving choice and adaptation. The conserving tendency of consciousness is at the basis of association of ideas, of memory, of certain forms of imagination such as revery, of habit, instinct, and the like, as well as the accompaniment of the function of reality. Consciousness has the double power of dissociation and of synthesis. The power of dissociation is manifested in choice, which permits a breaking up of past experiences and the prevention of automatism in their recall.

The writer's definition of mental capacity or intelligence is evidently that of analysis and synthesis, association being an aspect of synthesis. Attention is a heightened state of consciousness and first of all a mental synthesis. It is also a state of analysis. The principal characteristic of attention is the adaptation of the mind, of the senses, of all mental functions, to the present, "or, if one prefers it, to reality". Perception is the synthesis of many elements, of sensations of both external and internal categories. "To perceive is to recollect." Judgment is the operation of synthesis, but it also necessitates analysis, in which attention plays an essential rôle.

In a consideration of the affective life, the James-Lange theory is denied and Janet's conception of emotion as an oscillation of mental levels, a lowering of mental tension produced by abrupt disorientation from the accustomed environment, is accepted. The two categories of affective phenomena, pleasure and pain, are at the opposite poles. Following Spencer, the author holds that activity is the source of pleasure and enforced inactivity the source of pain. Here, it would seem, is a confusion of biological and psychological theory, but perhaps it is as useful as any other explanation.

Some of the writer's best genetic thinking is done in relating the animal, the child, the normal, and the abnormal adult under mental automatisms, of which there are four kinds: (1) those of the animal, in which synthetic activity does not exist; (2) those of the child, in which synthetic activity has only appeared to a slight degree; (3) those of the normal adult; and (4) those of the abnormal adult, where a dissolution of mental synthesis is implied. Instinct is likened to somnambulism. The child is held to be in a state of dispersion analogous to the dream. This renders attention difficult even in adolescence, easily distracted, giving an instability of feeling and lack of the control exercised by intelligence in the adult. The child has not the sense of reality; he is curious, but superficially so, easily satisfied with merely verbal explanations. In morbid automatisms there is a mental disintegration, an insufficiency of the synthetic activity, notable in cases of amnesia and hysteria, more serious in double personalities where there is a breaking up of the personal synthesis into a

number of centers and a complete dissolution of the mental synthesis, as in dementia, where delirium is nothing but the conquering of consciousness by automatism. Here are the cataleptics, who are reduced to the level of inferior animals, finding, perhaps, the lowest possible state of consciousness.

Janet's conception of psychological tension is held to permit oscillation of the mental levels and to establish a hierarchy of mental functions, based not on the old logical order which placed the most abstract operations at the top, but on a more solid basis of observation which may well overthrow the classical psychology. This basis is, of course, provided by the study of the mentally diseased, *the position of any function being determined by the readiness with which it disappears during mental disease*. "There are certain forms of purely mechanical reasoning which demand much less mental effort than 'the perception of a tree'." The sense of reality is early abolished, while language is likewise soon disturbed. Hence these two are placed high in the category. The theory underlying the scale is that the "*operations de haute tension*" disappear first in mental disease, and that these are the later and higher developments of the human psyche. The scale is as follows: (1) lowest of all, acts and operations purely automatic, which bring simply into play the conserving activity of consciousness; (2) just above this, the affective phenomena (in the neuroses and psychoses, emotivity, far from being lessened, is often exaggerated); (3) higher still, association of ideas and memory, which, if sometimes presented under an automatic aspect, manifest more often a certain spontaneity of selection; (4) attention, with which we reach the conscious and often voluntary form of the double activity of synthesis and choice which renders possible the intellectual operations, such as judgment, formation of general ideas, and the like; (5) on about the same rank as attention, the perception of objects; (6) one of the highest degrees of mental activity, the psychological function of language; (7) finally, at the top of the hierarchy, all that makes up the personality, the will and invention, or the creative activity of the mind. It is in this order that the psychological functions are surveyed by the writer. The book concludes with a brief and necessarily superficial consideration of the fields of applied psychology.

University of Utah.

DOUGLAS FRYER.

LORINE PRUETTE.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS. By Julia Turner. London: Kegan Paul, Trench Trubner, and Company, 1923. 243 p.

It would be justifiable in a magazine of this type to dismiss with a sentence this book, which exposes the author's "ideas of the con-

ceptual life", were it not that it invites a protest against that increasing class of "psychological" writing which takes exception to, improves upon, misstates, or restates in disguised or distorted form, the work of Freud and his followers. The author, who is the "president of the Psychological Aid Society, founded Sept. 26, 1921", in presenting her opinions, is a serene offender in this regard, playing fast and loose with analytic terms and disposing of Freud's carefully established theories with bold, categorical, though scientifically unsubstantiated assertions. Thus, on the second page we read: "Professor Freud's theory and practice of dream analysis involves the same confusion of terms as I shall hope to explain" (the explanation is unilluminating) and "Professor Freud has launched psychology on a wonderful new career, but unfortunately he has overlooked the seemingly trifling distinction between consciousness and self-consciousness. As a matter of fact, it is the key to the whole situation", the situation being "errors in psychology". The author is apparently naïvely ignorant of the fact that the entire terminology of dream analysis originated with Freud; that no consideration of the ego group of impulses exists as careful and brilliant as that which Freud has been evolving in his more recent writings, beginning with his *Einführung zur Narzissmus* (1914) and continuing to *Das Ich und das Es* (1923).

The author's own definition of self-consciousness is extremely vague, but we find that "another name for the self-conscious subject is the conceptual subject". In a general way, "conceptual subject" represents conscious activities in contradistinction to the perceptual subject which represents instinctive strivings. A little later we are apprised that "LIFE-HUNGER and FEAR, so blended, give what is known as ANXIETY" (we would refer her to Jones's *Papers on Psychoanalysis*<sup>1</sup> for Freud's conceptions of anxiety); and supposedly from this standpoint the author formulates an anxiety hypothesis. All by her lonesome, she has discovered that "dream life appears to me to be nothing more nor less than the life history of the individual, a soul seeking salvation". Thus she calmly bridges the gap between psychoanalysis and religion and finds toward the end of her *opus* that "the Anxiety Drama appears to be a unification of Power and Expiation with resultant emergence of the soul". And so, with bated breath and a sigh of relief, we arrive at her credo that the "ultimate concern of the conceptual subject is his relation to the unseen", and the conceptual subject "knows or should know that he is hereby his brother's keeper". It would seem that Miss Turner has few well-developed conceptual subjects among her friends in the

<sup>1</sup> See page 264 of this issue of MENTAL HYGIENE.



London Psychological Aid Society or they might have considered keeping their sister from her present endeavor.

One cannot criticize this hodgepodge of Freud, Jung, Dante, the Bible, McDougall, and others, from a psychoanalytic standpoint; nor, I think, could a theologian, a dramatic critic, or a biologist from their respective angles. Freud's name is mentioned every few pages and at each quotation of him we discover some erroneous conception (always without reference to the original source). Thus transference is called "the attitude expectant of salvation in every sufferer", "the amnesia" is used as if it were a patented term of Freud's, and so on throughout the book. Of course, Freudian theories are not exempt from criticism, elaboration, or change, but it is reasonable to demand some acquaintance on the part of the dissenter with the subject he attacks.

C. P. OBENDORF.

New York City.

**THE DIARY OF A DRUG FIEND.** By Aleister Crowley. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1923. 368 p.

This book is written with the verisimilitude of a Defoe, unless, as is more probable, the author's brief preface may be accepted literally:

"This is a true story.

"It has been rewritten only so far as was necessary to conceal personalities.

"It is a terrible story; but it is also a story of hope and of beauty.

"It reveals with startling clearness the abyss on which our civilization trembles.

"But the self-same Light illuminates the path of humanity: it is our own fault if we go over the brink.

"This story is also true not only of one kind of human weakness, but (by analogy) of all kinds; and for all alike there is but one way of salvation.

"Says Glanvil: 'Man is not subjected to the angels, nor unto death utterly, save through the weakness of his own feeble will.'

"Do what thou wilt shall be the whole of the Law."

The book is described in the publisher's note as "a swiftly moving, brightly colored picture of the hectic career of a man and a woman who have taken the fatal plunge into narcotism.

"Every detail is based on facts personally known to the author; and the glittering lure of, and the ghastly mental and moral havoc caused by, cocaine and heroin are described as they have probably never been described before."

In Book I—*Paradiso*—Peter Pendragon, an ex-medical student who has won distinction in the air service during the war, falls heir to his rich uncle's estate and becomes Sir Peter. In search of adventure in the bohemian world, he meets "Unlimited Lou", an unrestrained, original, and fascinating creature who teaches him to use cocaine. Together they go off on a wild honeymoon, sounding the heights and depths of perverted indulgence under the stimulation of the drug. After exciting adventures in several countries they find themselves back in London, where in Book II—*Inferno*—they sink to the lowest depths as addicts. In Book III—*Purgatorio*—Basil King Lamus, a masterful personality, a combination seer, philosopher, and super-psychoanalyst, takes them to the Abbey of Thelema where he conducts a cross between a Gnostic temple and a modern sanitarium with occupational therapy and psychoanalytic conferences on the side. Here the finishing touches are put to their cure and they learn their "True Will" and their real work in the world.

A note at the beginning of Book III states that the Abbey of Thelema is a real place; that the training there given is suited to all conditions of "spiritual distress", and for the discovery and development of the "True Will" of any person. Those interested are invited to communicate with the author of the book.

"Do what thou wilt shall be the whole of the Law. Love is the law, love under will." This is the formula that constitutes the refrain throughout the philosophy of King Lamus and his Order at the Abbey. From this one might expect to hear an exposition of the beauties of so-called free will in strict orthodox fashion; but the reader finds King Lamus approaching the case much as an honest-to-goodness psychoanalyst might if he had such helpful setting as is furnished by the abbey and such loyal assistants as Sister Athena, Lala, Mazie Jacobs, and the two charming children, Hermes and Dionysus. The uncovering of emotional conflicts and the recognition of the mechanisms underlying Sir Peter's and Lou's wild flight from reality goes on under the guidance of King Lamus in approved fashion and with the suggestion of a technique and a terminology that might lead us to suspect that the writer of the tale is quite familiar with at least the literature of the psychoanalytic school, with most devotion, perhaps, to the Zürich end of the bookshelf.

The psychology of indulgence and all the moral and social aspects of addiction are rather brilliantly set forth, including the psychology of the fall of Jabez Platt, the reformer and the framer of the Diabolical Drug Act.

The characters are all strikingly delineated, and Book II contains a really fine clinical picture of a drug psychosis.

The diction is excellent, the style exotic.

The average reader will, perhaps, be curious to know whether or not Aleister Crowley is a pen name, whether King Lamus is a flesh-and-blood psychiatrist, and whether on one of our European jaunts we might drop in overnight at the Abbey of Thelema at "Telepylus", sleep in the Stranger's House, drink champagne with the Big Lion and Sister Athena, and see the sun rise out of the sea from the great rocky promontory below the abbey.

We believe that any psychiatrist who has been called in consultation to some distant point, is facing some hours on a railway train, and hasn't room in his bag for Jung's *Psychological Types* or *Tertium Organum*, who has read his copy of MENTAL HYGIENE, *The Psychoanalytic Review*, *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, or what-not, and who has been unable to filch from the Comstockians a copy of *Memoirs of Fannie Hill* or *A Night in a Moorish Harem*, should secure a copy of *The Diary of a Drug Fiend* and banish the tediousness of his journey.

CLINTON P. McCORD.

Department of Educational Hygiene, Albany Medical College.

INTELLIGENCE TESTING; METHODS AND RESULTS. By Rudolf Pintner.  
New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1923. 406 p.

INTELLIGENCE TESTS AND SCHOOL REORGANIZATION. By Lewis M. Terman, Virgil E. Dickson, A. H. Sutherland, Raymond H. Franzen, C. R. Tupper, and Grace Fernald. Yonkers, N. Y.:  
World Book Company, 1923. 111 p.

MENTAL TESTS AND THE CLASSROOM TEACHER. By Virgil E. Dickson.  
Yonkers, N. Y.: World Book Company, 1923. 231 p.

Every one interested in intelligence testing should be familiar with this excellent summary by Pintner. It is an able attempt to tell what is meant by intelligence testing, what means are employed, and what results have been achieved.

The first section considers the various forces that have been operative in the development of tests. It shows how the necessity of considering exceptional children, such as the deaf, the blind, and the feeble-minded, led people to a consideration of individual differences. Further impetus was given to this study by the growth of experimental psychology, and the recognition in the laboratory that there were inherent variations in performance. As a prime motivation in test development, the author refers to the perennial interest of mankind in his own capacities, an interest that shows itself in pseudo-scientific procedures as well as in psychological measurements.

Chief consideration is given to the work of Binet, which provided the greatest stimulus for the development of measurements of intelligence. A lucid statement of Binet's interest and of the various steps that led to the presentation of his final scale enables one to understand better the problem that those who measure intelligence have to face. The author then outlines the history of the introduction of Binet's scale into this country and the modifications and revisions that have been attempted. As a further development of measurement methods, the group tests of intelligence are described.

After a discussion of the concept of general intelligence, the distribution of this characteristic and various ways of expressing intelligence ratings are considered. Intelligence quotients, mental-age ratings, and percentile standards, are explained.

The third part of the book presents results that have been secured in the measurement of various groups of people. Beginning with the attempt to measure the degree of ability in so-called feeble-minded children, the report considers the work that has been done in the way of detecting the child of superior ability, and also reports various pieces of work that have been done on the general school population. A significant contribution is the standardization of grade placement according to test age rather than chronological age.

Intelligence tests have been given of late years to many groups outside of the elementary school. Among them we find the college student, the soldier, the delinquent, the physically handicapped, the blind, and the deaf, as well as the dependent, the immigrant, and the employee. In conclusion, the author states that all sorts of mental traits are inherited in the same way as physical traits. Measurements of intelligence have done much to show that children are not created equal in respect to mental abilities. One's abilities are determined by one's ancestors, and environment cannot create new powers. The main function of education is to measure inherited capacities and to arrange the environment so as to give full opportunity for them to develop.

With the background provided by a reading of Pintner's book, one should take up the problems presented by the various authors who contribute to *Intelligence Tests and School Reorganization*. According to Terman, progressive educators are no longer interested in arguments as to the validity of mental measurements. "What next?" is now the question that causes deepest concern. The two to three million children who were examined in the year 1920-21 revealed individual differences of which it is essential that the school take account. Even after making every allowance that could



possibly be demanded for the correction of test results, it is doubtful, according to this author, whether in the average school system more than 70 per cent of the pupils are given instruction as well suited to them as would be the instruction in a higher or a lower grade. To handle the problem of individual differences we may work out methods of individual instruction or we may form classes with children of nearly the same ability.

The other authors in this report consider the various ways by which this modification has been attempted. In the adjustment rooms of Los Angeles, described by Dr. Sutherland, we have a program worked out which is in some respects very much like the now famous Dalton plan. In these rooms the children do not sit in prim rows or in good order. They do most of the correcting and marking of their own papers, keep a record of their daily programs, and make graphs of their progress. On admission to these adjustment rooms, the actual level of development of a child is determined, and he is then shown how to select for each of his subjects the practice exercises appropriate for his stage of development. By this means a child proceeds step by step according as his ability enables him. Results in actual classroom work have been little short of amazing. Of the first 200 pupils enrolled, 5 per cent were returned to their own grade after a short trial; 2.5 per cent were recommended for special training because of low-grade intelligence; the remaining 92.5 per cent spent an average time of 13 weeks in the adjustment rooms, and the median rate of progress was 4.35 weeks' work covered each week.

The other values in these adjustment rooms are not less important. Frequent failures have been due to a lack of confidence on the part of the child and an inability to concentrate. On entering the room, a child lacks enthusiasm and purpose, but after a short period a modification in character is noted. The attitude of the children is illustrated by a report from one child who said: "Aw, gwan! Cut it out! I've only got three minutes till the bell rings and I've got to finish this Project!"

Franzen and Tupper take up the question of the relation of accomplishment and retardation to intelligence. The former deals with the method of comparing accomplishment with intelligence, and shows that the experiment at Garden City proves that when children are properly adjusted and properly taught, their school accomplishment corresponds very closely with their intelligence, and that general intelligence, which is rated by means of these mental measurements, indicates what progress a child should make in a particular school subject. Tupper states that intelligence examination showed that there was "practically no real retardation". The most backward

children in the school were those who had the highest grade of intelligence, while those of low-grade ability were in classes in advance of their test age. Reclassification has decreased the range of ability in different groups. Special classes have been formed, but the aim is that every class should be a special class.

The concluding report by Fernald takes up the question of special disabilities in spelling, reading, and writing. There were 400 of the poor spellers, and the author reports that in all cases where the work was continued for a sufficiently long period the spelling was entirely corrected. Similar successful results in reading and writing are also described.

Dickson wrote one of the chapters in the previous book, but his discussion is much more elaborate in *Mental Tests and the Classroom Teacher*. He believes that the "importance of school systems is giving way to the importance of children" and in considering the individual child he presents data of variability in grade age, mental age, and grade progress. The chief factor in grade progress he believes to be the variability in intelligence. While in some cases it has been reported that less than 50 per cent of failures were due to low mentality, he believes it conclusively proven that the proportion due to this cause is much nearer 90 per cent.

The discussion of mental tests can be passed over lightly by one who has read Pintner on this subject, but Dickson's discussion of probable success in school work is one of great importance for all those interested in education. The relationship between school progress and test age is shown to be very close, the correlation with one experimental group being 72. In other experiments, covering a period of two years, it is shown that the percentage of retardation decreases as the I.Q. increases. These ratings are clearly shown to be a good indication of the general type of progress that may be expected of children. They must, however, be determined by the method of individual examination, at least for the early grades. In the higher grades the group test may profitably be used, but no result from a group examination should be taken as valid in considering the disposition of the individual child.

The use of various tests in the different divisions of the school is the subject of discussion in chapters 6-10. In each of these chapters the author shows what significance the tests have for the various groups and indicates what use may be made of the results. While written primarily for teachers, the book should be of great interest to many outside the teaching profession. While the author does not doubt the essential value of methods of measurement, the warning that he utters may be taken to heart by all of us:

"The greatest difficulty and the greatest danger come not from giving the test, but from the handling of results. A nurse may take and record the temperature, pulse, and blood pressure of a patient; she may know when any one of them is above or below normal, or when a danger point has been reached; but it is far more difficult to determine what ought or ought not to be done. For this there is need of a physician. Similarly a teacher may obtain a test result that indicates mental capacity above or below normal, but what should be done with respect to the child's placement or instruction is a matter that needs to be decided with greatest care. The teacher must realize that the mental test is not infallible; also, that there are many factors other than general intelligence to be considered in the education of a child."

DAVID MITCHELL.

New York Association of Consulting Psychologists.

THE CONQUEST OF SELF. By Louis E. Bisch. New York: Doubleday, Page, and Company, 1923. 326 p.

*The Conquest of Self* is another of the many books that attempt to tell us how to live. It has much to recommend it. One cannot expect a book on such a subject not to be full of platitudes; honesty must continue to be the best policy; right living is always plitudinous. One must expect quotations in plenty, but at least those chosen by Dr. Bisch are worth reading. It is a bit surprising that the Bible, which might be considered something of an authority, is not quoted so often as are the religious writings of the Hindus and the Chinese.

The book's strength lies in its educational doctrines, which are built upon the author's practical experience with children and a philosophy unobtrusively Freudian. The chapters that discuss the relations of teacher and parent to the growing boy and girl are excellent in their sympathetic understanding and practical advice. "To be insincere when instructing and guiding others over whom one has influence is in effect to be immoral." "An improving, advancing family is one in which the children as adults outstrip their parents." There is, incidentally, a eulogy of the nurses' training that is good to see. Throughout the exceedingly good chapters on how to excel as a mother and as a father runs the assumption that the parent is to serve as the lifelong model for his offspring's mate.

With the author's statement in mind that psychology is the science of self-mastery, it is interesting to read his chapter entitled *A Good Choice in a Marriage* and see how a psychologist would choose a mate. We learn that "love" is the one outstanding requisite. A man should

choose a girl who is careful in money matters, unselfish, not easily bored, and fond of children.

A subject of special importance is the method recommended for avoiding mental illnesses. The author promises that a study of your mind will explain the intricacies of your conduct. If you have a handicap—over-sensitiveness, fears, depression of spirits—you must seek the cause in a review of your own life. Let your thoughts run along in "free association" in a quiet and secure place. When there come halts, examine the thoughts just before the halt for painful memories. "If you are patient, you will ultimately find the provoking cause of the whole trouble, and with the finding and calm consideration of it, its power to trouble you will gradually disappear." The author gives illustrations to help you. Perhaps 25 per cent of your efforts at free association will not get a result; in such a case, go to a skilled analyst.

To avoid temperamental trouble, learn to make little decisions quickly, be pleasant, avoid self-pity and envy and daydreaming. Strike a balance between the ultra-conventional and the ultra-radical. Keep down the outside expressions of disturbing emotions and so diminish the bad internal effect. Develop an interest in other people and in hobbies. A last chapter is devoted to a very interesting group of quotations urging ethical and religious aims.

How can we know how many people need such a book? How adequate are the older ways of saying these things? Probably it is true that the general physician has not developed a method of dealing with mental handicaps—although his well-known "intuitive knowledge" may come into play at times—and that he and others may be helped by this book to see mental problems more clearly.

EARL D. BOND.

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OUR FEAR COMPLEXES. By Edward Huntington Williams and Ernest Bryant Hoag. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1923. 306 p.

There is definite need for such books as this—books, that is, that have for their serious purpose the matter of correctly informing the public regarding questions of mental health. There is such a mass of misinformation afloat, emanating often from pseudo-scientific sources and subtly set forth for purposes of exploitation, that even the intelligent reader may be misled. In the preface to *Our Fear Complexes* the authors state their aim in writing the book to be "to present their ideas on fear in relation to nervous disorders and character peculiarities . . . in a style not too difficult for any intelligent reader".



They have endeavored to anticipate the patient's needs, and with their stress upon the importance of wholesome self-education as to fear problems, have on the whole succeeded in putting out a helpful and reliable book.

The book is divided into two parts. Part I is presented under the general title of *Everyday Fears*. Here the authors make an exhaustive tabulation, mentioning, among others, superstitious fears, fear of insomnia, fear of high places, little fears and worries, sex fears, fears related to ambition, and so forth. While this enumeration of varieties of fears will enable the non-medical reader to appreciate some of the innumerable aspects his fears may assume, it seems to us that the authors do not always emphasize sufficiently the underlying anxiety state that gives rise to these manifold expressions. Emphasis upon the more fundamental etiology would, of course, involve an analysis of fear symbolizations, and so forth, which the general reader would not understand and which would lead into the field of abnormal psychology, a province that it is evidently not the purpose of the authors to investigate in this treatise. However, the case cited of the individual who had to be anesthetized in order to be brought down a mountain (page 34) because of his obsessive fear of the trail indicates a mental trauma too intricate and profound to yield to the simple therapy suggested by the authors. The inclusion of grave conditions along with those of simple character may tend to make the thoughtful reader question the soundness of the authors' position, which, generally speaking, is valid.

The authors bring out some excellent points in these chapters. Among other things, they emphasize the fact that "life is governed by emotions rather than intellect"; the part played by fatigue in the control of fears; and, later in the book, the intimate relationship between fears and ductless-gland anomalies.

Part I closes with a very brief chapter entitled *The Remedy*. Here the advice given as to the cure for these fears is easily understandable, aiming at restoration of confidence by suggesting explanations and by belittling the significance of such fears. The cultivation of a sense of humor is offered as efficacious therapy. Wisely, the authors advise, as elsewhere throughout the book, recourse to the family physician, or to the specialist, when the condition does not yield to the simple therapy placed at the patient's command.

Part II has as chapter headings: *Dreams, Fears, and the Modern Dream Doctor; From Freud to Coué; Fears Having a Sexual Basis; The Fears of Children; The Glands; The Habit of Fear; Cultivating National Courage*.

One grave flaw in the treatise is the fact that the work of Freud is

not given due appreciation. In a book for the general reader it would be obviously a waste of time to go deeply into Freudian mechanisms; yet it is misleading to group Freud with a "host of philosophers who have made the same observations throughout the ages", or to dismiss the matter of symbolization in dreams with the assertion that there is no unanimity (presumably among Freudians) in the interpretation of symbols. Whatever may be the personal attitude of the authors toward Freud, this exposition is on the whole derogatory as regards Freudian conceptions. When they quote as authoritative Dunlap's statement that Freudianism is only a new and somewhat thinly disguised form of mysticism, one wonders if they themselves have grasped the significance of Freud's contribution to modern thought. Do they realize how much they owe to Freud for the terminology employed throughout this book—for its title, even?

The chapter *From Freud to Coué* deals at considerable length with cure by suggestion, hinting at the similarity of method in miraculous cures from the Greek oracle down. Here Freud is passed with little direct mention, but again the inference is misleading, to say the least, implying that the mechanism of the cure is identical in the hands of Freud, Mesmer, Eddy, and Coué. The authors give a detailed account of the methods of Coué that is clear and well worth reading. However, the chapter leaves the impression that the writers find Coué's philosophy a happy expression of their own ideas.

With regard to the endocrine, or ductless glands, they make a good survey of the general well-known physiologic actions of these glands. They present the subject with warrantable enthusiasm, and establish their position by rather full quotations from Crile, Cannon, and others. They specify the bearing of these glands upon the body and mind sufficiently to indicate the practical rôle each plays in the production of conduct and bodily health, suggesting interestingly the probable relationship between glandular mal-function and crime.

*The Habit of Fear* deals with the mechanism of habit formation. The value of early mastery of primitive fears, which in civilized life have lost their original usefulness and may have an exactly opposite effect, is pointed out. The importance of this chapter is not to be measured by its brevity. It touches upon one of the most significant things in life—the relation of fears to habit formation.

Under the heading *Cultivating National Courage* the book urges the necessity of general education in matters that have to do with heredity and its bearing on public welfare, dealing with a subject still open to controversy even among the geneticists and eugenists. However, any exposition that will stimulate interest in this subject, with a recognition of what we know to date, will show its results in wiser

handling of the problems of criminality and feeble-mindedness. The authors make a clear statement of just what is meant by the term birth control.

The discussion of the fears of children is well worth the attention of parents and teachers.

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

C. C. WHOLEY.

**THE ACTION OF ALCOHOL ON MAN.** By Ernest H. Starling, Foulerton Professor, University College, London; with essays by Robert Hutchison, M.D., Frederick W. Mott, M.D., and Raymond Pearl, Ph. D. New York: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1923. 291 p.

In this carefully planned and well-written book the author gives a summary of present-day knowledge relative to the action of alcohol on man. His personal view of prohibition is set forth in the preface in these words: "The abolition of all alcoholic beverages from among our midst, even if carried out by universal consent, would be a mistake and contrary to the permanent interest of the race. If it were enforced by legislation against the wishes and convictions of a large proportion of the members of the community, I believe it would be little short of a calamity." It might appear, therefore, that the attitude of the author would disqualify him for the task of writing a dispassionate treatise on this mooted subject. From careful examination of the book, however, it is evident that the work is that of a scientist rather than a propagandist. The results of experiments and investigation are set forth as accurately as possible, regardless of their possible effects for or against regulatory laws.

The opening chapter deals with the history, manufacture, and composition of fermented liquors. This is followed by a discussion of the fate of alcohol in the body and a general review of the nature of foods, drugs, and poisons. After laying this groundwork, the author proceeds with the principal theme of the book and sets forth in order the effects of alcohol on human behavior, on fatigue, on digestion, on the circulation of the blood, on respiration, and on the regulation of the body temperature. Separate chapters are devoted to the effects of the immoderate use of alcohol, and the influence of alcohol on the community.

The conclusions arrived at are summarized in the closing chapter. Briefly stated, they are:

Alcohol is a food, but for the normal individual its food value is not of importance.

Alcohol is injurious in its effects, either when taken in immoderate doses or when taken repeatedly in excess over a long period of time.

An occasional debauch is not as harmful as the continual soaking of quantities of alcohol just short of the degree necessary to produce evident intoxication.

The relaxation of tension resulting from the narcotic action of alcohol on the highest centers of the brain may be of value in promoting repose after toil, in freeing a man from the cares and worries of the day's business, and in enabling him to digest and assimilate his food and restore his powers by sleep better than he would have done in the absence of such aid.

Three chapters are added as appendices. The first of these is a brief and rather unsatisfactory essay on alcohol as a medicine, by Dr. Robert Hutchison. The second is a more comprehensive treatise on alcohol and its relations to problems in mental disorders, by Dr. Frederick W. Mott. The third is a statistical review of alcohol and mortality, by Raymond Pearl.

Dr. Hutchison regards alcohol as a valuable drug and commends its use as an aid to digestion, as a tonic, and as a sedative and hypnotic.

Dr. Mott sets forth some old and crude statistics relative to alcohol as a causative factor in mental disease, and after showing their unreliability, proceeds to base his conclusions on evidence even less substantial.

His descriptions of the pathological effects of alcohol on different individuals are interesting, but the article as a whole constitutes a very inadequate treatment of the subject.

Professor Pearl reviews the work of actuaries and statisticians relative to the effect of alcohol on mortality and submits the results of his own extensive investigations; he discusses the consumption of alcoholic beverages and tea and coffee in this country during the period from 1870 to 1918 and compares the rate of such consumption with the population living under state-wide prohibitory laws in the census years. He also includes a section on the evaluation of supposed influences upon the duration of life, and another section on the influence of alcohol upon duration of life in animals.

This study is interesting, but not convincing. In discussing the annual per capita consumption of alcoholic beverages from 1870 to 1918, Professor Pearl fails to take into account the marked changes that took place during that period in the use of home-made alcoholic beverages, such as cider, elderberry wine, and so forth. No statistical data exist concerning the extent of the use of these beverages in the several years and consequently adequate comparisons of consumption of all alcoholic beverages during the various parts of the period are impossible. Professor Pearl's conclusion "that there has been no direct or causal relation between the consumption per head of alco-



holic beverages and the existence of laws prohibiting such beverages" seems unwarranted.

From his own investigations, Professor Pearl concludes that steady or heavy drinking shortens life, but that occasional or moderate drinking exerts no unfavorable influence on the length of life.

The book as a whole is worthy of careful reading, but it can hardly be used to sustain the opinions expressed by the author in the preface.

HORATIO M. POLLOCK.

New York State Hospital Commission.

SOCIAL WORK IN HOSPITALS; A CONTRIBUTION TO PROGRESSIVE MEDICINE. By Ida M. Cannon, R.N. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1923. 247 p.

This new edition of Miss Ida Cannon's well-known pioneer volume appears ten years after the original publication. A good deal of growth and development in hospital social work has taken place in that time, as the preface to the revised edition indicates. Hospitals that use organized social work have increased from about 100 in 1913 to about 400 in 1923; "such work is now accepted as an essential part of a modern hospital". Miss Cannon cites the survey made under the auspices of the American Hospital Association in 1920 in support of her statement that, while methods will be modified, "the principle is not questioned". "Important functions have been defined and the principles of organization worked out through experience. Although . . . the necessity for specialized training has been recognized, adequate provision for such education has not yet been made." There is a tendency on the part of the medical profession to recognize the value of special attention to social elements in treatment of the sick on all financial levels, and it rests with hospital social workers to promote a more general application of their service.

The opening chapters on history and hospital background, always important, have, naturally, been but little changed. Miss Cannon has had unusual opportunities to know at firsthand most of the "beginnings" and thus her record is in the nature of a source book for future historians. The whole book is, however, brief and highly untechnical, and presents such arguments and such material as will be easily assimilated by a non-professional public. This is one of its greatest points of value. It is a good book to hand to the friend who inquires, "Just what is this work you are doing?" as well as to the young doctor who asks if there is anything in print on this subject of medical social work.

The chapters on "medical-social problems" are not intended to be

exhaustive, but contain well-chosen illustrations and sound discussions of the types of cases commonly met in hospitals—involving communicable disease, lack of resources, mental and physical handicaps—with constant references to principles of social case treatment. A chapter is devoted to the groundwork of medical and social facts upon which treatment should be based, and one to the part that hospital social workers must play as one among many community agencies for service.

It is in the latter chapters that most new material has been introduced, particularly in relation to the future of hospital social work, in which connection Miss Cannon quotes surveys and studies recently made, and describes some of the developments of the past few years in the practice of medicine and in teaching. She predicts a fruitful field for medical-social research, in which but a small beginning has been made. We look for the 1933 edition to tell the world to what extent and in what manner this prognosis has been fulfilled and justified.

ANTOINETTE M. CANNON.

New York School of Social Work.

THE CHARITY ORGANIZATION MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY IN AMERICAN PHILANTHROPY. By Frank Dekker Watson. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1922. 560 p.

Professor Watson has made a painstaking effort to secure material upon which to base his scholarly book on the study of the charity organization movement in the United States, using excellent source material (as shown by his footnotes and bibliography), studying the Charity Organization Society in operation both through personal visits and through correspondence, and digesting this material in the light of his own personal experience as chairman of a district conference of the Charity Organization Society in Philadelphia. His book is not one to be lightly picked up; on the contrary, it demands real concentration. But it will command the attention of every social worker in the case-working field because it shows how, step by step, the principles and practices of the case-work methods of to-day have been built up.

In the introductory chapter, the Charity Organization Society is seen to emerge during the nineteenth century—an age of two opposing forces, one of machinery and the other of humanitarianism, manifested in the effort to change the condition of the poor through understanding.

The second chapter gives a résumé of the contributions of European leaders to the constructive handling of problems of poverty. French

influence is shown, first through the work of St. Vincent de Paul (1570-1660), who recognized that the giving of alms should include home visits to the poor, that begging should be discouraged, that there should be recognition of special classes (the sick, the aged, dependent children), and finally that trained visitors could best serve the poor; secondly, through the effort of Ozanam, the leader of a group of students who, meeting in the office of a Paris printer named Bailly (1823), to continue the work of St. Vincent de Paul, added to his concepts the principle that investigation was essential and that Paris should be districted, with a *conference in each district* to direct the effort of the friendly visitor and decide on the amount of relief to be given to each individual in need.

To German influence is traced the principle of *city districts* (Hamburg, 1711) with a central bureau to prevent overlapping; the concept of coöperation of church, police, and citizens (Münich, 1784); and the concept of *individualization* in treatment of the poor (Elberfeld, 1853).

In England the stand taken by Chalmers (Glasgow, 1821) toward public relief colored the thought of succeeding generations. While unable to swing the public opinion of his day to complete eradication of outdoor relief (public doles of clothing, food, or money disbursed by city or county officials to the poor in their own homes, as contrasted with indoor relief—i.e., institutional care in an almshouse, etc.) he did succeed in putting through his plan of organized social effort without public relief for the poor in a limited area of Glasgow. His doctrine of the "invisible relief fund of the poor which does not pauperize" has had a broad influence. From 1796 to 1864 there was a growing consciousness of responsibility for the poor shown by leaders of the day—e.g., Octavia Hill, Ruskin, and so forth—and in the interest taken by Oxford and Cambridge men. In 1869 the first C. O. S. was founded in London by C. S. Loch.

The C. O. S. movement abroad and in this country owes its origin to the constantly increasing number of beggars, and to a growing dissatisfaction with public relief and with the indiscriminate giving of doles on the part of charitably inclined individuals.

In the United States the movement toward constructive social betterment developed slowly, since pioneer conditions did not call for the same organized effort as the older civilization of Europe, with its concentration of population in large cities. The Reverend Tuckerman, of Boston (1834), was the first to see the relation between

poverty, inadequate wages, and seasonal employment. He *originated the idea of a social-service exchange* which has proven to be the keystone of good case work. By 1842 the first A. I. C. P. (Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor) was organized in New York as a protest against the work done by some thirty-odd agencies which had sprung up to meet the emergencies of an exceedingly severe winter. Although the "A. I. C. P. movement became the predominant charitable development in America for the next thirty years", beginning with real vision, it was doomed, according to the author, to eventual failure, since it gradually abandoned its progressive principles and degenerated into a relief agency.

At this point the author drops the historical thread to develop the theme of the functions, principles, and methods of the C. O. S. A more logical sequence would be obtained by a regrouping of the chapters dealing with the historical development (chapters 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9) and the chapters dealing with the theory and practices of the C. O. S. in operation (chapters 4, 5, 10, 11, 12, 13).

By 1883 there were twenty-five C. O. S. in the United States. In studying the history of these pioneer societies—the first in Germantown (1873), followed by others in Buffalo, Boston, Philadelphia, and New York—one is impressed by the courage of the social leaders in standing against the spread of public outdoor relief (one in ten persons in Brooklyn was receiving such aid in the winter of 1870) and also by the influence of one city upon another in developing standards of service, with slight variations, accounting for the differences in detail in the social practices of to-day. Relief was *never* to be given by the C. O. S. itself, but was to be secured through *already existing channels*, such as the church, employers, relatives, and charitable agencies. In this lies the *original* contribution to the movement—namely, the organizing of charity (called C. O. S.) to make help effective. The *modus operandi* was investigation, registration of cases, coöperation with the client, his relatives, and the social agency interested in him, and friendly visiting. But the mottoes of that day echo strangely to modern ears, with the New York C. O. S. saying, "United an army, divided a mob", and Boston, ever more intellectual, "Not alms, but a friend".

From 1883 to 1895 was a period of expansion from twenty-five to one hundred agencies, mostly north of the Mason-Dixon Line and east of the Mississippi, with emphasis laid on the organizing and educational aspects of the movement. The development was too rapid and therefore uneven, some agencies having high standards and some very low. The leaders found themselves handicapped by inability to secure adequate numbers of trained workers (there were no pro-



fessional schools for social work) and by the necessity of swinging many specialized needs (housing reform, the anti-tuberculosis movement, child problems) and thus being kept from developing better case-work procedure.

During the period 1895 to 1904, emphasis came to be laid on the preventive aspects of the work. The subcommittees caring for specialized needs (housing, and the like) sloughed their activities, which were launched independently, leaving the C. O. S. to develop its own legitimate field. The first professional school for the training of social workers was organized in 1904 (New York School of Social Work). The famous inter-city transportation agreement was entered upon, solving the problem of "passing on" the ne'er-do-well from one community to another. From rigid adherence to the doctrine that no relief was to be given under any condition by the C. O. S., relief now became included in the budget of many organizations.

During the period 1905 to 1921, the C. O. S. movement spread through the South and West. This also was a period of the nationalization of the movement, expressing itself in 1911 in the formation of the American Association for Organized Family Social Work, with a field secretary whose mission was to develop standards of work and to organize C. O. S. in new communities, such an organization often proving to be the only modern social agency in a city. At the same time the Russell Sage Foundation opened its research department for C. O. S. work. As the newly organized specialized agencies developed (hospital social service, children's aid societies, probation work, psychiatric social work, and the like) they took over the case-work method, thereby enriching it by discovering the relation between poverty and disease, poverty and feeble-mindedness, poverty and maladjustment of the individual. The Pittsburgh Survey (1907-1908) was made at this time largely through the inspiration of the C. O. S. movement. The professional attitude in social work expressed itself in the rapid growth of professional schools, but most revolutionary of all was the reversal of the attitude toward private and public outdoor relief as seen in the rapid enactment of widows' pension laws (1911-1921) in forty states, the assumption of public responsibility for relief as evidenced in the Iowa plan of combined public and private effort, and in the creation by the municipality of Los Angeles of the local C. O. S.

Of special interest are the pages devoted to the evolution of disaster relief in its relation to the C. O. S. movement. In 1842 the A. I. C. P. was launched to meet the needs of a severe winter. Later, in Cincinnati, Louisville, Lynn, and San Francisco, the C. O. S. was called upon to handle the emergency-relief problem. Like service was ren-

dered during the periods of great industrial depressions of 1873, 1893, 1907, and 1914. In 1873 the post-war problems, combined with the failure of Jay Cook, swamped the country and the old method of personal doles to the poor collapsed. The first C. O. S. in the United States (Germantown) was organized at this time. In 1893, wherever the memories of 1873 held over, good work was done by the local C. O. S. (notably in Philadelphia) in preventing the growth of mushroom societies, but wherever the public, egged on by the press, did not understand the lessons taught by past emergencies, much duplication of effort and needless suffering resulted (as in New York City). Certain outstanding contributions in social thought were evolved, such as the need of a trained constituency in times of emergency, of an intelligent public opinion, including the press, and of the danger of using public funds for relief. By 1907 many communities had learned to centralize their effort in the C. O. S., and cities following this plan suffered less than those in which indiscriminate giving flourished. In 1914 mushroom societies were universally "prevented", and a national conference of C. O. S. executives in New York City paved the way for much constructive relief through municipal undertakings (roads, parkways, and so forth) for the employment of men thrown out of their jobs by the industrial upheaval following the outbreak of the war.

But to return to chapters 4 and 5, which are the *real meat of the book*, showing the functions, principles, and methods of C. O. S. work which are threefold: first and foremost, the rehabilitation of families that for any reason fail to be self-sufficient; second, the education of the community in correct principles of relief; and, third, aid in the elimination of the causes of poverty. This discussion will probably prove to be of more service to those who are initiated in the art and practice of case-work than to the student. The latter will find it invaluable, however, to supplement classroom discussions of the theory of social case-work, since as a reference book for the history and principles of case-work it ranks without equal. The author gives the aspects of the steps taken in case-work procedure and the philosophy underlying these steps, instead of following the usual method of showing processes in case treatment by the use of illustrative material (only one case is used). The historical approach is maintained throughout and is very helpful in showing *why* different stages of accepted case-work technique in operation to-day have been developed. There are several excellent charts, dealing with social case-work procedure and with coöperation with other agencies.

Certain constructive suggestions are well developed, such as the need of limiting intake in order to keep up standards in work and

the scope and possibilities of volunteer service, the success of which is the barometer of the effectiveness, not only of the C. O. S., but in fact of all the social work in a community. The influence of the C. O. S. in a community through organizing central councils of social agencies—which have advanced the standards of social work and which in turn have developed into the dynamic force, “financial federation”—is well presented.

Chapter 10 is devoted to the renaissance of case-work (1905-1921) which was made possible through the sloughing off of special interests that had engulfed the C. O. S. during the previous decade. Coöperation between agencies in the highest sense was often achieved, and the technique of case-work embodied the contributions made by the specialized agencies. Through the American Red Cross Home Service, reaching practically every nook and cranny of the land, case-work became popularized.

In chapter 11 tests for efficiency applicable to any C. O. S. are outlined in great detail and may possibly prove helpful to a student or a board member who comes to a local C. O. S. with a fresh point of view, as they indicate what should be looked for.

Chapter 12 is a masterly treatise devoted to prejudices and criticisms of the C. O. S. itself as well as of the lay public, showing reasons for the position that a local C. O. S. may hold through failure, by reason of overwork, inadequate relief, poorly trained workers, inactive directors, or a poor use of volunteers, to match up with the standards in operation to-day.

In chapter 13 an admirable summary of the philosophy of the C. O. S. movement is given, leaving with the reader the larger concepts of the movement.

ELSA BUTLER GROVE.

Smith College School for Social Work.

YOUR HIDDEN POWERS. By James Oppenheim. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1923. 249 p.

The author in his foreword says: “During the several years I was a psychoanalyst, I was asked, by nearly every one who came to me, for a book on psychoanalysis which told what it was all about and was understandable, not merely to people already interested, but to people in general. There was no such book.”

The reviewer might close his review at this point with the statement that such a book as the author has described has still not been written. But this would be manifestly unfair to those who may benefit by the wisdom of the book and who might be deterred from reading it by such a statement.

The book is a compilation of articles which the author wrote for a "column" in a daily paper and represents an attempt to answer questions propounded by his readers. He has written in an easy, conversational manner, using the question-and-answer method and keeping always in mind the necessity for using simple language.

He holds out to inquirers the possibility of a promised land if they will only learn to know themselves. This has been done before in the popular New-Thought literature, but this author goes the necessary further step and tells his readers that this knowledge is to be obtained from psychoanalysis.

He then cautions against any but the best, and gives his concept of the qualifications of the analyst, which very rightly limits the practice of psychoanalysis to the chosen few. The reviewer agrees with the qualifications demanded, but would go one step further and add that the analyst should be a physician.

To return to the original criticism that an understandable book on psychoanalysis has not yet been written, it seems to the reviewer that the reason why the author has not written such a book is because it cannot be written. And it cannot be written for the same reason that one cannot explain algebra to the average ten-year-old child.

The author quite rightly realizes that to give his readers an understanding of what it is all about he must explain the theory of the unconscious. He gives Freud the credit for the discovery of the concept of the unconscious, and for the analytic approach, but considers his concepts too narrow and prefers the "collective unconscious" of Jung. The reviewer very much doubts whether the average reader without a philosophical and psychological background can possibly understand the analogies with which the author attempts to describe the unconscious.

This failure in no way reflects upon his literary ability. It is simply, as we have said, that he is attempting the impossible.

He reflects the philosophy of Jung in dividing people into types, and there is no doubt that the popularizing of this philosophy will be very welcome, for intimates of different types will now have an appreciation of the reason why they cannot understand each other.

The reviewer is doubtful, however, of the wisdom of putting before the public matters that are still in a hypothetical state, especially scientific matters of such deep significance as the workings of the mind. I am not at all sure that we can state definitely that the dream has a purpose, that the "collective unconscious" is the seat of all wisdom, and that all that one needs to do to get greater wisdom is to go down into the unconscious for it. Such effort may be fraught with considerable danger for some who may try it.



Running all through the book is the concept of the four types of humans. Every one who reads the book will be trying to make out the type to which he belongs and if he rightly understands the author, this can do much good.

Withal a very readable book which will have its greatest vogue among the thinking and intuitional types.

LOREN B. T. JOHNSON.

Out-Patient Department, St. Elizabeths Hospital, Washington, D. C.

PHYSIOTHERAPY TECHNIC; A MANUAL OF APPLIED PHYSICS. By C. M.

Sampson, M.D. St. Louis: C. V. Mosby Company, 1923. 443 p.

In his dedication the author states: "That the results secured by properly applied physiotherapy in the late war-reconstruction hospitals resulted in the conversion of thousands of physicians from a state of therapeutic pessimism to one of optimism cannot be denied and that a renaissance in therapy is now in full swing as a result is evident to any physician who attends the various medical meetings over the country." This would warrant his being classified, to use one of his own expressions, as a "therapeutic peptimist".

It is true that the problems that resulted from war conditions directed attention to the necessity for a more practical knowledge of the technique of physiotherapy on the part of men in the medical corps. One of the first questions that arose in regard to the equipment of the mental hospitals related to the installation of physiotherapy apparatus, and it eventually played a very important part in the treatment of psychoses and psychoneuroses.

Dr. Sampson very properly emphasizes the absolute necessity of proper technic in the therapeutic procedures advocated. He classifies these physical remedies as thermal, chemical, mechanical, and electronic. There are chapters on high frequency, diathermia, auto-condensation and non-vacuum electrode, the static modalities, and actinotherapy. He explains very thoroughly the technic of using the ultra-violet and X-rays, the galvanic, faradic, and sinusoidal currents. The book also covers massage and hydrotherapy. The application of physiotherapeutic treatment as applied to arthritis, locomotor ataxia, pyorrhea alveolaris, genito-urinary conditions, and hay fever is discussed in detail. The chapter on hydrotherapy includes a description of the whirlpool bath, the contrast bath, and the continuous bath. The subject of the continuous bath is covered in a paragraph of less than one-half of a page.

Unfortunately, there is very little in the book that has to do with the treatment of the psychoses or psychoneuroses, and for that reason

it will not be of any special value to the psychiatrist, aside from affording him full instructions relating to technic, which are, of course, well worth while.

JAMES V. MAY.

Boston State Hospital.

HEALTH AND THE HUMAN SPIRIT; A BIOLOGICAL STUDY. By K. W. Monsarrat. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1923. 132 p.

To catalogue and analyze the spiritual ills of mankind, to demolish various schools of philosophy, including James's pragmatism, and to outline a doctrine that will bring happiness and contentment to the individual and the world—and all within 132 short pages—is something of a task.

The author's text—though unacknowledged—is taken from the eighth chapter of the Gospel of St. John: "Ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free." These words of Christ are as true to-day as when first uttered, and may well be emphasized and elucidated. This little book would serve its purpose better, however, if the field plowed over were less extensive and the plowing deeper.

DONALD GREGG.

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THE NEW EDUCATION IN EUROPE. By Frederick William Roman. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1923. 271 p.

If one takes seriously the title of this book and the publisher's announcement, one will be disappointed. It is not primarily an account of the new education in Europe. It describes, rather, the origins of the present educational systems of Great Britain, France, and Germany, concluding in each case with a brief survey of the existing situation. But it deals essentially with *systems* of education, not with the new spirit and philosophy in education. The philosophy of education that has come to a clear expression in all European countries since the war, and that is finding embodiment in new curricula, in new methods of teaching and discipline, and in radical experiments in administration, Dr. Roman barely mentions. Indeed, his plan of treating each of the three nations separately conceals rather than reveals this unity of purpose and endeavor.

He finds no occasion, in a book of 271 pages on the new education in Europe, to mention educational experiments in Russia, Holland, Sweden, Belgium, Switzerland, or the new democracies of eastern and central Europe, where, according to many observers, most significant movements are in their beginnings. He devotes 87 pages to Great

Britain, but takes only 6½ pages to mention, much as would any reference book, some of the experimental schools. He writes primarily as an educational anatomist, not as an educational physiologist, and in consequence what many are most anxious to learn regarding the new education he refers to only in passing or relegates to a footnote.

Nevertheless, if one succeeds in controlling one's disappointment and is willing to read the book with a different purpose—namely, to understand the developments of the educational systems of these three countries—one will find a remarkably well-organized discussion. Dr. Roman's account of the origins of the English public schools as primarily institutions for educating "poor scholars", their gradual passing into the control of the upper classes, and the determining function they exercise in the present scheme of education, is most enlightening. Likewise his discussion of the forces and opposing theories of education struggling for the control of education in the French schools is well worth reading.

The book more nearly approaches its professed purpose as it unfolds, and when the reader reaches Germany, he is given a very adequate account of the effects of the revolution upon German education: the new status of the teacher, the changes in the curricula and organization of the schools, and the radical departures from tradition in the experimental schools. Even here, however, the interests of the anatomist predominate over those of the physiologist or the psychologist. The book has yet to be written that will discuss adequately that new educational philosophy in Europe which has overrun national boundaries and is finding channels of expression through international organizations and periodicals, which is calling for a more intelligent understanding of children and the conditions of child growth, which looks to new curricula, new methods of educational practice, a wider extension of educational facilities, a reform of secondary education, an improved status of teachers, and a more democratic form of school administration.

V. T. THAYER.

Ethical Culture School, New York City.

AMERICAN NERVES AND THE SECRET OF SUGGESTION. By Anne Sturges Duryea. New York: The Century Company, 1923. 256 p.

"Awful" is the only word necessary to sum up this book, in the opinion of the reviewer. Considered by itself it really deserves no further characterization, but because it is so amazingly representative of a host of other effusions of the same kind, we feel some altruistic responsibility for hoisting a danger signal to warn prospective, and especially neurotic, readers.

*American Nerves and the Secret of Suggestion* is dedicated "To the Turtle on Its Back". To the reviewer, at least, its entire tone is a hash of maudlin sentimentality, psychologic arrogance, and maundering babble. It reeks with the claptrap and hokum of the "practical psychologist" and its wretched style is replete with his jargon. The author in a foreword warns that "this is an unpretentious volume written between times and almost casually". We can quite agree on this at least. Every page bears out this modest truth, but we cannot share in Mrs. Duryea's placid confidence that "nervous people may find it useful in securing a better understanding of their condition and their needs, for themselves as well as for their families and friends".

A few selections almost at random will illumine the author's attitude toward professional ethics and other matters. On page 39, under the caption *The Futile Appeal to Will*, is found the following: "Conditions under which an appeal to the will proves to be futile are illustrated by the case of a physically healthy, but mentally disturbed youth who for reasons of his own took to his bed and turned his face to the wall. A physician and nurse were in attendance. The physician said to the nurse: 'The patient is just as well able to come and see me as I to come and see him. Get him to come. Keep his coming as an objective before his mind. Mention it to him every day until he does it.' There was a psychologist on the case *using suggestion in its technical form addressed to the unconscious mind in the dissociated state.* [Italics ours.] The psychologist said to the nurse:

"'As a matter of professional courtesy [sic!] I cannot countermand the physician's order; but the strong probability is that when the patient gets into action, he will not go to the doctor's office, and your urging it will perhaps delay his doing something else. Though he may not protest aloud when he refuses your appeal, he will silently register a protest in his mind which will strengthen the inner tendency already opposed to action.

"'If I have success in the work I am trying to do, it will be by stimulating the natural impulse toward activity, though not by suggesting any particular course. It will be through the liberation of inhibited motor processes, the stimulation to old, familiar lines of action, and a spontaneous desire to return to normal life again.'

"'After ten days the young man sat up in bed and said, 'I am going to the movies', a thing he had not done for two years. He did not go to the doctor's office or make any mention of doing so and he did go to the movies."

Of course poor old Coué must be dragged into the discussion, and Mrs. Duryea is especially anxious that our "shell-shocked" ex-service



men be "Coué-ed" en masse. "The boys who came out of the war with mental confusion, reversed automatic action, introversion, extraversion, or any of the other forms of war neurosis . . . might have made or might still make use of a hundred Coués if they were at hand. . . . There is undoubtedly ample work for Coué and others if they could get access [God forbid!] to the multitude of boys who are slipping beyond help in various institutions because some psychologic technique of reversal and reintegration is not put into operation" (page 74).

The author condescends to pat on the back the work of psychiatric social workers during the war: "There was valuable work on the part of the fine body of women who in the department of psychiatric social service tabulated in detail, took careful histories, followed up, did special social work; but very much more than this was needed in the way of technical psychological attention which in the widespread confusion was somehow overlooked" (page 76).

From her hallowed heights of superior psychologic wisdom a consoling word or two is dropped for the lowly physician. We even find, on page 100, the generous confession that "sometimes the very best results come and come only from a balanced and coöperative effort between the physician and psychologist. The practical [sic!] psychologist has no impulse to endanger any one by denying him the use of medicine or surgery or electricity or osteopathy or massage or anything that might possibly help. That restriction is not within his province and the agency he utilizes is too deeply and radically a part of nature to be seriously interfered with by physical agents."

Under the caption *The Secret of Suggestion* we hoped to find at last what the title promised, but after six pages of bewildering digression we gave it up. As in all other books of this character, an alibi is established against criticism or charges of muddled thinking. Thus on page 148 the "practical psychologist" informs us that "any one may cavil at our forms of speech. It is difficult to express these things [the technique of strengthening the will] if one grows too matter-of-fact. We need to be fluid in our thought to accept the parable and grasp the meaning. . . . If we are overburdened with scientific skepticism, various living examples come to mind who would joyously give their testimony and say that the experience of a strengthened, balanced will is a reality, whatever vague forms of speech we are obliged to use in describing it."

The "Primal Rest" is a procedure much endorsed. We confess we don't quite know what it is, but it must be something rather potent for on page 159 we are told: "A previous morphine user, if not a habitué, in rousing herself from a short period of such Rest, exclaims

as she gathers herself together with a look and manner of refreshment, 'Oh, it's so much better than morphine!'"

The book wanders on *ad nauseam* to a total of 256 pages. Competent and conservative psychologists and psychiatrists deplore the impression such a book as this gives to the public. If we are prone to complain that the man in the street fails to take seriously the hard-won knowledge of the psychopathologist, if we wonder why he scoffs and derides with tolerant amusement our efforts to bring about through mental hygiene a broader and more useful understanding of our mental mechanisms and motivations, the blame, to a serious degree, must be placed at the doors of such casual and misleading effusions as *American Nerves*.

GEORGE K. PRATT.

Massachusetts Society for Mental Hygiene.

**SEX WORSHIP AND SYMBOLISM.** By Sanger Brown, II, M.D. Boston: Richard G. Badger, 1922. 149 p.

This is the second edition of Dr. Brown's book. The greater part of the first three chapters appeared in the *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*.

In the chapter on simple sex worship, Dr. Brown points out that "psychiatry, during recent years, has found it to its advantage to turn to related sciences and allied branches of study for the explanation of a number of the peculiar symptoms of abnormal mental states. Of these related studies none have been of greater value than those which throw light on the mental development of either the individual or race. In primitive races we discover a number of inherent motives which are of interest from the standpoint of mental evolution. These motives are expressed in a very interesting symbolism. It is the duty of the psychiatrist to see to what extent these primitive motives operate unconsciously in abnormal mental conditions and also to learn whether an insight into the symbolism of mental diseases may be gained through comparison by study of the symbolism of primitive races."

This book deals with the sex motive, with its accompanying symbolism. In the primitive races the group is the unit, and the individual has little, if any, personality distinct from the group. Such a state gave rise to group thoughts and feelings that found expression in the loftiest of sentiments and the most earnest of religious beliefs. These motives or beliefs were developed and elaborated in a way quite beyond the mental capacity of any one individual or community. The early myths are examples of this. A racial motive became an integral part of each and every member of the group, and

in studying the evolution of these motives we are studying the evolution of the human mind. The feelings associated in primitive man with the instinct of reproduction were raised to the dignity of a religion and in this we have the worship of sex.

The author points out, by quotations from various ancient and more modern writings, that sex was at one time frankly and openly worshiped by the primitive races of mankind. He disagrees with those writers who claim that such worship was evidence of immorality and degradation, and points out that the ceremonies concerned with phallic worship were carried out with respect and solemnity. Reference also is made to sacred prostitution as a form of sex worship.

In the second chapter, on symbolism, attention is called to the fact that as civilization advanced, the deification of sex was no longer frank and open, but came to be carried on by means of symbolism, the use of which was due to an effort on the part of the originators to express the source of generative attributes under disguise; such symbolism was often understood only by the priests or those initiated into the religious mysteries. Sexual symbols can be found in most of the countries the early history of which is known to man. The generative organs were symbolized by objects of similar form or by some desirable quality of animal or vegetable life; the bull, snake, fish, fire and water, and the sun and moon were sexual symbols, worshiped with varying degrees of religious ceremony. Many of our present conventional symbols of art are very easily traced to ancient symbols of religion. It is pointed out by the author that "while this symbol may indicate a high degree of mechanical skill and execution, it does not follow that it expresses either deep or complicated intellectual processes". It is rather an indication of a comparatively simple intellect.

In the chapter on sun myths, mysteries, and decadent sex worship, the author points out that the most important myths, dramatically produced in the religious festivals, were sun myths and that the main object in the myths seems to have been to restore the lost God and permit his union with woman, a motive that was evidently of a sexual nature. In the early centuries of Christianity and in the Middle Ages, when the race had progressed from its primitive state and a simple conception of a deity failed to express all religious desires, while primitive phallic principles had lost their dynamic value, the symbolical sex worship and the mysteries ceased to exist as national institutions. They were continued, however, in secret through the formation of secret societies, in the rituals of which perversion and licentiousness became dominant. The author points out that such

ceremonies showed evidence of decadence and regression to a lower level.

In the chapter on interpretations, the author indicates the significance from a biological standpoint in mental evolution of the elaborate rituals of sex worship. It is shown that, whereas a more primitive form of religious ceremony in connection with nature worship was enacted to increase the food supply, phallic ceremonies were an expression of the desire for human reproduction. "Where the increase of the food supply is the main motive, the entire development and symbolism centers about articles of food and since in the phallic rites an entirely analogous development and symbolism centers about the generative organs, it is only reasonable to infer that the phallic rites have to do with the desire for children. In this we have the meaning of sex worship. It is primitive man's expression of a desire for the perpetuation of the race and so it represents a biological necessity, the earlier motive being for the preservation of the individual." As mental development continues, the nutritive and reproductive motives cease to be all-absorbing. Higher desires force themselves into consciousness and earlier motives are no longer outwardly expressed. The form of the early motives is retained, however; usages, symbols, and practices that have long ceased to be dynamic and whose meaning is entirely forgotten are still observed. So we see evidence of primitive racial motives cropping up in all sorts of ways in later civilizations. The individual goes through a somewhat similar development. The child with his daydreaming is analogous to primitive man. The author points out interestingly that "probably the child, by entertaining the thoughts of his future life, is preparing himself to some extent for future life". The individual in his further development shows at times in his moods and mental attributes and actions remnants of feelings and forces that were dynamic in childhood, again showing the analogy of individual and racial development.

Finally it is pointed out that psychiatrists have recognized for a number of years that certain mental states appear to be reversions to more primitive types of reaction. Just as the reversion to primitive sex ceremonies was evidence of decadence in the Middle Ages, so reversion in the individual to a primitive reaction is evidence of an undesirable regression, and the adult who lives in childlike fancies is showing an unhealthy reaction. Such individual failures of adaptation frequently occur during the adolescent period, the individual failing to continue that development which is desirable for himself and which was necessary for the race. In abnormal mental regressive states the symbolism of primitive man is frequently observed and



knowledge of racial symbolism is of value in understanding the individual symbolism.

Dr. Brown's book is a valuable contribution to psychiatry and should be particularly helpful in the interpretation of the acts and thoughts of those individuals who have regressed to a more primitive stage of individual and racial development.

CLARENCE O. CHENEY.

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**THE IMMIGRANT'S DAY IN COURT.** By Kate Holladay Claghorn. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1923. 546 p.

During the war and after, there has been a demand for unquestioning loyalty on the part of the immigrant, for "100 per cent Americanism". We have expected as a matter of course that the stranger within our gates should love our country and her institutions. We have not stopped to remember that when we go abroad, our own attitude towards a particular country is largely determined by our experience there, and that most of us know comparatively little about the hardships of the foreigner in America. Is his experience with our institutions such as to create in him a love for them and a readiness to sacrifice in their behalf? The Carnegie Corporation has tried to find out, in a series of ten studies covering the major phases of immigrant life.

The volume entitled *The Immigrant's Day in Court* has been particularly successful in describing the immigrant as he comes in contact with our government and its legal machinery. The author, Kate Holladay Claghorn, Instructor in Social Research at the New York School of Social Work, has utilized available published material in addition to making an independent study of the legal machinery in our Eastern and Middle-Western states as it affects the immigrant.

The result is an accumulation of data and case records which show clearly why so many foreigners fail to love our country or her institutions. The America they have seen is unlovely.

The problem resolves itself into governmental agencies unadapted and unresponsive to the needs of foreigners and immigrants, who are grossly ignorant of our customs, our language, our institutions, and who come very largely out of a background of poverty, autocracy, and superstition.

At the outset we are shown in detail the troubles of the immigrant in relation to his money, in getting it and in keeping it. The scores of ways in which he is defrauded are described. The cumulation of evidence in this chapter leaves one with perhaps a blacker picture than

is true for the average. For the author has not attempted to give us even a vague inkling of the proportion of foreigners who are so victimized, and this might alter the picture somewhat.

We are next introduced to the home troubles of the foreigner, mostly brought about by his abnormal sex life away from his native hearth and friends.

How misleading are the statistics that purport to prove the high ratio of crime among the foreign born is clearly pointed out. Taking into account considerations of sex and age, the criminal records show them no worse than the native born; this in spite of the fact that the environmental forces are, to them, more unfavorable and the recourse to law more difficult. For instance, the following case illustrates the dire consequences of a lack of understanding on the part of the American police. "A Pole, deserted by his wife, who had gone to live with another man, made three successive visits to the police station to inquire what he could do in the matter. The police gave him no satisfaction at any visit, and, in despair of getting his wrong redressed in any legal way, he took the matter into his own hands and shot his wife and her lover."

We are led through the maze of corruption and trickery that surround the immigrant as he approaches the courts. Politics are shown to be extremely influential with judges. The foreigner from his experience is led to feel that the judges and district attorneys are unsocial in their viewpoint and unfair to him. One says, "In the eyes of the judges all the foreign born are liars." The reader is made to realize how much the human peculiarities of the judge enter into his decisions. For example, in an accident case, one judge refused to hear the testimony until the foreigner who had been hurt should learn English.

Perhaps one of the most valuable chapters in the book is that which depicts the foreign workman who is brought into court as a result of labor conflict. Here is a relatively uncharted legal field, bristling with technicalities and moot questions. The attitude and practice of one judge is totally at variance with that of another, and the immigrant feels that he is not getting justice. Many judges are shown to be afflicted with a definite class bias in lawsuits between capital and labor. For example, the attorney for certain employers engaged in strike litigation admitted quite frankly "that decisions in strike cases were influenced by the prejudice of the court". A strong illustration of this is cited in Cincinnati, where Judge Bell ruled that there was no clothing strike because the Amalgamated Clothing Workers are not members of the American Federation of Labor. In the strike at Lawrence, Massachusetts, the local court appears to have been par-

ticularly biased, for the majority of all labor cases which were appealed to a higher court were either reversed or dropped by the district attorney.

Probably the least satisfactory chapter is that which details "special provisions of law relating to the aliens". The treatment is extremely brief and many important discriminatory laws are not mentioned.

As a result of the war, America suffered from a red hysteria which culminated in the arrest of over five thousand "red" foreigners and the deportations of 1919-1920. Perhaps the best and most authentic treatment of this phase of public policy and its effect on the immigrant is found in Miss Claghorn's book. It is a record that should make every honest American ashamed.

In the final chapter, the work of the various agencies that give legal aid to the immigrant are briefly described. The shortcomings of the legal-aid societies are well outlined. It seems especially unfortunate that almost all of them fear to avail themselves of publicity, because they lack the funds to handle the cases that would arise as a result of it. The consequence is that thousands of foreigners are ignorant even of the fact that such potential help is available.

Throughout the book, the author has attempted to picture actual conditions rather than to outline constructive changes. This tends to make more vivid the realization of what is really happening to-day. One is forced to the conclusion that in so far as the operation of the law affects the immigrant, our American judicial machinery is woefully inadequate. It also seems apparent that by far the greater number of real Bolsheviki, if there are such in America, have been created here, the product of our own carelessness, indifference, and selfishness.

No review of the book can do it complete justice. It is a veritable storehouse of case histories which shed light not only on the actualities of our American democracy, but on the powerful influence of the economic and social environment on the individual. No one who wishes to be fully informed about the life of the immigrant in America can afford to neglect it.

JEROME DAVIS.

Dartmouth College.

STUTTERING, LISPING, AND CORRECTION OF THE SPEECH OF THE DEAF.

By E. W. Scripture, M.D., Ph.D. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1923. 290 p.

This second edition of Dr. Scripture's book is somewhat of a disappointment. Those of us interested in speech disorders had hoped

that he would embody in this new edition some of his latest researches concerning stuttering and cognate speech disorders. The second edition, however, is a word-for-word and page-for-page reprint of the first edition published in 1912, with the addition of Part IV, which concerns itself with new methods of speech training for the deaf. The reprinted part is divided into three parts: Part I is devoted to stuttering, and includes five chapters: *Description and Cause of Stuttering; Symptoms, Forms, and Nature; Diagnosis; Therapy; and Methods of Treatment*. This part covers 74 pages and consists of a brief and necessarily superficial discussion of some of the factors concerned in stuttering.

Part II deals with lisping, and also contains five chapters, one introductory, and the other four discussions of (1) negligent lisping, (2) organic lisping, (3) neurotic lisping, and (4) cluttering.

Part III is concerned with exercises. Dr. Scripture includes eighteen exercises which he uses along with other measures for the treatment of stuttering. These exercises are helpful to the teacher and physician. The principles involved in them are used by most of those who treat patients suffering from speech disorders. These exercises have to do with the following:

Breathing	Enunciation and	Telephoning
Melody	spelling	Talking with people
Flexibility	Expression	Relaxation
Slowness	Confidence	Muscular control
Smoothness	Spontaneous speech	Word lists
Voice quality	Thinking	
Starting and ending sentences	Description and relation	

The new part of the second edition consists of the description of a machine, the strobilion, which is designed to help the deaf develop normal speech. Another apparatus for the same purpose is the organ trainer. This is similar to a machine used in physics laboratories. A person speaks or sings into a mouthpiece, and by means of a flexible diaphragm gas is made to issue in waves and the flame thus repeats the vibrations of the voice. When the flame is observed in a revolving mirror, the vibrations can be seen separately. The organ trainer consists of two flame boxes placed close together. One of these is connected with an organ in such a way that the vibrations of the reeds are communicated to the flame. The person sings into the other box, and when the mirror is turned, two bands of vibrations are seen. It is easy to make the deaf child understand that his vibrations must match the organ vibrations. In this way the pitch of the voice of the



deaf child can be trained. The strobilion and the organ trainer are, I understand from teachers of the deaf, of great value in teaching normal speech to the deaf.

In the preface to his second edition, Scripture states that "stuttering is not a defect of the nervous mechanism of speech", and that its characteristics are not difficulties of articulation: "Stuttering is a disease of the mind; not a defect of the body." He also says: "Comparison of stutterers with persons having other mental peculiarities shows that the trouble is connected with the emotions. *It is a psycho-neurosis whose essential is the unconscious desire to avoid human society, and whose mechanism consists in using ridiculous speech as a means of obtaining the desired isolation.*" This is undoubtedly true and is the essential fact with regard to stuttering. To put it another way, the stutterer is unable to adjust himself to social situations which require speech.

Dr. Scripture points out that he uses the various exercises only as a means to restore confidence. He emphasizes the fact that mechanical or ignorantly performed exercises are injurious. The exercises, he points out, must always derive much of their efficacy from the personality of the teacher. He says: "Great successes can often be achieved by the exercises alone, used in proper surroundings by a particular teacher." It is true that the symptom of stuttering can often be relieved by such methods, but it is doubtful whether the successes so attained really influence and modify profoundly the personality of the patient.

Dr. Scripture states that he formerly used the Freudian form of psychoanalysis in combination with treatment by exercises and change of surroundings. He says: "Recently I have adopted certain modifications and somewhat improved methods of analysis, by which it is possible to get more quickly at the stuttering complex." It is to be regretted that he did not include a discussion of his improved methods in this new edition. Finally he makes the statement: "Psychoanalysis without exercises is useless for stuttering." This has not been our experience. Fully one-quarter of the cases that we have treated have been entirely cured through mental analysis (we reserve the word "psychoanalysis" for those who use the Freudian technique exclusively) without any exercises at all.

To those teachers and physicians who have not read the first edition, this second edition is to be recommended. Teachers of the deaf will be especially interested in Part IV.

SMILEY BLANTON.

University of Wisconsin.

**HYPNOTISM AND SUGGESTION.** By Louis Satow. Translated by Bernard Miall. New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1923. 290 p.

The average reader nowadays is not likely to be attracted by a book on hypnotism and suggestion. The subject has been so extensively explored that the title conveys no new thought; one wonders why the public is asked to read another book on this question. The answer, in the case of the present volume, is to be found in the last five chapters, in which Dr. Satow outlines his views on religion, politics, monarchism, militarism, and war. In short, he tells what is wrong with the world and suggests a remedy.

The history of hypnotism and suggestion is very concisely outlined up to and including Coué. Considerable space is devoted to technic; the reader is not left floundering about with broad principles and generalities—he is told how to hypnotize. Some of the therapeutic claims of hypnotism appear a bit extravagant, but no more so, perhaps, than the claims made by the older writers. The exponents of psychoanalytic therapy will choke a bit on the author's theory of dreams—to wit: "Because many parts of the brain are asleep or because the parts by which they would otherwise be connected with the waking portions are obstructed, dreams appear distorted, confused, illogical, and inconsequential."

The author traces in a most interesting way the mass suggestion underlying the various psychic epidemics, both religious and otherwise—the Crusades, the dancing mania, the flagellation mania, witchcraft, religious revival meets, and the like. Here the theologians will be shocked to read that "Jesus was a wandering psychotherapist of the purest water, who was skilled in the thoroughly perfected art of producing the results of intensive suggestion in the individual no less than in the crowd". But an even bolder stroke is to be found in the concluding paragraph of the book: "It is, to be sure, a difficult task to free mankind from superstition, ignorance, and internal servility. But there is one excellent method—the complete and final renunciation of all belief in another world and the training of mankind from youth upwards in an atmosphere of free, unprejudiced, critical, scientific thought."

It appears, then, that what is wrong with the world is, in a word, suggestion and that the cure lies in independent thinking. Whatever of truth man has acquired, he has gained from independent, unprejudiced thinking, but not without sharp disagreement and bitter strife. Every step has been hotly contested. When, if ever, ultimate truth is gained, there will be agreement, and war will be impossible. This sounds a bit utopian—indeed, the possibilities for universal peace by

this method seem so far off that it is doubtful whether Mr. Bok would consider it a practical plan.

The author has magnified the possibilities of suggestion for good or bad to a degree that is almost alarming. All the same one cannot help feeling that his premises are sound. The book is an interesting and valuable contribution.

HARRY N. KERNS.

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**SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY.** By Robert H. Gault, Ph.D. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1923. 336 p.

Enthusiasm in science may easily give the impression of dogmatism. The author of *Social Psychology* recognizes this and in his opening sentence tells us that it is most important that students of psychology maintain an open, interrogative mind. The book throughout stresses the fact that psychology is still developing and in spite of its popularity and present utility is as yet in no position to pronounce final judgment upon most of the fascinating subjects it now treats. The book impresses the reader with its tolerance and its catholic attitude. It shows familiarity and sympathy with the so-called new psychology without disclosing in any degree the zeal of the missionary. As one would expect, the book also reveals the author's great interest in criminology. It furnishes the general reader a discriminating entrance into social psychology.

Social psychology is defined as a study of the "reactions of members of the human race one to another". It is social behavior, conscious or unconscious, for the purpose of adjusting the organism to its whole environment, psychic and physical. Social behavior is instinctive, but is not a collection of instincts. The basic instinctive material is woven into a complex web of habits. These habits are shaped by the social influences, and this makes possible the unity without which society cannot exist. When this instinctive or impulsive groundwork of a personality is stunted or warped or associated with lack of capacity, we have a defective individual who cannot reasonably adjust. These failures of social assimilation and interaction concern the social psychologist. The science must give attention to all differences that affect social unity, whether due to variations in intelligence, racial characteristics, or class experiences. Following this program, the author applies psychological analysis to a variety of the practical problems of everyday life. Keeping close to practical interests, Professor Gault analyzes in their relation to group unity and social welfare such problems as differing intellectual levels and psychic stability of the population, the racial factor, suggestion and

suggestibility, the crowd, convention, custom, morals, social progress, potentiality for the development of civilization.

The book overflows with sane comments that enthusiasts and propagandists, with their love of overstatement, need to heed. Professor Gault's discussion of the social value of the intelligence level (pp. 76-78) is one such. Another is his treatment of heredity and the uncertainty of eugenic determination (pp. 80-83).

The author takes his place among the optimists: "Let there be but increased motivation and, with our knowledge of human nature as it is, we can enormously increase the quantity and quality of our output even in the face of unaccustomed complexities." He does not blink, however, at the serious obstacles that at present hamper: "The very hub of social progress, then, is a growing psychic background of such a quality that the people who possess it are growing daily more and more capable of mutual understanding and coöperation, and more and more inclined thereto. Practically, we may be permitted to say that social progress is the increasing occurrence amongst the personnel of a community of sympathetic coöperation toward a common goal. This is equivalent to the statement that social progress is always a slow, gradual process. There are accelerations and retardations, as in all processes of growth and decay, but these are never sensationally abrupt like a flash from the clear sky. The great political campaign, the stirring religious revival, the war craze sweeping the land, are not progress, but ripples upon the surface of the great silent current of progress or reaction in every normal personality, occasioned by a leader's or agitator's interference with its accustomed course."

ERNEST R. GROVES.

Boston University.

REMEMBERING AND FORGETTING. By T. H. Pear, M.A., B.Sc. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1922. 242 p.

It is no easy task for a scholar to present scientific material to the "general public" in a popular style. Especially is this true when the results of scientific investigation are still in the controversial state, so that the author, if he be honest, must show both or several sides of the story. The "general public" would prefer to wait until the scientists have threshed out among themselves the difficulties and formulated some didactic phrase that could be easily understood and applied to any and every situation. If one is looking for catch words and Couésisms in this little volume on remembering and forgetting, one will be sorely disappointed.

Professor Pear states that the interest of the general reader is to



be kept in mind throughout the book, and certainly in the first chapter the style and treatment of the matter is well adapted to that purpose. The author is original and delightful in the many illustrations and analogies that he uses to make clear his various points, nor does he at any time sacrifice scientific fact to the temptation to fanciful elaboration. But the feat of popular writing combined with careful scientific thinking cannot long be sustained, and after the first chapter he gradually loses sight of the general reader, and especially in his discussion of imagery and his allusions to the famous "imageless thought" controversy, it is necessary to be fairly familiar with recent literature on the subject to follow him intelligently.

Psychologists, glancing at the title of the book, will wonder where the author stands, what is his method of approach, and whether or not he has anything new to offer on a subject that has for so many years been one of the richest fields for experimental research. In answering these questions one might say in the first place that the author is attempting to straddle two fences, both of which have hitherto displayed rather prominent "no trespassing" signs. These two fields are behaviorism and psychoanalysis. The middle term that serves as a bridge may be said to be the "image". The image is the meaningful side of the physiological or neurological stimulus-response reaction.

In regard to method of approach, the author examines introspective psychology, which concerns itself with the function of imagery, and objective experimental methods, such as those used by Ebbinghaus and others interested in studying memory in a quantitative way. He finds the psychological approach inadequate, since the factors of frequency, recency, and intensity do not explain the ability to recall seemingly insignificant details. He examines the experimental work of Rivers and Head, discussing particularly the latter's idea of fusion. He finally classifies material which is forgotten into the three following categories:

1. Embodied. (The meaning of this term is not quite clear, but approaches "fused" as a synonym.) Two types of experiences are "embodied": (a) those that are apparently insignificant, (b) those that are significant, but completely congruous with the personality.

2. Exiled. Forcibly barred.

3. Superseded. "Retired." ("Our own dead selves.")

In the chapters on dreams, he again approaches the style of the popular writer. He sets forth particularly the views of Freud and Rivers, with a detailed analysis of one of his own dreams, which shows that in this field, too, he is attempting to take the middle road. Nothing new is brought out here, but the material is well presented and makes interesting and instructive reading.

The last four chapters of the book—*Synæsthesia*, *Number-Forms*, *The Respectability of Muscular Skill*, and *The Significance of Experiments* (a description of Head's experiments on nerve division and posture perception)—are in the form of an appendix, since they do not relate directly to the general theme or to each other from the point of view of continuity or development. The chapter on the respectability of muscular skill is particularly interesting. The author makes a plea for the acceptance in the family of the "intelgentia" of those "motile" individuals who interpret life through movement of muscles, joints, and tendons rather than through the organs of seeing and hearing. Kinæsthetic imagery is part of intelligence as well as visual or auditory. The case of Helen Keller is cited as an apt example.

On the whole, the book is very readable. Psychologists will wince at a few significant oversights, the general reader will at times find himself wandering in a forest whose trees are scientific terms, but certainly all will agree that it is an honest attempt to bring before the public some of the many factors involved in the complex processes of remembering and forgetting.

SADIE MYERS SHELLOW.

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**DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT OF YOUNG SCHOOL FAILURES.** By Helen Thompson Woolley and Elizabeth Ferris. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1923. 115 p. (Bureau of Education Bulletin, 1923, No. 1.)

The psychologist who is constantly called upon to diagnose and map out a plan for treatment in the case of the child who is failing in school, and the teacher who undertakes to carry out the suggestions in a classroom for special work, should both read this excellent monograph. It contains reports of sixteen cases that were given medical and psychological diagnoses at an early age and placed in a special class in the Cincinnati school system. The difficulties under which the work was carried out and the interesting results obtained in spite of obstacles will offer encouragement to others who are encountering similar difficulties in the study and treatment of atypical children in the usually overcrowded public-school system.

Although handicapped by insufficient social service for making thorough home studies or undertaking family case-work, some knowledge of the home background of the children was obtained by the one social worker and the class teacher. The medical and psychological study was adequate, and fears, repressions, conflicts, and the like, were taken

into account, as well as mental age and I. Q. Miss Ferris' account of the methods of teaching employed offers a valuable supplement to the case studies.

PHYLLIS BLANCHARD.

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THE MECHANISM OF LIFE; IN RELATION TO MODERN PHYSICAL THEORY.

By James Johnstone. New York: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1921. 248 p.

This is an excellent little book, dealing with a great many of the fundamental conceptions of life. Much of it is very clearly and simply written and can be easily understood by the average lay reader. Other parts, however, presuppose a considerable knowledge of physics, chemistry, biology, and mathematics. A great many apparently diverse topics are covered, ranging all the way from some of the simple conceptions of physics to some of the most obscure conceptions of metaphysics.

In general, the book may be said to deal with the physical organization of living beings, the production of energy, some nervous physiology, and some psychology.

Chapter VIII, the analysis of behavior, is a particularly stimulating chapter to the psychiatrist. Certain conceptions are brought out in regard to mental disease and the evolution of behavior. The author discusses the fact that "both in decerebrate dogs and cats painful stimulation elicited expressions of anger, but no caressing could invoke any indication of pleasure or affection", and there was apparently no dreaming. This is explained on the basis that altruistic feelings are the result of the herd instinct and are to be "interpreted as inhibitions or checks upon the natural predatory and highly individualistic modes of behavior". According to the author, "a study of social evolution and of mass psychology impels one to the conclusion that what we recognize as 'good' is mostly the inhibition of what we may call the lower animal instincts that are in us".

There is but little to criticize unfavorably in this book. However, the chapter on brain and nerve speaks of ten pairs of cranial nerves, although the illustrations show twelve.

On the whole, the book is to be recommended to all those interested in a study of life and behavior.

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CHARACTER AND THE UNCONSCIOUS: A CRITICAL EXPOSITION OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF FREUD AND OF JUNG. By J. H. Van der Hoop. Authorized Translation by Elizabeth Trevelyan. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1923. 223 p.

This volume of the International Library of Psychology, Philosophy, and Scientific Method surveys the principles of Freud and of Jung with much better balance than do most of the popular books on psychoanalysis. Van der Hoop, who writes as the result of nine years' study of psychoanalysis, points out how amateurishness in the application of psychoanalytic principles may easily cause very serious mistakes. In *Character and the Unconscious* he has not given a detailed description of psychoanalytical technique or of the sources of the various neuroses. The origins of psychoanalysis, the unconscious in the normal mind, and the development of the emotions are considered in the first three chapters. The three remaining sections are devoted to the analytic and the synthetic points of view, psychological types, and the relation between the conscious and the unconscious.

The origin of hysteria the author describes as a conflict of vitally important impulses which results in the repression of the one among them concerned with sex, using the term in its widest sense. He adds that it would be foolish to attempt the cure of patients of this type by providing them with direct sexual satisfaction, because of the complexity of their emotional life.

The determining factors of a neurosis due to repression are set forth as, first, a difficult and inharmonious disposition and, second, a tendency to repress too much due to a mistaken ideal. A high ideal may, however, provide a great support in a person's development, provided the ideal is in sufficient harmony with the individual's disposition and potentialities.

Brief consideration is given to the mechanism of forgetting, to slips of the tongue and pen, and to dreams. There is a sketch of Freud's work on the origin of the emotions. Development is depicted as adaptation to the lack of freedom that exists in the world.

The book is intelligible until the divergence in the theories of Freud and Jung is reached under the heading *The Analytic and the Synthetic Points of View*, when mysticism becomes prominent. Freud, a determinist, considers that environment is the chief formative influence in the growth of the human mind, although inherited characteristics may modify the process. Van der Hoop, who accepts Jung's creative indeterminism, on the other hand, concludes: "We are led to believe that life possesses some inherent force which, notwithstanding all the varying influences of surrounding circumstances, follows



its own principle of development, and makes use of circumstances only in so far as they can be made to agree with this principle." Jung and others of the Zürich school pay special attention to the sublimating process and emphasize synthesis rather than analysis. Scientists in general, Van der Hoop admits, will feel inclined to hold the determinist theory rather than the idea of an intervening, independent, creative force.

The basis for Jung's psychological types is the academic psychology—which presents mind as an entity divisible into various functions—as distinguished from dynamic psychology and, of course, from behaviorism. The academic background for Jung's types is well depicted in the definition of sensation as "the psychic function that draws the perceptions into the conscious mind . . . an element in the mental image".

Persons are grouped as introverts or extraverts according to their predominant mental attitude and are then designated by the name of one of four primary functions. The two irrational or empirical functions are sensation and intuition, which provide the material for the psychic event, and the two rational functions are thinking and feeling, which sort and organize the conscious material of the mind. The description of the characteristics of the persons of the eight types are comprehensible and interesting. It is understood that there are no clear lines of demarcation between the types. May this understanding continue and individuals be considered as variants!

The relation between the conscious and the unconscious is set forth in terminology that is not clear to an experimental determinist. There is an important concept that all one's past experiences may influence the present, although one may be unconscious of the motivation.

The book merits circulation as an elementary exposition of the psychology of Freud and of Jung.

ARCHIBALD S. DEAN.

The National Committee for Mental Hygiene.

MIND IN ACTION; A STUDY OF HUMAN INTERESTS. By George H. Green. London: University of London Press, 1923. 166 p.

This little book is another addition to that rapidly growing group of works which has been placed on the market during the last few years with the aim of helping the laity to an understanding of the psychology of everyday life and of the vaguer problems of abnormal psychology as manifested in nervous and mental ailments.

The author states that the incentive for writing this volume was the popular approval and interest shown in a lecture that he gave to a

group of publicity men and laymen on the subject of advertising. In the lecture he made use of his knowledge of the principles of genetic psychology, as developed by Professor Freud and his confrères, to demonstrate the dynamic power of human interests.

Successful advertising, he explains, brings compensating results solely because the methods employed appeal to something in each individual that formerly was dormant, but that, when aroused, manifests itself by desire and craving directed toward the attainment of the advertised article. He demonstrates that this interest is nothing new—is not something that has been created—but that it is a force, which, when stimulated and directed toward a certain desired goal, is a powerful element in successful business. In this manner he lays the foundation for an understanding of the properties of the unconscious mind, which contains other powerful forces analogous to human interests. In a very admirable manner, in one chapter, he discusses the primitive instincts as these dynamic forces, and the incidents in each individual's life and environment as the stimulating media which act, as do advertising media, to furnish opportunities for the outlet of these forces in cravings and desires.

The new psychology, as handled by writers of similar works, has created unwarranted antagonism in many minds, and morbid curiosity in many others, because of the prominence given to the sexual instinct as the main driving force that motivates all human conduct. This author finds it unnecessary to give this instinct such prominence; in fact, he is able to develop all of his theories with only a casual reference to it. In spite of this fact it would appear that the most ardent Freudian student will find very little material in the work that he can criticize.

That the purpose of the book is a very comprehensive one may be judged by a glance at the index of chapters which contains, beside the material outlined above, a preface and an epilogue and chapters on the place of reason, suggestion, auto-suggestion, daydreaming, the outcropping of interest, bias, dreams, memory, forgetting, repression, personality, fears, symbols, and identification and projection. It is readily apparent that the scope of the work is too great to allow more than a few pages to the discussion of any one topic. If there is any criticism to be made, it is of this conciseness; the paragraphic type of writing tends to become very tiresome.

Directed as the book is to the average reader—written in simple, understandable language, with no scientific phraseology—it makes a very commendable primer for the beginner in this line of study; also to those who are interested in the motives of human conduct and allied social problems. A more advanced reader will find nothing

new in it, but will readily appreciate it as a statement of the elementary principles of psychology viewed from a slightly different angle.

Morris Plains State Hospital, New Jersey.      ARTHUR G. LANE.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MISCONDUCT, VICE, AND CRIME. By Bernard Hollander, M.D. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1923. 220 p.

This book is not worth reviewing, and would not be worth mention at all were it not for the fact that the author has previously demonstrated his ability in that strangely labeled, two-volume encyclopedia, *In Search of the Soul* (to which he refers many, many times in this small book). It is surprising that so discreet and judicious a publishing company as Macmillan should publish so fatuous and sterile a book on so timely a subject.

The following is typical and needs no comment: "But since there is no definite knowledge of the 'mental' functions of the brain . . . and since there is no agreement whether one can tell the size and shape of the brain by the size and shape of the head, there is no information available as to what constitutes a good or bad head, except that supplied by phrenology . . ."

The author goes on to say that phrenology has long been considered dead by scientists, but that this opinion is based upon popular rather than scientific observations, referring in the latter category to an article he relies upon in the *Encyclopedia Britannica*. Then he says that he has seen "many children adopted by good people and brought up with the utmost care who have turned out bad in later years. They had abnormal types of head. And the moral I want to draw is that no child should be adopted without a strict medico-psychological examination."

What possible connection there is between these three sentences, I leave to the ingenuity of my readers.

The book is full of erroneous theories and erroneous emphases. There is much talk of curing, and of head injuries as the cause of crime. Excellent, although already well-established, points are made in abundance, but they are scattered among so much banality, fatuity, and positive error that the book is certainly capable of doing much more harm than good. Some of it reads like a caricature of *What Every Girl Should Know*. For example, "Thus a man who was carried away by his instincts to make an assault on a girl . . . confessed to me that she saved herself by the exclamation, 'How would you like this to happen to your sister!'"

"Well-developed young women are very prone to have an unusual amount of sex feeling . . ."

"It is only the repentant sinner who visits the consulting room."

Judging from this book, one concludes that the science of criminology is far more retarded in England even than in America; one concludes also that the Macmillan Company should subscribe to MENTAL HYGIENE.

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MEASURING MINDS; AN EXAMINER'S MANUAL TO ACCOMPANY THE MYERS MENTAL MEASURE. By Caroline E. Myers and Garry C. Myers. New York: Newson and Company, 1921. 55 p.

This is one of the flood of new intelligence tests that have come out of the army experience. That fact is not sufficient to commend it, but if all the claims of its authors can be substantiated, it may well meet a need for a certain type of test hitherto unavailable. Briefly, its advantages are these:

1. It is a group test which can be given to a roomful of as many as 100 conveniently.
2. It is a performance test, composed exclusively of pictures, thus eliminating to a large extent the language and schooling factors that enter into the results obtained with many intelligence tests.
3. It is brief, consisting of but four tests, with but fifty-one parts in all. It can be given in fifteen minutes. Time limits are set for each test.
4. It has a wide range, yielding mental ages corresponding to intelligences of all grades from Grade I to college seniors. Each part is graduated to provide tasks ranging all the way from the very easy to the very difficult.
5. The methods of giving and scoring the test are simple, but accurate.

6. It correlates .80 or above with the Stanford revision of the Binet.

The authors give norms by grades and ages for 15,241 cases. Most tests have been based on a much smaller number than this. They have also devised an "intelligence ratio"—namely, the raw score divided by the chronological age in months.

Perhaps the chief criticism that comes to mind is the meagerness of the attributes tested. Test I is a directions test, similar to Test I of Army Alpha. Test II is a missing-parts test, such as was used in Beta. Tests III and IV are both "common elements" tests on the analogy of certain Binet material, but composed entirely of pictures. Whether these are sufficient to give a satisfactory measure of a complex phenomenon like native intelligence may be questioned, though the correlations given seem to be in their favor.

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